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ABSTRACT
THE WAY TO GOD OR GOD’S WAY TO US:
THE THEOLOGIES OF EDWARD FARLEY
AND JAMES MCCLENDON
IN CRITICAL DIALOGUE
Thomas W. Harrington, B.A., M.Agr., M.Div.
Marquette University, 2011
A lively theological debate in recent decades has been the dispute over
theological method between “revisionist” and “narrativist” theologians. To explore and
evaluate this debate I consider the work of “revisionist” theologian Edward Farley and of
“narrativist” theologian James William McClendon, Jr. Farley’s method calls, first, for
an attempt to uncover faith realities that can be directly perceived, such as the faith
community’s efforts to remove ethnic boundaries, and, second, for an endeavor to
examine how such realities indirectly demonstrate the existence of additional faith
realities, such as the character of God. In contrast, McClendon’s method calls for an
attempt to ground doctrine in various sources, such as experience, community and the
narrative of Christian tradition, but most especially in the narrative of Scripture,
conceived of as the word of God.
An endeavor to address adequately their understandings of theological method
requires not only a direct analysis of the methods themselves (set forth in chapters 1 and
2) but also an examination of how these methods may be applied in the construction of
doctrine. Thus, (in chapters 3 and 4) I consider the manner in which Farley’s and
McClendon’s methods inform their doctrines of God. Finally, (in chapter 5) in dialog
with other commentaries on their work, I present an assessment and comparative
evaluation of their theological methods and doctrines of God, demonstrating strengths
and potential deficiencies in each case.
I conclude that there are some significant differences between Farley’s and
McClendon’s projects. For instance, they vary from one another in how they conceive of
the identity of Scripture. For Farley, the Bible is chiefly a text that the faith community
has “made,” and it is one means (among others) through which one can uncover the
realities of faith; for McClendon, Scripture is primarily a text in which God speaks
(through humans), and it is thus a text through which God can “find” us. Another related
difference is in where they place authority as the basis for developing doctrine. Farley
locates this authority chiefly with the contemporary ecclesial community, while
McClendon places it primarily with the narrative of Scripture.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s one of the more lively debates within the context of North
American Christian theology has been the dispute over method between representatives
of so-called “revisionist theology” and “narrative theology.” On the one hand, distinctive
to theologies of “revision” (or “correlation”), whose representatives include David Tracy,
Schubert Ogden, and Edward Farley, is not only the recognition that human religious
experience and Christian tradition are theologically co-determinative, but also the
insistence that the two must somehow be made to stand in a relationship that preserves
their independence as well as their interdependence. Accordingly, for this group of
theologians, theological method should resemble something like the following: theology
is best understood as simultaneous reflection upon both the meanings present in common
religious experience and the meanings present in the language of the Christian tradition
(in particular, this tradition’s classic religious texts). While Farley may be included with
school of thought, he does vary somewhat with this description, in two ways. First, he
emphasizes that the specific type of human religious experience he considers is not
individual but communal or interhuman religious experience.1 Second, while he
examines both communal (interhuman) religious experience and the meanings present in

1

Farley indicates that “‘religious experience’ suggests the individual. But you
will see in all of my books, starting with Ecclesial Man, that what is primary is the
interhuman,” as set forth in Edward Farley to author, 19 June 2000. Here, Farley refers
to Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1975).
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the language of the Christian tradition, he considers the former – communal (interhuman)
religious experience – to be of the most significance, and he makes clear that the texts of
the Christian tradition should be treated as resources (through which some of the realities
of faith might be discovered) but not as authoritative documents (in and of themselves)
for constructing theological doctrine.
The “narrative” group of theologians, on the other hand, whose representatives
include Hans Frei, Ronald Thiemann, and James McClendon, has stressed that religious
language is not the expression of prelinguistic experience but the means by which
religious experience may even be possible. Therefore, this group generally avers,
Christian theology should not begin with our experience today, and try to understand the
Bible in light of our experience, but should let the Bible’s language and narratives define
the world, making sense of our lives in its terms. Accordingly, for this group of
theologians, theological method should be akin to something like the following: theology
is best understood as reflection first upon the meanings present in Christian religious
language and then (only later) upon the meanings present in particular religious
experience. While McClendon may be included with this school of thought (only,
though, when it is broadly conceived as “narrative” theology – and not when it is
identified with one of its larger subgroups, “postliberal” theology), and while his
theological method reflects the various aspects of the above description, he would
underscore the importance of seeking to establish the connection between the meanings
present in Christian religious language and the meanings present in particular religious
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experience; that is, he would not be content to simply stop with the meanings contained
in language, in order to develop theological doctrine.
At the core of the disagreement, therefore, that these two types of theology have
over the structure of theological method are different understandings as to what
constitutes religious experience and religious language. And, near this core, are diverse
notions of the nature of knowledge and truth. On most of these issues, “revisionist
theologians” are closely aligned with the philosophical positions of figures such as
Edmund Husserl and Paul Ricoeur, while “narrative theologians” are more closely related
to the positions of such figures as Gilbert Ryle, John L. Austin, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
In general, “revisionists” defend a “web of belief” (to borrow from W. V. O. Quine) that
contains: the view that there is universal religious experience; a referential theory of
language; an allegedly foundationalist theory of knowledge; and, a correspondence
theory of truth. Yet, “narrativists” support a “web of belief” that includes: the view that
there is only particular religious experience; a holistic theory of language; a nonfoundationalist theory of knowledge; and, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth
(although, McClendon and some other “narrativists” would seek to add correspondence
theories of truth to this list). Pointing to these different “webs of belief” opens the way
for an approximate statement of much of the problem to be addressed in this dissertation:
Which theological method, the “revisionist” method with its “web of beliefs” or the
“narrativist” method with its “web of beliefs,” makes the stronger argument?
An endeavor to address adequately this problem, however, requires not only a
direct analysis of the various methods themselves (as well as a treatment of their use of
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particular philosophical resources) but also an examination of how they may be applied
in the actual construction of doctrines. Various doctrines could be chosen for this task,
but I will consider the doctrine of God, largely because it is a central – if not the central –
doctrine of the Christian faith.
For this dissertation, on the “revisionist” side, I will focus on Farley. Some of his
most substantial systematic work on the doctrine of God has been developed in Divine
Empathy,2 and in this monograph he offers an especially clear application of the
Husserlian-based “revisionist” method he developed in his earlier works, Ecclesial Man
and Ecclesial Reflection.3 And, on the “narrativist” side, I will turn to McClendon.4 His

2

Edward Farley, Divine Empathy: A Theology of God (Minneapolis, Minnesota:
Fortress Press, 1996).
3

Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1975); idem, Ecclesial Reflection: An
Anatomy of Theological Method (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1982).
4

When one understands “evangelical” in the broad sense as being a theological
heir of the Radical Reformation (and not in the more narrow sense as being a recovering
fundamentalist), McClendon may be described as an “evangelical-narrativist.” This
means, in part, that, strictly speaking, he is not a “postliberal-narrativist.” McClendon
has objected to the assertion that he might share affinities with postliberal thought:
“Don’t you have to be a liberal in order to become a post-liberal,” as indicated in James
William McClendon, Jr. to author, 3 May 2000. Yet, it is perhaps worth noting that
McClendon also identifies certain aspects of his own non-foundationalist, J. L. Austinand Wittgenstein-based method (which he, on occasion, refers to as “perspectivism”)
with that of the “postliberals,” as set forth in James William McClendon, Jr. and James
Marvin Smith, Understanding Religious Convictions (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1975), revised as Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism (Valley
Forge, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1994), 187-88. In addition, Nancey
Murphy points to the degree of similarity McClendon’s method shares with that of the
“postliberals,” as shown in Nancey Murphy, “Textual Relativism, Philosophy of
Language, and the baptist Vision,” in Theology Without Foundations, eds. Stanley
Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy, and Mark Nation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 24950.
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most significant work of systematic theology, Doctrine,5 contains the development of
several doctrines, most of which contribute to an overall doctrine of God, and these
doctrinal efforts reflect the “narrativist” method he sets forth in Convictions, Ethics,
Doctrine, and Witness.6
Both Farley’s and McClendon’s educational and career paths help to shed some
light on their particular theological perspectives. Farley, a Presbyterian, graduated from
Centre College (B.A.), in Danville, Kentucky, and then attended Louisville Presbyterian
Seminary, where he received his B.Div. He pursued further studies in philosophical
theology at Union Theological Seminary and at Columbia University, where he earned
his Ph.D. in 1957. He has taught at DePauw University, Pittsburgh Theological
Seminary, and, since 1969, as professor of theology at the Divinity School of Vanderbilt
University. In addition, McClendon, a Baptist, graduated from the University of Texas
(B.A.) and then attended Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, where he received
his B.Div. He continued with his studies at Princeton Theological Seminary, where he
received a Th.M., and again at Southwestern, where he earned his Th.D. in 1953. He
taught at such institutions as Golden Gate Baptist Theological Seminary, the University

5

James William McClendon, Jr., Systematic Theology, vol. 2, Doctrine
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994).
6

James William McClendon, Jr. and James Marvin Smith, Understanding
Religious Convictions (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975),
revised as Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism (Valley Forge, Pennsylvania:
Trinity Press International, 1994); James William McClendon, Jr., Systematic Theology,
vol. 1, Ethics, rev. ed. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002); idem, Systematic Theology,
vol. 2, Doctrine (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994); and, idem, Systematic Theology, vol.
3, Witness (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000).
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of San Francisco, and the Church Divinity School of the Pacific, before concluding his
career as a distinguished-scholar-in-residence at Fuller Theological Seminary.
Moreover, in light of the above discussion of the application of method and of the
contributions of Farley and McClendon, I can now endeavor to more precisely state the
problem to be addressed in this dissertation. By means of a direct analysis of their
theological methods and of an examination of the application of these methods in their
constructions of a doctrine of God, I will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their
theological methods and the way in which their theological methods influence and shape
their doctrines of God; also, I will compare Farley’s and McClendon’s methodologicaltheological projects with one another, in order to assess the advantages and disadvantages
of each approach.
In response to this problem I will first examine and evaluate the theological
methods of Farley and McClendon. Here, I will give particular attention to the “webs of
belief” present in their methods. That is, I will probe their methods for understandings of
experience, language, knowledge and truth. Secondly, I will focus on the way in which
these figures use philosophy as a resource for the development of their theological
methods. Thus, for instance, I intend to explore Farley’s use of Husserl’s
phenomenology as well as McClendon’s employment of Austin’s notion of speech-acts.
Thirdly, I will analyze the way in which the two theologians apply their methods to
constructions of a doctrine of God. Finally, I will compare Farley’s and McClendon’s
understandings of theological method as well as their doctrines of God with each other.
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In general, my work will be dialogical and dialectical in that I will engage Farley
from McClendon’s point of view, as well as, interact with McClendon’s work from
Farley’s perspective. Thus, my intention is to allow each perspective to engage and
challenge the other. I will explore (in chapters 1 and 2) Farley’s and McClendon’s
understandings of theological method. Here, I will primarily limit myself to the way in
which Farley develops his concept of method in Ecclesial Man and Ecclesial Reflection
and to the manner in which McClendon develops his notion of method in Convictions,
Ethics, Doctrine, and Witness. In addition, I will consider (in chapters 3 and 4) the
application of Farley and McClendon’s method in their constructions of a doctrine of
God (chiefly for the purpose of being able to evaluate the “cash value” of their methods).
Here, I will mainly limit my analysis to the manner in which Farley constructs this
doctrine in Divine Empathy and to the way in which McClendon constructs it in
Doctrine. Here also, I intend to set forth not an exhaustive but merely a preliminary
exploratory analysis of their developments of this doctrine. Finally, (in chapter 5) I will
present, in dialog with other commentaries on their work, an assessment and comparative
evaluation of the two methods and of the two doctrines of God, demonstrating strengths
and potential deficiencies in each case.
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CHAPTER 1
EDWARD FARLEY’S THEOLOGICAL METHOD
In this chapter I endeavor to set forth and to begin to evaluate what Edward
Farley considers to be both inappropriate and appropriate approaches to theological
method. I begin by examining what he maintains theological method should not be.
Here, he avers that most modern understandings of theological method have been
misguided because they have gotten away from the pursuit of reality and have turned
instead to a reality-detached “house of authority,” with both its presuppositions –
salvation history and the principle of (divine-human) identity – and its loci of authority –
sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional church.7 Then, I examine what Farley
maintains theological method should be. First, he argues that, in order to see realities,
one must turn to faith’s apprehensions, as they are found in the faith community.
Second, he avers that the faith community has various structures that pertain to the
relationship between faith and realities, structures such as: language, redemptive
existence, and intersubjectivity. Third, he maintains that the faith community mediates
realities which are present to those of the faith community and that these realities can
become the basis for what might be referred to as doctrine.8

7

Edward Farley, Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1982), chaps. 1-7 passim.
8

Farley sets forth his understanding of theological method primarily in Farley,
Ecclesial Reflection, and in Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of
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Modern Theology’s Reliance upon “the House of Authority:”
A Misguided Approach to Theological Method

The Crisis Faced by Modern Theology: Reality-Loss
Modern theology, according to Farley, faces a problem. While it endures no loss
of “theological language,” it has suffered a loss of “correspondence between ‘theological
language’ and ‘realities.’”9 In other words, the problem confronting theology is whether
or not there are “realities . . . behind the language of . . . historical faith,”10 that is,
whether or not “believing in God” means anything more than “believing in God.”11
Farley suggests that two different groups are responsible for bringing about this
“loss-of-reality” problem. One group consists of certain members of the theological
academy who press for “playing the games of intellectual inquiry by some very narrow
rules,”12 rules which insist that “realities” are reducible to “linguistic expressions.” He
identifies this group with “Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic theologies, . . . [within
which] it is fashionable to emphasize language as the way in which the historical faith is
available.”13 If “realities” may be reduced to “linguistic expressions,” then, Farley

Faith and Reality (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1975).
9

Farley, Ecclesial Man, 6. Hereafter, references to this work will be abbreviated

as EM.
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EM, 6.
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EM, 15.
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EM, 22.
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EM, 80. Farley does not specify, at least with this reference, who he feels
constructs or holds to such Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic theologies. Yet, with regard
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suggests, faith does not actually have access to “realities” themselves; that is, faith has
access to doctrines of God but not to God. According to Farley, this group within the
theological academy bears a significant but ultimately only a secondary level of
responsibility for the “loss-of-reality” problem facing theology.
The group most responsible for the “loss-of-reality” problem, he maintains, hails
not from the academy but from the church. Accordingly, “in contrast to the customary
assumption that a religious community lags behind its avant garde intellectual leadership,
we shall stress the opposite,”14 that is, that “reality-loss” occurs from the church to the
theological academy (and not vice versa). He is not particularly clear as to why “realityloss” occurs in this direction; yet, he offers a compelling argument that “reality-loss”
does, in fact, occur at the level or realm of the contemporary ecclesial community. For
Farley, since much of the faith-world of Western Christendom is no longer a collection of
small, face-to-face congregations within “a provincial social world [with a single]
common . . . stock of knowledge,”15 but is now a collection of large, anonymous pseudo-

to hermeneutic theologies, he suggests, in one of his later works, that they are indebted to
Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur, as set forth in Edward
Farley, Divine Empathy: A Theology of God (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press,
1996), 180.
14

EM, 9.

15

EM, 11. Regarding the concept of “stock of knowledge,” Farley makes
reference to the concept of “stock of knowledge at hand,” as developed by the
phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,
ed. Richard Zaner (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1970), 66ff. Aron
Gurwitsch interprets Schutz’s notion of “stock of knowledge at hand” as “the sediment of
the whole history of my life; it comprises what was passed on to me by those who taught
me and whose teachings I accepted on the strength of their authority, as well as what I
acquired through intercourse with my associates,” as set forth in Aron Gurwitsch,
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congregations within “a pluralistic social world [with] a number of competing stocks of
knowledge,”16 “the reality status of [such a matter as] redemption, its references and
conditions, . . . [has become] compromised.”17 Thus, the church is responsible for
“reality-loss” chiefly because it has acquiesced to or has been unable to resist the larger
social world’s recent turn from “knowledge” to “knowledges.”18 By allowing for the
possibility of more than one type of knowledge, the church has established an atmosphere
in which it is more difficult to have confidence about ecclesial realities.
Farley suggests that the ecclesial community was susceptible to giving credence
to multiple stocks of knowledge because, for several centuries, it has permitted itself to
submit to what he terms “the house of authority.”19 The faith community and, therefore,
theology have so fallen under the sway of (that is, have become so reliant upon) various

introduction to Collected Papers, by Alfred Schutz, vol. 3, Studies in Phenomenological
Philosophy, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), xvii.
Perhaps more significantly for the task at hand, this is one of several indications that
Farley, who relies heavily upon Husserl in the development of his theological method,
has been influenced, at least in part, by Schutz’s understanding of Husserl, as I will show
more fully below.
16

EM, 11.
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EM, 12.
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Elsewhere, Farley argues that the church is culpable for “reality-loss” primarily
since it has been unable to resist the larger social world’s shift from modernism to
postmodernism, as shown in Edward Farley, Deep Symbols: Their Postmodern
Effacement and Reclamation (Valley Forge, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International,
1996), 65-73. Indeed, Farley here likens postmodernism to a disease that has had a
“devastating effect . . . on our sense of and commitments to truth and reality,” as set forth
in Ibid., 61.
19

Farley, Ecclesial Reflection, xiv. Hereafter, references to this work will be
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authorities – such as sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional church – that they
have ceased to seek after the experiential realities on which these authorities are
presumably based. According to Farley, this phenomenon is equivalent to the resident of
a city perceiving the city not directly as a city-dweller (with her everyday experiences of
the city) but indirectly through the perspective of the formal descriptions of a
cartographer.20 What is at stake, according to Farley, is that without going to realties
themselves, the contemporary ecclesial community is left only with the prospect of
having to choose from among multiple “authoritative” (but potentially distorted) notions
of reality-apprehension. Unless the city-dweller examines the everyday life of the city,
she is vulnerable to possibly misleading descriptions of the cartographer(s), or she takes
the chance of being limited to a formalist (and probably superficial) understanding of the
city. Similarly, if the starting point of the faith understandings of the ecclesial
community is, for instance, not Jesus Christ but the doctrine of Jesus Christ (as indicated
by sacred Scripture, institutional church teachings or other loci of the house of authority),
the community risks being misled or being relegated to an empty (trapped-in-language)
formalism.
Therefore, primarily because it sheds such significant light on Farley’s
understanding of the proper approach to theological method, I will examine both his
description and his critique of “the house of authority.”
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Farley is here drawing upon a city-dweller / cartographer example developed by
Alfred Schutz in his work Collected Papers, vol. 2, Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid
Brodersen (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 66-67, as shown in
EM, 53.
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Farley’s Description of “the House of Authority”
Farley suggests that most contemporary theological work continues to make use
of a long-standing (though, in his view, erroneous) theological method, which he refers to
as a “classical criteriology,”21 And, he holds that the main feature of classical criteriology
is its reliance upon “the house of authority.” Furthermore, he maintains that “the house
of authority” has: two “founding axioms”22 – a presupposition of salvation history and a
presupposition of the principle of identity; and, at least three stratum that are built upon
these founding axioms – sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional church.
The “founding axioms” of salvation history and the principle of identity.
The two presuppositions of “the house of authority” are salvation history and the
principle of identity. Farley maintains that the first of these presuppositions, salvation
history, “is present in some way in the religion of Israel, Judaism, and Christianity,”23 and
he holds that the three central aspects of its framework are: “corporate historical entities
(not just individuals), their temporality teleologically interpreted, and the kingly deity
who governs through causal interventions.”24 Most significant here, for Farley, is “the
royal metaphor of God’s relation to the world and the ‘logic of triumph’ of the salvation-
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ER, 3.
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ER, 28.
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ER, 30.
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history scheme.”25 Accordingly, he avers that, with salvation history, God allows most of
“world history . . . [to] occur under the rule of the powers of evil. . . . But history ends
with an exercise of God’s sovereign kingship which overthrows the powers of evil and
rectifies all wrongs.”26
With the second presupposition, the principle of identity, Farley holds that this
principle “affirms an identity between what God wills to communicate and what is
brought to language in the interpretative act of a human individual or community.”27 Or,
as he restates elsewhere, the principle of identity is an assertion of “the identity between
God’s projected will and events in history.”28 In other words, this principle affirms that
there is an identity between what God wills and what humans do. Within the JudeoChristian tradition, Farley argues, this identity used to occur between what God desired
to communicate and the interpretations of the prophets of God’s more immediate
presence in theophanies, visions, and dreams.29 However, within this tradition, especially
as “the house of authority” began to take hold,30 identity started to gradually shift from
the original (authoritative) prophet to more secondary representatives – first to oral
tradition; then to written deposit; then to definitive interpretation of the written deposit;
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ER, 93.

26

ER, 156.
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ER, 35, emphases mine.
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ER, 159, emphases mine.
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ER, 36.
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ER, 12-13.

15
and, finally, to the institutional protection of the definitive interpretation.31 In addition,
Farley maintains that, for those theologians operating under “the house of authority,” “to
believe and obey the secondary representative . . . [has become] to believe and obey God
himself.”32
The three loci of sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional church. On top of
the two founding axioms of salvation history and the principle of identity, Farley locates
the stratum of the three loci of “the house of authority” – sacred Scripture, dogma, and
the institutional church. He holds that the first of these loci, sacred Scripture or “the
Scripture principle,”33 originated with Judaism,34 but that, even in this case, there was no
sense of more full-fledged sacred or “canonical Scriptures . . . [until later] synagogal
Judaism.”35 Before then, for the religion of Israel, the “Torah story,”36 for example, was
not sacred Scripture but merely “an authoritative record of Israel’s history.”37 However,
with the Exile and the concomitant threat to their duration, Israel came to embrace “the
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ER, 40-41.
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ER, 42.
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ER, 51.
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ER, 51.
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ER, 51.
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ER, 52.
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ER, 52.
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Scripture principle.”38 Similarly, with Christianity, he argues that originally – before “the
house of authority” was established – the early church “had a norm other than
‘Scripture,’ the living presence of the Lord and a nucleus tradition of early testimony to
the Lord.”39 But, just as Judaism had done when their duration began to be threatened,
the early Christian church also, largely due to an internal threat “created by a plurality of
traditions,”40 came to embrace “the Scripture principle.” Therefore, by the second
century, the church eventually ceased to treat the early Christian writings as simply
“authentic human testimony to the Lord and to the events of origin of the ecclesial
community,”41 and it started to treat them as “inspired Scripture.”42 As Farley
summarizes, “the Christian movement thus embraced the Jewish Scripture principle . . .
as a new, divinely given canon of literature embracing the two epochs of revelation.”43
With the second loci, dogma, Farley holds that faced with both the internal
problem of the so-called heresies and the external problem of Hellenistic syncretism and
pluralism, “the church’s solution . . . [was the establishment of] doctrina. . . . The
importance of this solution is that it took a written form whose status and function is that
of a definitive commentary on Scripture. It [. . . became] the key unlocking the mysteries
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ER, 71.

41

ER, 72.
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of the text.”44 Moreover, within the church, Farley argues that dogma has become “an
officially sanctioned comprehensive proposition which articulates some article of faith
and which has the character of freedom form error.”45 Accordingly, when this occurs,
dogma, rooted in “the ‘logic of triumph’ of the salvation-history scheme,”46 becomes an
authority. In other words, “dogmas become criteria.”47
Finally, with the third loci of “the house of authority,” the institutional church,
Farley argues that faced with the same internal problem of heresies and external
difficulty of Hellenistic syncretism and pluralism, the church responded by developing “a
definitive institution . . . [for itself, with] bishops as successors of apostles and deposits
of apostolic tradition.”48 In addition, Farley holds that “the final step in this process is a
new unit of divine-human identity. Because of his place in the succession, the bishop
becomes an authority.”49 Accordingly, the church came to have “a divinely instituted
infallible institution whose articulations under certain specified conditions have the status
of divine truth itself.”50 Therefore, Farley maintains, “with Scripture and dogma the
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church too . . . [has become] an authority.”51 Furthermore, he is not seeking just to
describe the Roman Catholic Church. To the contrary, he holds that “because
Protestantism extended divine-human identity to the structures and living voice of the
church itself, it has, like Catholicism, retained the three-location structure of the way of
authority and falls within the framework of the classical criteriology.”52

Farley’s Critique of “the House of Authority”
Having described “the house of authority,” Farley then offers a critique of it in
reverse order, starting with the three loci of sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional
church and then turning to salvation history and the principle of identity. However, in
addressing the three loci, he focuses the majority of his attention on sacred Scripture.
Therefore, I limit my focus to just this critique and to those he makes of the two founding
presuppositions of “the house of authority:” salvation history and the principle of
identity.
Critique of sacred Scripture. Farley argues that, with the canonization process,
the early church made the decision to grant authority to a certain collection of writings
and to declare this collection sacred, which is “a great deal different from claiming
divine authorship, inspiration, and identity.”53 Therefore, he holds that because the early
church had this choice – to view this collection of writings “as ‘sacred Scripture’ . . . [or]
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as something else”54 – this actually demonstrates that this collection of writings cannot
be sacred.55 In other words, he maintains that if this collection of writings were truly
sacred, there would have been no human choice involved in the matter. Accordingly,
Farley argues, that for the Christian faith, “sacred Scripture is thereby abolished.”56
Moreover, he holds that the early church wrongly placed its social identity in Scripture,
when it should have been placed, instead, where it originally had been (when the church
was birthed) – in a common “experience of salvation.”57 And, one consequence (among
others) of this misplaced social identity, he avers, is that, under “the house of authority,”
the church has come to look upon Scripture “not . . . as narrative . . . but as an atomistic
compilation of truths.”58
Critique of the “founding axioms” of salvation history and the principle of
identity. According to Farley, “essential to any salvation history view [whether Jewish or
Christian, for example,] . . . is that God wills a definite end and accomplishes his will
toward his creation.”59 Furthermore, as is implied, from the perspective of salvation
history, God’s causal intervention is so strong – so triumphant – that either (under a more
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provincial salvation-history scheme) God willfully intends salvation to only a portion of
humanity or (under a more universal scheme) God willfully determines not only all good
human actions but also all evil human actions.60 For Farley, this raises such
overwhelming theodicy problems that the salvation history framework, in both its Jewish
and Christian renditions, is completely discredited.61
With his critique of the axiom of the principle of identity – the principle which
affirms that there is an identity between what God wills and what humans do – Farley
argues that the supposed “discovery of identical meaning between our willed and
accomplished aims is possible . . . [according to the claims of some] because of our own .
. . [supposed] direct access to both sides, to our wishing for the apple and the act of
eating the apple.”62 But, he further posits, since “we have no such direct access to God’s
acts of willing and actualizing, . . . the principle of identity . . . cannot be retained.”63
More specifically, Farley argues that the principle of identity fails because “identity
between the divine will and creation is either a synthesis of meaning which is
inaccessible or an identity between detailed states of affairs which violates the autonomy
of creatures.”64
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Thus, with his description and critique of “the house of authority,” Farley has
substantially illuminated that which he is arguing against as he sets forth his own
understanding of theological method. It is to this understanding that I now turn.

Theological Method outside “the House of Authority:”
Farley’s Theological Method of Ecclesial Reflection
An essential feature of Farley’s critique of theological method done under “the
house of authority” is that it is a methodology that has become detached from the very
realities which it seeks to address. Therefore, it is not surprising that a central tenet of
Farley’s own method is a constant call to return to the realities themselves.
In order to return to these realities, he argues, first, that the Christian theologian
must seek to discover faith’s apprehensions, as they may be found in the church (when
the church is properly understood as a faith community). Next, he holds that the church
has various structures that bear upon the relationship between faith and realities,
structures such as: language, redemptive existence, and intersubjectivity. Finally, he
avers that the church mediates realities which are directly present to those of the faith
community and that these realities become the basis for what might be referred to as
doctrine.
Moreover, throughout the development of his theological method, Farley draws
extensively from several philosophical and theological figures. Most notably, he builds
upon the philosophy of Edmund Husserl (explicitly so) and upon the theology of
Friedrich Schleiermacher (not always as explicitly but, nevertheless, quite
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significantly).65 Accordingly, as Farley turns to and engages with the thought of these
figures (and others), I will endeavor to examine these connections.

Seeking Faith’s Realities as They May Be Found in the Faith Community
Farley argues that part of what is involved in returning to the realities of faith is
an effort to locate faith’s apprehensions as they may be found in the community of faith.
This effort includes at least four components. First, he explores the conditions for
“getting to” realities through phenomenological theology and by means of participating
in the faith community itself. Second, he considers whether or not phenomenological
theology is able to bridge the gap between the immanent and the transcendent (that is,
between inner consciousness and external reality). Third, he unfolds the operative
principles of his phenomenological theology. Some of these operative principles (and
related features) include: the principle of positivity; apprehensions; realities (and their
attendant noemas); and, the reflective method (with its concepts of bracketing,
uncovering, and theological eidetics). Fourth, he sets forth his understanding of
theological portraiture as a way to approach tradition not as an authority but as a
historical resource. Especially in his development of these first three components, Farley
is substantially indebted to Husserl;66 therefore, in the process of examining these
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Farley indicates that while “it may not . . . [always] be very clear, . . . Friedrich
Schleiermacher is probably as determinative of my theological method as continental
philosophy,” as set forth in Edward Farley to author, 19 June 2000.
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Furthermore, Farley concurs with the Lutheran theologian, Theobald Süss, that
Husserl’s philosophy is well suited for constructive theological efforts, as set forth in
EM, 33. Here, he cites Süss as follows:
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components, I will attempt to show how Farley builds upon Husserl’s work. Moreover,
with certain aspects of the above operative principles (such as the principle of positivity),
Farley shows a strong reliance upon Schleiermacher. Thus, after examining the above
four components, I will offer a brief excursus on the way in which some of
Schleiermacher’s central theological concepts seem to impact Farley’s comprehension of
theological method.
Retrieving faith’s realities by means of phenomenological theology and through
participation in the faith community itself. In order to get back to the realities of the
Christian faith themselves, Farley suggests that “the procedure called for is a procedure
of turning back to the obscured or diminished realities and reflecting on them.”67

The only demand which Husserl makes is, as he occasionally expresses it, that
Christianity possesses characteristic, genuine themes, that it therefore has its law
in itself, in its own unique structures and essential forms. Theology obtains from
this the task of clarifying these themes, structures, and essential forms and
formulating Christian doctrine with regard to them [as set forth in Theobald Süss,
“Phänomenologische Theologie,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie
und Religionsphilosophie 5 (1963), 38-39; quoted in EM, 33].
67

EM, 19. Farley’s emphasis on examining or “turning back” to the realities
themselves and reflecting on them clearly shows the influence of phenomenology, in
general, and of Husserl, in particular, on his thought. “Zurück zu den Sachen selbst”
[“return to the things themselves”] is a theme that recurs throughout much of
phenomenology and especially throughout most of Husserl’s works, beginning at least as
early as his Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press,
1970; reprint, 2 vols., Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, an imprint of Prometheus
Books, 2000). For instance, in this work, he argues that “meanings inspired only by
remote, confused, inauthentic intuitions – if by any intuitions at all – are not enough: we
must go back to the ‘things themselves,’” as set forth in Ibid., vol. 1, 252. However, for
Husserl, this phrase – “return to the things themselves” – means not a return to literal
objects but: for example, a return to essences as they reveal themselves through eidetic
reduction involving the relationship between the noesis (the subjective act in an
intentional experience) and the noema (the objective act in an intentional experience); or,
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Furthermore, he argues that this can be accomplished through phenomenological
theology, by which he means “that inquiry within theological prolegomenon which
attempts to expose the situation in which realities are apprehended by faith.”68 That is,
the analyses of phenomenological theology “do not establish the realities of faith’s
apprehensions; . . . [rather,] they are efforts to understand the conditions of those
apprehensions whereby such reality-apprehensions are possibilities.”69 In addition,
Farley seeks to clarify, on the one hand, “that phenomenological theology cannot itself
restore faith’s present-day reality-loss,”70 but, on the other hand, that “faith’s realities
have not simply flown away; they have been obscured by a certain kind of human being,
civilization, historical consciousness, all of which are attended by an insistence on
playing the games of intellectual inquiry by some very narrow rules.”71 Therefore, he
holds, “what phenomenological theology can do is to render explicit the contours, the
essence, the modes of existence which lie present but hidden in . . . [faith’s]

for instance, especially in some of his later works, a return or a questioning back, through
history, to other people’s experiences of essences. Farley seems to have some of these
Husserlian meanings in mind, as becomes more apparent with the continued development
of his understanding of theological method, as I will endeavor to show below.
68
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EM, 22. With his reference to “playing the games of intellectual inquiry by
some very narrow rules,” Farley appears to have in mind Ludwig Wittgenstein and
similar philosophers and those theological methodologies that have been influenced by
this line of thought. However, Farley does not here specifically indicate who he feels
holds or demonstrates these views.
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apprehensions.”72 However, he is careful to stress that “the actual reality-apprehendings
of a determinate community do not occur in the ‘uncovering’ analyses of phenomenology
but in participation in the community itself.”73
Is phenomenological theology able to bridge the gap between the immanent and
the transcendent? Farley recognizes that a potential challenge to phenomenological
theology is whether or not it can bridge the gap between the immanent and the
transcendent or, to restate, whether or not it can reach, in a sense, from the mental (inner
consciousness) to the physical (external reality). In order to probe this possible
challenge, he offers a closer examination of the relationship between phenomenological
theology and phenomenological philosophy, particularly as the latter was developed by
Husserl.
Farley maintains that Husserl and other phenomenological philosophers, such as
Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur, “begin philosophical reflection . . . with the human
being in his pre-reflective intentionality, . . . [and] to the degree that philosophy attempts
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EM, 23. Although I do not here abundantly expound upon Farley’s emphasis on
the role of communal participation with reality-apprehendings, this is not in any way to
minimize the importance that such communal participation has for Farley’s
understanding of theological method. In addition, his stress on communal participation
in this regard reflects one of the significant ways in which Schleiermacher’s theological
method seems to be determinative of Farley’s theological method, as the nineteenth
century theologian similarly claims that “unless religious communities are to be regarded
as mere aberrations, it must be possible to show that the existence of such association is a
necessary element for the development of the human spirit,” as revealed in Friedrich
Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, ed. and trans. Terrence N. Tice
(Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), § 22, p. 12.
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to find the key to being, nature, or reality by attending to the very structure of prereflective directedness, it is phenomenological philosophy.”74 Thus, a central feature of
phenomenological philosophy is, according to Farley, the attention it gives to the prereflective intentionality of the human being or, more simply, the attention it gives to
“intentional analysis.”75
However, Farley concedes that with the call to intentional analysis, one can well
argue that the harking of phenomenological philosophy for one to turn to the realities
themselves can be interpreted (especially in its Husserlian versions) as a harking to turn
“to the human subject himself.”76 To the degree that this argument might have merit, it is
fair to ask, Farley suggests, whether or not “the Husserlian program eschews reality?
[That is,] does Husserlian phenomenology turn away from existing, transcendent, and
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EM, 26, emphases mine. Moreover, Robert R. Williams argues that
Schleiermacher is, in this respect, a progenitor of phenomenological theology. For
instance, Williams argues that, for Schleiermacher, “feeling is . . . the original,
pretheoretical consciousness of reality,” as revealed in Robert R. Williams,
Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God (Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1978), 4. In addition, Williams holds that
“Schleiermacher’s theology is phenomenological in that he approaches the question of
God and the entire doctrine of God through a reflective analysis of religious
consciousness and its object,” as shown in ibid., 5. I am indebted to Edward Farley for
pointing me to Williams as one who could shed light on the potential connection between
Schleiermacher and phenomenological theology, as set forth in Edward Farley to author,
24 July 2000. And, while I think Williams is on the right path which such a line of
thought (although I would be inclined to explore the notion that Schleiermacher merely
anticipates some aspects of phenomenological theology), investigating this potential
connection is beyond the scope of this work.
75

EM, 28.

76

EM, 32.

27
objective references in favor of meant, immanent, and subjective appearances?”77 If so, it
may be that “phenomenological theology [as well] . . . inevitably transforms
transcendence into immanence, the determinate into the universal, and theology into
anthropology.”78
In response to such potential queries, Farley holds that, at least for Husserl, “the
region of the transcendental necessarily ‘mirrors’ the structures of the world;”79 that is,
“the structure of the world at large . . . [has been] repeated in the microcosm of human
consciousness.”80 Yet, Farley ultimately acknowledges that “Husserl does little in setting
forth the ontological grounds of this correspondence.”81
The operative principles of phenomenological theology. Having introduced the
concept of phenomenological theology and having addressed what may be referred to as
its challenge of the transcendent, Farley next endeavors to depict the operative principles
of his phenomenological theology. Part of the function of these operative principles is to
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Erfahrung (Gütersloh, Germany: Gerd Mohn, 1963), 75-110.
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help uncover what he terms “the theological given,”82 since, with phenomenological
theology, “the theological given precedes doctrines.”83 Thus, for example, in developing
a theology of Jesus Christ, one begins not with the doctrine of Jesus Christ but with the
“theological given” of Jesus Christ himself.84 In short, part of the function of these
operative principles is to assist in ensuring that “theology’s object precedes and controls
theology’s method.”85
One operative principle is what Farley terms “the principle of positivity.”86 The
need for this principle emerges because “the methods and instruments of . . .
[phenomenological theology are] oriented . . . toward universality, . . . [but they must] be
applied to a historical, determinate subject matter.”87 Farley argues that “Pascal
anticipates . . . [the principle of positivity] in his distinction between the God of the
philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, a distinction which is not
between the false and the true but between a universal, speculatively apprehended entity
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and the God of a determinate . . . [or given] religious faith.”88 And, what Pascal
anticipates, Farley more fully defines and illustrates, as follows:
Each general stratum undergoes transformation when it is incorporated into the
strata more determinate than itself. This, in brief, is the principle of positivity.
To illustrate, being an American is transformed in the determinacy of being a
black American. Being a black American undergoes transformation in the
determinate situation of urban black youth.89
Thus, he holds that “what we have before us is a hierarchy of forms which range from the
most general (those which characterize being as such) to the most restricted. The more
general forms are transformed by the more restricted forms.”90 With this understanding
of the principle of positivity, one can better see how, according to Farley:
Both provincial and generic hermeneutics violate . . . [this principle]: provincial
hermeneutics because it does not see itself as reflecting or participating in
structures more universal than its own actuality; generic hermeneutics because it
presupposes that more universal strata simply reappear unchanged in more
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EM, 57. In his understanding of the principle of positivity, Farley clearly draws
upon the manner in which Schleiermacher developed this concept. According to Robert
R. Williams, “Schleiermacher embraces this principle when he writes that while the same
generic features are present in religions, they are differently determined, that is
concretely modified, in each,” as revealed in Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian,
12. Here, Williams points to the following argument made by Schleiermacher in The
Christian Faith: “Each particular form of communal piety has both an outward unity, as a
fixed fact of history with a definite commencement, and an inward unity, as a peculiar
modification of that general character which is common to all developed faiths of the
same kind and level,” as set forth in Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.
R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart, trans. D. M. Baillie, W. R. Matthews, Edith SandbachMarshall, A. B. Macaulay, Alexander Grieve, J. Y. Campbell, R. W. Stewart, and H. R.
Mackintosh (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), § 10, p. 44; referenced in Williams,
Schleiermacher the Theologian, 12. I will more fully consider Farley’s understanding of
Schleiermacher’s conception of positivity in an excursus below.
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determinate levels. To illustrate, the resurrection of Jesus is another case of a
‘rising god.’91
Two other operative principles of his phenomenological theology are
“apprehensions” and “realities.”92 An “apprehension” is not a “sense perception . . . [but]
an act which grasps realities directly or immediately,”93 and “a genuine apprehension is
not confirmed because it itself is that consciousness-act in which confirming evidence is
grasped as evidence.”94 “Realities,” according to Farley, “refer . . . to anything and
everything which has the status of being over against us, and has the capacity to evoke
from us an acknowledgment of that status.”95 That is, for him, a “reality” is “an entity
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EM, 61, emphases mine.
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EM, 65. Here, Farley refers to the following passages within Husserl’s work:
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R.
Boyce Gibson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), 82-85, 379-403; idem,
Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 57-58; idem, Formal
and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1969), chap. 4; idem, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
1970), 123-35; idem, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic,
trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press, 1973), 17-18. However, to be more precise, Husserl seems to actually argue that
we perceive realities or things due to the essence(s) available in the relation between us
and the things, as set forth in Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure
Phenomenology, 134.
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EM, 70. With his explanation of “reality,” Farley does not cite Husserl, but, by
“reality,” Farley appears to have in mind not so much Husserl’s concept of “Erlebnis,” an
inner, immanent mental experience of an intentional object (i.e., an object of intentional
relation), as he does Husserl’s notion of “Erfahrung,” an outer, transcendent physical
experience of an actual object (i.e., an object of the senses), as Husserl sets forth in
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which has a certain (noematic) content, a certain unification and differentiation (essence),
and which occurs in a certain mode of existence.”96 But, this latter definition requires
another one: a “noema” is a “meant-object.”97 To illustrate, Farley indicates that “even a
mirage house has the noema, the meant-object, house. However, unless we simply define
reality as whatever a consciousness-act intends, the noema must be distinguished from
reality.”98 Furthermore, Farley holds that not only would human bodies count as
“realities,” but so would “structures and processes of consciousness . . . and the structures
of dependence between individuals and collectivities;”99 and, he implies that all of these
types of realities would also have noemas. In addition, Farley maintains that, unlike
realities, noemata perdure; that is, he avers that a noema can “be retained whatever . . .
[the corresponding] object’s empirical fate.”100

Edmund Husserl, “The Amsterdam Lectures on Phenomenological Psychology,” trans.
Richard E. Palmer, in Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the
Confrontation with Heidegger, ed. Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 213-21.
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EM, 69.

97

EM, 68. With his treatment here of noema, Farley does not cite Husserl. And,
while it does seem to be the case that, in a certain sense, Husserl may be said to convey
that a noema is a “meant-object,” Husserl also clarifies (as Farley partially points to in
EM, 79-80): that one does not perceive a noema; rather, a noema allows one to perceive,
as set forth in Husserl, Ideas, 255-65; and, that there is a prescriptive or regulatory aspect
to the noema (i.e., the noema of a table would indicate that a table cannot fly, etc.), as
shown in Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 53-54.
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Yet another operative principle of Farley’s phenomenological theology is “the
reflective method,”101 a method that involves not only theological bracketing and
uncovering but also theological eidetics.102 Here, in general, Farley argues that “the
method of phenomenological theology is primarily reflective. This reflection is not so
much ‘thinking about’ an explicitly given totality as it is an attempt to penetrate and open
up matters which are present but hidden.”103 This is perhaps a crude example, but if one
were to phenomenologically reflect on a “page of printed matter, . . . [one would, with
practice, begin to] encounter the . . . [present but hidden] essence ‘page’ and also the . . .
[the present but hidden] essences ‘white,’ ‘black,’ and ‘rectangular.’”104
Turning to the first aspect of the reflective method – theological bracketing –
Farley maintains that since theological reflection can become easily sidetracked when it
is first begun, “the procedure calls for a negative moment resembling what Husserl called
the epochē.”105 It is “negative not in the sense of denial or repudiation but in the sense of
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EM, 70. In his essay, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” Husserl appears to
make a similar point, as he argues that phenomenology tries to penetrate to the being that
language expresses,” as set forth in Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as a Rigorous
Science,” in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), 95-96.
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Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, 2d ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
College Publishers, 1980), 269.
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suspending, putting into brackets, or temporarily not taking into consideration.”106 And,
with phenomenological theology, there are “two sorts of commitments or belief-systems
in . . . [the] initial moment of theological reflection . . . [that must be suspended or
bracketed in this manner].”107 Those two sorts of commitments are church authority and
metaphysics.108 The former must be bracketed for reasons that have already been
examined (under the above discussion of “the house of authority”); the latter must be
bracketed, in part:
Because the ways in which realities are apprehended in the particular historical
faith will remain hidden if they are allowed to be realities only to the degree that
they are translatable into the scheme in question. This is, of course, simply
another way of expressing the principle of positivity. It presupposes a certain
distinctiveness in such historical entities as religious faiths which reflect but also
particularize (and sometimes explode) the ontological structures discovered by
philosophers.109
Thus, according to Farley, “the theological epochē . . . is partly an existential act
involving not just a temporary change of stance but a permanent attempt, perhaps always
only an attempt, to put out of action the reality models which have shaped our
consciousness, so that the specific realities of a determinate faith can appear.”110
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EM, 71. In one of his writings, Husserl describes the epochē as involving a
bracketing of ontological commitments that we have in our natural attitude (that is, in our
daily living), as shown in Edmund Husserl, “The Amsterdam Lectures on
Phenomenological Psychology,” 221-24.
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EM, 74. Here, Farley refers to Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, 71-73.

34
The second aspect of the operative principle of the reflective method is
theological “uncovering” or “questioning-back.”111 Here, Farley maintains: (1) that “the
everyday activities of the religious cultus . . . [i.e., going to worship services, caring for
the poor, etc.] are founded in a ‘world’ . . . [i.e, a ‘background’] that contains many
strata; institutional, pre-institutional, intersubjective, subjective and experiential, and
transcendental;”112 and, (2) that this “world” or “background” “remains unexplored but
offers itself as explorable.”113 Furthermore, he avers that what enables this exploration of
this “world” (that he begins to identify as a “faith-world”) is “a reflection which is a
conscious second-order act that turns back, questions back to the accessible strata
beneath the everyday acts of the cultus.”114
The final aspect of the operative principles of the reflective method is
“theological eidetics.”115 And, what Farley has in view here is a theological version of
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EM, 77. However, Farley indicates that, in this regard, he breaks somewhat
with Husserl, in that he does not advocate a questioning-back to a transcendental region
(as Husserl would); rather, following Alfred Schutz, he advocates a questioning-back to a
social world (in particular to the social world of what Farley will come to refer to as a
faith-world), as shown in EM, 75. Farley does not here cite any particular work by
Schutz, but he seems to have in view passages such as the following: Alfred Schutz,
“Some Structures of the Life-World,” trans. Aron Gurwitsch, in Collected Papers, vol. 3,
Studies in Phenomenological Theory, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague, The Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 116-32.
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EM, 77.

EM, 79. As Farley indicates, “eidetics . . . refers simply to the . . .
[phenomenological] method of essence inquiry,” as set forth in EM, 80.
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what Husserl terms “eidetic reduction.”116 To approach what Husserl means by “eidetic
reduction,” it can be helpful to contrast this type of reduction with a more superficial one
that he refers to as a “psychological reduction.” With a “psychological reduction,” one
endeavors to reduce things to their meaning or to their phenomena for “Erfahrung” (that
is, for the realm of physical experience, where objects can be encountered through the
senses). However, with an “eidetic reduction,” one strives to reduce objects to their eidos
or essence for “Erlebnis” (that is, for the realm of mental experience, where objects can
be encountered through intentional relation). Thus, to illustrate these two concepts of
reduction by way of paraphrase, a Husserlian-informed perspective would suggest that by
reflecting upon, say, a hundred different tables (assuming that each table is different from
the others in at least some way), one could conduct both a psychological reduction and a
eidetic reduction. With the former type of reduction, one could: examine the physical
tables; measure them according to the instruments suitable to various physical senses;
conduct statistical analyses; and, posit sensory results appropriate to the realm of physical
experience (“I find that these tables have an average height of x, an average color, on the
color spectrum, of y, etc.”). However, with the latter type of reduction, one could take
into consideration noetic elements (“how am I intending these tables?”) and noematic
elements (“what rules do the “front sides” of these tables suggest about what the “whole
table” should be?), and, in view of these considerations, through free variation, one could
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Some of Husserl’s clearest explanations of eidetic reduction can be found in
Husserl, “The Amsterdam Lectures on Phenomenological Psychology,” trans. Richard E.
Palmer, in Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with
Heidegger, 213-53, and in idem, Ideas, 112-70, passim.
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eventually isolate the invariant eidos or essence of “table” appropriate to the realm of
mental experience (“I find, in the interplay between these various noeses and noemata,
that this notion x of “table” is the essence of “table.”). With this latter eidetic reduction,
the essence of “table” would not be in the actual hundred different objects; nor would it
be projected by this person’s consciousness; rather, this essence of “table” would, in a
sense, be “in between” the objects and this person’s intentional consciousness.117 A
Husserlian-informed perspective would maintain that the second type of reduction, the
eidetic reduction, is fuller and deeper because it gets to the core of what “table” is.
Farley holds that this type of eidetic reduction (especially in its noematic components)
can be carried out on realities found within the faith community – including the entire
faith community itself. Thus, Farley maintains that, in theory, one could obtain the
essence of ecclesia.118
Furthermore, Farley argues that with phenomenological theology, “under the
principle of positivity, . . . [the essences or] the noemata with which we are concerned are
not the universal essences of religious man but the more specific essences of a concrete
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Ibid. Where exactly does Husserl locate these “in between” essences? I would
argue that he places the essence between the noesis (the subjective aspect of an
intentional experience, on the side of consciousness) and the noema (the objective aspect
of an intentional experience, on the side of the thing); however, at least on occasion,
Farley identifies the eidos (or the essence) with the noema, as, for instance, he indicates:
“The essence or eidos in eidetic intuition and analysis is . . . a noema,” as set forth in EM,
79. However, debating Farley’s interpretation of this fine detail of Husserl’s
understanding of eidetic reduction is beyond the scope of this work.
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and corporate historical existence.”119 In addition, he maintains that “theological eidetics
may be a contemporary and phenomenological version of the nineteenth-century attempt
to obtain the ‘essence of Christianity.’”120 However, Farley avers that, granted certain
similarities (with these earlier efforts to obtain the essence of Christianity), his
“theological eidetics differs from that program because, in its attempt to obtain the eidos
or essence, . . . [theological eidetics] focuses on . . . the meant correlate of the
consciousness-act which ‘means’ such entities from within.”121 Therefore, Farley
suggests that the advantage theological eidetics has over earlier essence of Christianity
programs is that theological eidetics enables the phenomenological theologian to uncover
more fully and deeply what participants in the faith community “mean” by ecclesia and
other faith realities.122
With his understanding of theological eidetics, Farley makes clear that he is also
breaking from “both Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic theologies, . . . [where] it is
fashionable to emphasize language as the way in which this historical faith is
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EM, 81. And, here, perhaps more than anywhere else within the various
components of his theological method, Farley demonstrates his reliance upon
Schleiermacher. Accordingly, I will consider Farley’s understanding of
Schleiermacher’s notion of the essence of Christianity in an excursus below.
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EM, 81, emphasis mine. Farley indicates that “the meant correlate of the
consciousness-act” is the “noema,” as set forth in EM, 81, which alone, Husserl implies,
would provide a fuller, deeper essence than is possible through psychological reduction.
However, it seems to me that with eidetic reduction, Husserl allows not only for
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available.”123 He indicates that while he concurs with these theologies “that language has
a certain priority as a bearer of the availability, we would argue that this formulation is
subject to an unfortunate abstractness.”124 One reason he gives for this claim of “an
unfortunate abstractness” is that the “historical faith has vehicles of availability other
than its own language, namely, its cultic acts, institutional structures, and the like, which
in any given present are available both to intuition and to the historian.”125
Theological portraiture. Yet another way in which Farley describes the manner
in which one may seek faith’s apprehensions as they are found in the faith community is
through a concept that he terms “theological portraiture.”126 According to his
understanding of phenomenological theology, theological “reflection begins . . . already
disposed by . . . tradition. In brief, some view of ecclesiality is already at work in
theology’s prereflective situation.”127 And, Farley suggests that this already given view
of ecclesiality is neither a doctrine nor a “vague feeling of well-being, . . . [but something
that may be described with a] metaphor . . . of a picture, less a photograph than an
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these hermeneutic theologians. However, as previously mentioned, in one of his later
works, he implies that they are indebted to Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, and
Paul Ricoeur, as set forth in Farley, Divine Empathy, 180.
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ER, 195. With his concept of “theological portraiture,” which Farley presents
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impressionistic painting.”128 That is, Farley holds that tradition (which he describes as a
picture) comes to the theologian not as an unrevisable authority (i.e., as a photograph) but
as a revisable resource (i.e., as an impressionistic painting). In addition, Farley argues,
reflection on the already given material reference may be called a portrait (by which he
means a “reflective theological painting” of a “prereflective impressionistic picture of
ecclesial existence ”);129 thus, “the move from picture to portrait is the move from the
prereflective to the reflective.”130
Furthermore, Farley maintains that “the object (portrait) of theological portraiture
. . . [is] a portrait of that total corporate historical phenomenon, ecclesial existence,”131
and he holds that one may find “ecclesial existence . . . primarily in the depth sociality,
the determinate intersubjectivity of the community.”132 Theological portraiture is not a
work that one can hope to perfectly complete, but it is a task that should strive to grasp a
unified “ecclesial existence” or “ecclesiality.” As Farley claims:
Portraiture is itself a constantly changing enterprise. It resembles an artist
constantly redoing a portrait and even offering new portraits of a child who is
growing up. We need not conclude from this metaphor, however, that the process
of change in the history of Christianity is necessarily one of maturation. Further,
the focus of the portrait is not on essence, a kernel in a husk. Yet the portrait does
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ER, 197, emphasis mine.
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ER, 199. Farley indicates that his use here of “determinate intersubjectivity
refers to the specifically ecclesial mutual intentions or ways of meaning through which
participants in ecclesial reality are present to each other,” as set forth in ER, 199.
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try to capture the unity, the interrelation of features. The result, if successful – the
face staring out of the portrait – is ecclesiality.133
In sum, one of Farley’s central concerns with this description of theological
portraiture is to show that theologians may approach tradition not as an authority but
more as a historical resource.134 And, he argues, what makes this particular portraiture
theological is that “ecclesial existence . . . [has already been] given as redemptive.”135
This process of questioning back to historically available faith apprehensions – a process
that Farley describes not only as “theological portraiture” but also as “reflective method”
– can also be seen through Farley’s understanding of certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s
theological method; therefore, it is to this understanding that I now turn.
An excursus on Farley’s understanding of Schleiermacher’s notions of the
“positivity of Christianity” and the “essence of Christianity.” Another perspective from
which to approach a key aspect of Farley’s concept of theological method can be gained
through an exploration of his understanding of Schleiermacher’s notions of the
“positivity of Christianity” and the “essence of Christianity” and of the role these notions
have played in the larger Christian tradition. Therefore, I will examine the way in which
Farley approaches these Schleiermacherean notions, especially through his most
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substantial treatment of them in his work, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of
Theological Education.136
In order to establish a context for his understanding of Schleiermacher’s notions
of the “positivity of Christianity” and the “essence of Christianity,” Farley argues that
throughout approximately the first seventeen centuries of the Christian tradition,
“theology” (or “theologia”) was primarily conceived of: as “an actual, individual
cognition of God and things related to God;”137 as “a habit (habitus) of the human
soul;”138 or, as the pursuit of “a sapiental knowledge.”139 However, he further avers, with
the eighteenth century, a shift occurred in which “theology” began to be thought of more
as a “cluster of disciplines” than as a “habitus.” This shift was significant because it
revealed a move from an understanding of theology as “the theologian’s pursuit of
knowledge of God and of the wisdom that accompanies salvation” to an understanding of
theology as “the doctrines of the faith.”140 In addition, along with this shift (and perhaps
as part of it), Farley maintains that in the eighteenth century a new “fourfold pattern” for
studying theology took hold, in which theology was arranged into four divisions,
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consisting not only of three “theoretical” disciplines – Scripture, church history,
dogmatics (of which Scripture was the cornerstone) – but also of an “applied” (or
“practical”) discipline – pastoral theology.141 At the core of this development of the
fourfold pattern, according to Farley, was that the “truths . . . [provided by Scripture
became] theology’s subject matter.”142 Thus, there are echoes here of Farley’s argument,
discussed above, of how at least the theological academy began to come under “the house
of authority” – exchanging the pursuit of experiential realities for the pursuit of written
authorities (i.e., Scripture and dogmatics) that (supposedly) speak to these realities.
As these changes were taking place in what “theology” meant and in the way that
it was being studied, Farley holds that Schleiermacher offered two significant insights
that bore directly upon these developments, one of which may be referred to as the
“clerical paradigm” and the other as the “essence of Christianity motif.”143
With the “clerical paradigm,” according to Farley, Schleiermacher argued that
theology was not, like philosophy, a “pure science” (which would seek to study
“universal” matters) but, like medicine and law, a “positive science” (which would
endeavor to study “specific, historical” matters),144 for the purpose of training clergy.145
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With this development of a “clerical paradigm,” Farley sees both strengths and
weaknesses.
One of the strengths, he holds, was that, in treating theology as a “positive
science,” Schleiermacher was simultaneously working to advance the notion that
Christianity should be considered not as a natural religion but as a positive religion, that
is, as a “religion which is institutional, public, traditional, even precritical.”146 In other
words, Schleiermacher was advancing the idea of the “positivity of Christianity,” of the
idea that Christianity was a “concrete, historically rooted . . . religion.”147 In the case of
Christianity, this historical rooted-ness was “in the given reality or fact of Jesus.”148 And,
for Schleiermacher, this was profound because, for him, this meant that facticity of the
historical Jesus ensured the validity of Christianity. Moreover, for Schleiermacher, this
meant that “the authority of the Bible and Church teachings rests on the positivity of
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Christian ecclesial faith;”149 that is, the authority of Scripture as well as “every legitimate
doctrine must have its historical origin in Christ.”150
While the “positivity of Christianity” was the great strength of the development of
Schleiermacher’s “clerical paradigm,” Farley argues that one of its weaknesses was in
establishing the teaching of clergy as the purpose of theology. More specifically, he
avers that, while this goal did not create immediate difficulties, it caused catastrophic
problems in the later history of the church, as, unfortunately, this clerical purpose came
to be merged with the “fourfold pattern” for studying theology (which was developed
before Schleiermacher but continued on – and was further embraced – after him). For
instance, in the realm of theological education, he holds that this merger led to “the
rationale for . . . [the teaching of] . . . each [theological] discipline . . . [being] not its
theological character, its relation to Christianity or . . .[to the] Christian faith but its
contribution to the training of professionals.”151 What became lost in this process,
according to Farley, was the way in which “theology at one time meant . . . the sapiential
knowledge which attended Christian life.”152
In addition to the “clerical paradigm” (with its strengths and weaknesses), Farley
maintains that the second significant insight that Schleiermacher offered – that also bore
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directly upon the developments that were occurring in his era with regard to what
“theology” meant and to the way that it was being studied – was the “essence of
Christianity motif.”153 Farley argues that Schleiermacher set forth this motif, which
presupposes the notion of the “positivity of Christianity,” as part of a new “threefold
pattern” for studying theology. Schleiermacher’s threefold pattern consisted of three
divisions: practical theology; historical theology (which called for the study of: Scripture,
church history, and dogmatics); and, philosophical theology.154 Farley holds that, with
each of these divisions, Schleiermacher included the “essence of Christianity” motif
“either as criterion appealed to or as a directly thematized subject of inquiry;”155
however, he maintains that this was most especially the case with the third division,
philosophical theology. Here, Farley avers that, for Schleiermacher, the “essence of
Christianity” motif meant all that was most connected with “the determinate redemption
of Christianity”156 – or, as Schleiermacher puts it in The Christian Faith, “everything . . .
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related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.”157 As with his
advancement of the notion of the “positivity of Christianity, Schleiermacher’s
development of the “essence of Christianity” motif was profound since, for him, this
meant an “attempt to substitute historical inquiry for the appeal to . . . [biblical and
doctrinal] authority.”158 That is, for Schleiermacher, the “essence of Christianity” was a
new authority that the theologian could utilize to develop authentic Christian doctrine.159
Furthermore, Farley holds that, according to Schleiermacher, the “essence of
Christianity” must be correlated with “a fundamental ontological structure and
requirement of the human being.”160 Indeed, he avers that Schleiermacher saw this as the
core task of his philosophical theology.161 In addition, Farley argues that, for
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Schleiermacher, the “essence of Christianity” is “historical and therefore in process.”162
Thus, according to Schleiermacher, since “there is . . . [both] something fixed and
something mobile about the nature of Christianity,”163 “the essence of Christianity must
continually be interpreted, evaluated, and reformulated so that the articulation of this
essence can be developed.”164
Farley further argues that as the Christian tradition continued to develop after
Schleiermacher – while his notion about the training-of-clergy purpose within the
“clerical paradigm” was, generally speaking, embraced – his notion about the “essence of
Christianity” did not gain as much traction.165 Farley holds that part of the fallout of the
these developments is that there has been not only a loss of seeking to “grasp what is
‘essential’ [in Christianity] . . . and . . . [of endeavoring to] relate it to (human) reality”166
– but also an opening of the way “to the older biblicism and supernaturalism.”167 In other
words, he avers that while Schleiermacher pointed to the way in which the Christian
tradition could have regained “theology” – as a “habitus” – as a human cognition of God,
the Christian tradition has largely missed this opportunity and, therefore, has lost the
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opportunity to once again grasp authentic “theologia.” Therefore, Farley identifies his
methodological task as an effort to encourage the Christian tradition to return to a
Schleiermacherean endeavor to correlate the essence of Christianity (everything related
to the redemptive activity of Jesus Christ mediated through the church) with human
cognitivity in its prereflective and reflective forms.168
In short, Farley’s comprehension of Schleiermacher’s concepts of the “positivity
of Christianity” and the “essence of Christianity” and of the way these concepts have
functioned within the larger Christian tradition seems to offer a microcosm of Farley’s
overarching theological project. In particular, what can be seen in Farley’s
comprehension of Schleiermacher – the summons to turn away from a universal to a
more specific, historical subject matter as well as the summons to turn away from an
understanding of theology that endeavors to ground itself with a historically detached
biblicism to an understanding of theology that seeks to connect the historical
distinctiveness of Christianity with the way in which human cognition has been
structured – can also be seen, in a more developed manner, not only with Farley’s
critique of “the house of authority” but also with his method of ecclesial reflection, in
which the faith community attempts both to retrieve the buried but nevertheless
historically available realities of faith and to relate these realities to human cognitive
processes.
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A Theological Eidetics of the Faith Community’s Structures of Language,
Redemptive Existence, and Intersubjectivity
Having endeavored to demonstrate that, in order to see realities, one must turn to
faith’s apprehensions, as they are found in the faith community, Farley might then,
ideally, endeavor to carry out “a full eidetics of ecclesia.”169 However, since the scope of
such a project would be so vast, he determines, instead, to focus on “those components of
ecclesia which bear on the problem of faith and reality.”170 He maintains that those
components (or structures) of ecclesia (or the faith community) which most pertain to this
problem are: language (especially images or symbols), redemptive existence, and
intersubjectivity. Yet, in order to examine these structures in their proper context, one
must first consider Farley’s concepts of: “world,” “life-world,” and “faith-world.”171
World, life-world, and faith-world. Alluding to Husserl, Farley argues that
“world” is the entirety of all backgrounds and of all potential future acts and intentions,172
and he suggests that since the “intention of a background and horizon is present prior to
any actual perception, . . . the result is that world is ‘passively pre-given.’”173 Moreover,
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he holds that “life-world” is “the world in the sense of the common-sense world, the
world of everyday life.”174 On the basis of these concepts, Farley, again alluding to
Husserl, stresses that one’s life-world “is comprised not just of things but of facts, and
not just of facts but entities which exist . . . in graduations of importance.”175 Thus, for
example, “the chair in my living room is not simply a thing with a certain shape and
color. In my life-world it is present as expensive, as early American, as having been
inherited from a revered ancestor, as being too frail to be used.”176
With these Husserlian-informed sketches of what he means by world and lifeworld, Farley develops a concept of faith-world. Here he maintains that “faith has a
‘world of its own;’ . . . possesses a language of its own; . . . and has a community of its
own.”177 However, he also argues that the faith-world is not “a world in the sense of one
among many contiguous worlds that exist side by side.”178 There are two reasons for this.
First, “faith tends to permeate the total life-world . . . [because the] faith community . . .
[intends to] re-form the life-world after its own image.”179 And, second, “faith tends to
be world-creating not merely in the sense of permeating any existing life-world; it calls
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forth ‘world’ in the very special sense of the world, the one world.”180 Yet, Farley
acknowledges, “in Western civilization where secularity has largely replaced the
preceding religious world-view, faith is largely unsuccessful in actualizing its own telos
toward world, and lives in fact in a schizophrenic state, being impelled to incorporate the
very secularity which is its greatest threat and competitor.”181
According to Farley, “the recovery of the faith-world helps partially to correct the
usual individualistic treatments of faith, and reminds us that, when faith does occur, it
tends to pervade and alter the life-world.”182 Yet, he argues, this intended correction
leaves out “the very thing that carries faith in its world-pervading and world-creating
propensity, namely a specific human community.”183 Therefore, he turns his attention to
the specific human community of faith or, more precisely, to those structures of the
community of faith that most pertain to the problem of faith and reality – the structures of
language, redemptive existence, and intersubjectivity.
The faith community’s structure of language. Farley argues that the community
of faith has a “language of its own,”184 and he maintains that this occurs because of three
different reasons. First, the faith community (like any community) “necessarily involves
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ways in which human beings are reciprocally related by . . . everyday life activities, . . .
and these activities involving reciprocal relationships are conducted, as Wittgenstein
says, by means of the appropriate language games.”185 Second, the faith community has a
language of its own, according to Farley, because language plays a role in the historical
continuity of the faith community, as this community (like other communities) seems “to
have a kind of instinct for survival which propels . . . [it] to a constant selfperpetuation.”186 Third, the community of faith has its own language since this
community has the concern to redemptively alter human existence, and it appears
“evident that language is an utterly indispensable component of this alteration.”187
Having endeavored to show why the faith community has a language of its own,
Farley then seeks to “find a way to identify the more enduring and constitutive
dimensions of . . . [the] linguisticality of the community of faith.”188 Towards this end, he
begins by setting forth the notion that between “the perceiving subject” (the act of
consciousness) and “the perceived object” there is “the meant object” or “the noema.”189
Thus, Farley argues that “noematic analysis would appear to be a potentially fruitful tool
in the hands of theologians, . . . [for] if faith involves human consciousness or is in some
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way an ‘act of consciousness,’ it will have noemata which can then be propounded.”190
But, he holds that, so far, noematic analysis, as it has been practiced, has been too
individualistic; therefore, he indicates that he intends to explore how it can be carried out
in a more communal manner.191
Intending to point the way toward a more corporate understanding of noematic
analysis, Farley argues that “there is an analogy between the . . . consciousness acts of an
individual psyche and the cooperative and interdependent activities and co-intentions
which characterize a particular social world.”192 And, in light of this, it must follow, he
maintains, that “the corporate stratum like the individual one is intentional in structure.
This means that it too is linguistically carried, that it has meant objects in necessary
correlation with its social acts and its depth intersubjectivity.”193 Therefore, according to
Farley, corporate noemata do exist. And, because they do, theological method and
theological hermeneutics “must reach for the noematic dimension . . . [not only of
individuals but also] of the community.”194
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Farley holds that the language which carries the corporate intentions of the faith
community is the language of story and image and that the language whose role it is to
help make the corporate intentions relevant and comprehendible is myth and doctrine.195
Here, he maintains that “myth itself is not the most original layer of religious imagery but
the product of an attempt to translate such into the inclusive and objective world-view of
a given age.”196 This shift from “story and image” to “myth and doctrine” occurs because
“story and image are always in search of myth . . . [and doctrine], a way of being
cosmologized into the objective consensus of an age and its world-picture.”197 For
instance, “with the creation narratives of Genesis, . . . the prevailing Babylonian
cosmology is appropriated in order to make understandable that the ‘world’ is the setting
of the story of Yahweh and his people.”198 And, Farley avers, if one were to try to reach
the corporate noemata reflected in these creation narratives, one would need to try get
beyond the “second moment” of the (conscious, institutional) Genesis myth to the “first
moment” of the (pre-conscious, pre-institutional) story and images behind the Genesis
myth.199
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With his treatment of story and image, Farley gives particular attention to the
latter, indicating that the unique type of images on which he has focused are “constitutive
images, meant correlates of a community’s corporate intentionality and not the everchanging and rich imagery that resides in the rhetoric of the leaders of that community in
a given time.”200 Later in his career, he appears to refer to this type of images as “deep
symbols.”201 And, his development of the concept of “deep symbols” reveals much about
his understanding of theological method; therefore, I will turn to a more substantive
exploration to the way in which he sets forth this concept.202
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One might wonder if this development in Farley’s theological method also
reflects a change in his theological method. I would argue that it does not reflect a
change, at least not a substantive one. In some of his later works, such as Edward Farley,
Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress
Press, 1990), Divine Empathy: A Theology of God, and Deep Symbols, he does turn to a
broader base of philosophers, most notably Emmanuel Levinas as well as Martin Buber
(and, to a lesser degree, Alfred North Whitehead and others); however, the central tenets
of his theological method remain the same throughout all of these books. As Farley notes
in an article in which he considers some of his own major works:
I have always thought that theologians are better off as philosophical pluralists.
This is because any specific philosophy is only one way to supplement and
correct abstracting human experience. . . . If theology would probe the way
things of faith modify actuality, it finds itself drawn to whatever may be useful for
that purpose [as set forth in Edward Farley, “Reflecting on Some Reflections: A
Third-Order Essay,” Religious Studies Review 24 (April 1998): 153].
Thus, philosophy has primarily an instrumental (rather than a determinative) function in
Farley’s thought. In addition, some of his terminology (for the same or similar concepts)
undergoes alterations, such as from “constitutive images” (in his earlier work, EM) to
“deep symbols” (in his later work, Deep Symbols); yet, in general, these changes simply
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An excursus on Farley’s understanding of “deep symbols.” Farley defines “deep
symbols” as “the values by which a community understands itself, from which it takes it
aims, and to which it appeals as canons of cultural criticism,”203 and he indicates that they
are “deep” since “they reside in perduring linguistic structures . . . [or master narratives]
that maintain the community’s very existence and . . . [since] they do not come and go
with particular acts of speaking.”204 However, Farley argues that postmodernism now
threatens to infect, discredit and perhaps to altogether remove deep symbols, including
those of the Christian tradition, at least as they currently exist in industrialized Western
societies.205 Therefore, in view of this threat, Farley argues that the faith community
should seek to reclaim these deep symbols.
In an effort to point to how a broad-based reclamation of deep symbols might
occur, Farley addresses several significant deep symbols that currently (still) exist in
Western culture, including: tradition, obligation, and hope. In each case, he examines not

reflect an effort to use less formal (and more accessible) language.
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only what the particular deep symbol expresses but also how it is under a postmodern
threat and how it might be restored.
For instance, he holds that the deep symbol of tradition conveys, among other
elements, “the experiences and insights of a specific people and time . . . [that] can be
occasions for truth and wisdom ranging far beyond that people.”206 Thus, tradition
expresses the wisdom of past corporate human experience. Yet, he maintains that
Western culture has been on the brink of becoming a “traditionless society,” since the
postmodern outlook has so contaminated corporate, media, political and other “powerful
institutions that set the . . . dominant interpretive categories of everyday life . . . [that] the
central function . . . of these institutions is . . . [no longer] the mediation of wisdom [of
the past] . . . but the successful prosecution of the institution’s distinctive aim.”207 In
order for the deep symbol of tradition to at least be rethought (if not also restored), three
things are required, according to Farley: “centering, sorting, and embodying.”208
“Centering . . . simply means grasping the god-term . . .[or deep symbol] itself, centering
so exclusively on it that one presses past the caricatures, criticisms, and paradigms – the
wrapping in which tradition comes to us – to grasp what tradition is.”209 “Sorting is a
rethinking that disentangles tradition from the packages in which it is interpretively
wrapped, from paradigms that have captured it but no longer work, and from social
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systems that would use it as an offensive weapon.”210 Thus, Farley’s concepts of
“centering” and “sorting” seem similar to his concepts of “bracketing” and “uncovering,”
as he indicates they should occur within the process of the reflective method. Finally,
embodiment “is to think . . . [tradition’s] wisdom as incarnated in the actualities of the
present.”211
In addition, Farley avers that the deep symbol of obligation expresses duty or
responsibility from one human being towards another. To illustrate this deep symbol and
to show how it suffers from postmodern influences, he argues the following:
In the pages of . . . George Eliot and Charles Dickens, the power and reality of
obligation is taken for granted, . . . [but] when we enter the social worlds of
multinational corporations, the phenomenon of Madonna, or even a mental health
clinic, we find ourselves on what seems to be a different planet. Even if
obligation has not disappeared from these worlds, it is not the primary stuff that
structures them.212
If the deep symbol of obligation is to have the possibility of being retrieved, what has to
happen, Farley maintains, is that the faith community must “try to recall . . . something
we experience, not just a hypothesis or theory or concept.”213 Thus, as with tradition, he
argues that centering, sorting, and embodying must be employed in order to rethink
obligation. “Centering” obligation involves, among other aspects, comprehending not
only that “obligation draws us toward an acknowledgment of the other . . . [but also that]
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as obliged we are called to act, to be active toward the other.”214 Furthermore, drawing
on Emmanuel Levinas,215 Farley holds that centering obligation includes grasping that
“the other as face . . . [or the other in its intrinsic vulnerability] . . . is the origin of
obligation,”216 and, alluding to Martin Buber,217 he suggests that centering obligation
involves comprehending that “obligation . . . originates as human beings exist in ongoing
relation to each other.”218 “Sorting” obligation, Farley avers, means, in part,
disentangling obligation from “the sphere of an ordering institution . . . [and taking it
back to] the sphere of relation.”219 Also, “embodying” obligation, he argues, entails
seeking to carry out obligation not just “in the coziness of our primary relations . . . [but
also] in ever wider world environments.”220
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Moreover, Farley holds that the deep symbol of hope “finds its way into a variety
of expressions: the kingdom of God, Messiah, second coming, . . . the new aeon.”221 Yet,
as with tradition and obligation, Farley posits that “hope has little place in the way
postmodern society confronts problems or understands the world. What currently makes
more sense in such a society is planning, organizing, or predicting.”222 In order for the
deep symbol of hope to be rethought, two potential solutions, according to Farley, must
be avoided. The first is an objective solution; this solution holds, for instance, that
“because of a passage in Revelation 21, because the millennium will take place, we
hope.”223 The second is a subjective solution; this solution maintains, for example, that
“my act of hope, my hopeful disposition, so orients me to action that my future is
reshaped, and in some sense the kingdom of God comes.”224 He argues that both of these
possible solutions are inadequate – “the objectivist view . . . [fails because it] reduces
hope to a belief that something will come about in the future; . . . [and] the subjectivist
view . . . [comes up short since] it reduces hope to subjective confidence and makes it an
extension of human effort.”225
Against these two potential but flawed solutions, Farley avers that a more reliable
way for the deep symbol of hope to be thought is by turning to community, since “all
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deep symbols arise within and guide the life of communities.”226 He acknowledges that
“communities do not, of course, engage in acts of hoping.”227 Yet, he holds that they “are
temporal entities; . . . [therefore,] they have a past and ways of keeping the past
(tradition) alive, . . . [and] they also move into the future and have ways of symbolizing
their future.”228 Thus, “the enduring gatherings of face-to-face relations we call
communities symbolize and narratize the way we hope.”229 Accordingly, he argues that
“religious communities . . . are called to hope, to rediscover and rethink hope in a
situation in which the words of power are not confirmed or embodied in the larger
society.”230
Farley’s concept of deep symbols – including his treatment of tradition,
obligation, and hope – brings greater clarity to and further develops some of the aspects
of his understanding of theological method. In particular, his notion of deep symbols
more fully shows that the new authority he has in mind to replace “the house of
authority” (with its loci of sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional church) is
communal experience or, more specifically, the experience of the faith community. That
is, his highest authority or, to borrow his archaeological framework, his deepest authority
for theological method seems to be the faith community’s experience. In other words,
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while he allows for the existence of such entities as deep symbols, master narratives
(which, he argues, could be “grand paradigms” or, for Christians, “the Gospel”),231 and
doctrines,232 he holds that it is not entities such as these that inform or serve as ultimately
authoritative resources for the faith community or the experience of this community but
just the opposite. He argues that the faith community or the experience of this
community (or sometimes, more broadly, the interhuman) informs or functions as an
ultimately authoritative resource for deep symbols, master narratives, and doctrines.
For Farley, deep symbols should not be changed lightly – and, in most cases, the
faith community should vigilantly endeavor to preserve them – however, in the end, deep
symbols or “god-terms originate as human beings have to do with each other in the
distinctive sphere of the interhuman . . . [or in a particular community],”233 since “it is the
problems and phenomena of the sphere of the interhuman that provide much of the
content of deep symbols; . . . in this way arise symbols that sort out the world, constrain
certain kind of human acts, and set responsibilities.”234 Therefore, since they originate
within the interhuman, “deep symbols . . . are relative to a particular community and thus
are changeable,”235 by, he implies, the particular community.
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Likewise, he holds that master narratives, which exist together with deep
symbols,236 should perdure – and, generally speaking, the faith community should seek to
protect these narratives – however, “the master narrative [for Christians], . . . the Gospel
is neither an aggregate of ancient texts nor is it the content of most specific texts. And to
leap from specific text to application surely bypasses the question of the real and the
reality of the Gospel.”237 Where is this “question of the real” to be addressed? Farley
suggests that it is to be addressed in “the world,” that is, in “creation,” by the community
of faith.238 And, if the faith community comes to discover an insight to the real in
creation, then it may fix or revise the “ancient codes . . . [of the master narrative].”239
Similarly, Farley argues that doctrines also rest upon the deeper authority of the
faith community’s experience. For instance, he sets forth the following view with regard
to the deep symbol of hope:
The church of course has its doctrines of heaven, resurrection, and all that. But
the power of those doctrines rests on hope as a word of power. To think that
these doctrines are the reason we hope is to get the matter backward. We do not
hope because we believe X, Y, or Z. We believe X, Y, and Z as expression of our
hope. Accordingly, instead of exploring the doctrines of heaven, second coming,
or life after death, I shall try to uncover the sense, the reality, the idea of hope.240
Thus, for Farley, doctrines rest upon deep symbols; and deep symbols, in turn, rest upon
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reality; and, reality, in turn, as has already been shown, rests upon the faith community’s
experience (in the world).
Therefore, when it comes to relations among the faith community’s experience,
deep symbols, master narratives, and doctrines, Farley indicates that he intends to
“privilege . . . the interhuman.”241 That is, among these relations, he argues for the
privileging of human experience as it occurs within the community – or, more
specifically from the Christian perspective, for the privileging of human experience as it
takes place within the faith community. In other words, he argues that “deepest
authority” should be granted to the experience of the faith community.
The faith community’s structure of redemptive existence. However, in the context
of his thesis that “faith’s apprehensions occur pre-reflectively and by means of an
enduring participation in a form of corporate, historical existence which . . . [he
sometimes refers to as] ecclesia,”242 Farley maintains that “ecclesia is that form of
corporate historical existence whose origin and continuation is made possible by Jesus
Christ, . . . [and] since Jesus Christ is the redeemer, ecclesia is both his instrument of
redemption and the extension of his redemptive presence.”243 In light of this, Farley
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further argues that to participate “in ecclesia means, therefore, . . . [to participate in] a
modification of human existence toward redemption.”244
Yet, in setting forth the notion that ecclesia is the instrument of Jesus Christ’s
salvific presence, Farley is not suggesting that humans have no role in the redemptive
existence of the faith community. To the contrary, he holds that humans have the innate
capacity: to respond to redemption;245 “to distinguish good and evil;”246 to refuse “chaos”
(i.e., to refuse to willingly accept the effects of evil and disorder);247 to refuse external
determination by another (even if this refusal may not always be successful, as, for
instance, with an unsuccessful attempt to refuse an act of murder);248 and, to apprehend
alienation.249
Among these innate human capacities, Farley argues that the refusal of chaos is
paramount. In fact, he suggests that the “refusal of chaos . . . is the ultimate framework
of man’s endeavors,”250 part of his “religious a priori.”251 And, he holds that “this refusal
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persists even when man’s world picture is thoroughly secular and when there is an
intellectual resignation to chaos, . . . [since] human consciousness is structured by a
proclivity toward the anti-chaos, whatever that is.”252 When humans inappropriately
handle this refusal of chaos, disrupted existence ensues.253 For example, Farley maintains
that “idolatry” occurs when man seeks “to secure himself against refused chaos and to
transcend his vulnerability by means of something in his environment.”254 That is, stated
conversely, he suggests that “idolatry” occurs when one attempts establish order through
something of this world. Another way in which humans can inappropriately deal with the
refusal of chaos is through what Farley terms “flight.” “Flight” happens when one seeks
to escape chaos by escaping “the world, . . . [with all of] its events, furnishings, and
relations.”255
Yet, Farley holds that with redemptive existence, both “idolatry” and “flight” can
be overcome. “Idolatry,” which he argues is more common in Western culture,256 may be
countered with “freedom,” and by “freedom” he means “the modification of idolatrous
existence toward an existence whose feature is a certain power over one’s self-securing
and its idols.”257 In addition, “flight,” which he argues is more common in Eastern
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culture,258 may be countered with “obligation,” and by “obligation” he means, at least in
part, the transformation of flight-ful existence toward an existence whose feature is a
particular power in the direction of “mutual forgiveness and agape.”259
The faith community’s structure of intersubjectivity. In addition to having a
structures of language and redemptive existence, the faith community, Farley avers, has a
structure of intersubjectivity.260 He begins his description of this structure by trying to
clarify and locate the particular aspect of the faith community’s intersubjectivity that he
intends to examine. Along these lines, he makes a distinction between: (1) the surface
“church” strata of the faith community, where participants consciously interact with one
another; and, (2) the depth “ecclesia” strata of the faith community, where
intersubjectivity happens pre-consciously.261 To illustrate this distinction, he points to
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how in a marriage relationship there are: (1) “everyday conscious reciprocities . . .
[between marriage partners];262 and, (2) “an intersubjectivity in which the partners . . .
[pre-consciously] intend each other as mates and possible parents.”263 After making this
distinction, he indicates that he will be investigating intersubjectivity not at the level of
“church” but at the pre-conscious depth level of “ecclesia.”264 Furthermore, he argues
that this depth intersubjectivity of ecclesia is necessarily a “determinate
intersubjectivity,”265 since at this level of the faith community there occurs “the
transposition of the universal structures of intersubjectivity (intending the other as selftranscending other, as personal body, etc.) into the specificity required by a particular
relationship.”266
Having at least somewhat situated the ecclesial intersubjectivity he intends to
examine, Farley stresses that an intersubjective existence comes before redemptive
existence.267 Therefore, he holds that “we are prevented . . . from describing the rise of
ecclesia as the generation of a sociality out of mere isolated individuals.”268
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Finally, he comes to his analysis of “ecclesial” intersubjective existence (which
precedes – but also accompanies269 – redemptive existence). Here one may see, he
argues:
That in ecclesia believers intend each other as human beings and therefore as selftranscending beings marked by the refusals of chaos and of external
determination. And they intend each other as participants in disrupted existence,
and therefore as retaining in some sense the modes of self-securing and flight and
their intersubjective expressions. Thus, the religious a priori and the images of
idolatry and flight are present in the co-intentions of ecclesial man. But these cointentions are always present in and are modified by redemptive existence.270
In other words, he maintains that with ecclesial intersubjectivity (or co-intentionality),
believers pre-reflectively intend each other as those who struggle between right and
wrong in an imperfect world but who have hope of being modified through participation
in redemptive existence.
Moreover, Farley suggests that what makes ecclesia’s intersubjectivity distinct
from the intersubjectivities of other communities is the unusual way in which nonecclesia participants are present to ecclesia participants.271 And, in order to set forth this
strange uniqueness of ecclesia, he indicates that it is now necessary (in the course of his
argument) to remove the brackets that he has heretofore placed on “the whole question of
God and with it the issue of the role of God in bringing about redemptive existence.”272

269

EM, 158.

270

EM, 159.

271

EM, 158.

272

EM, 165. While Farley does not here (with his development of theological
method) articulate how one can know God to be present “once the brackets have been
removed,” he does treat this theme directly with the development of his doctrine of God,

70
With these brackets off, Farley argues that “the most striking thing about ecclesia is that
the presence of God has absolutely no existing social or ethnic conditions; . . . [thus] the
breaking of necessary connections between the divine presence and divinely established
(or permitted) social structures, always a possibility in Israel, is actualized in ecclesia.”273
Accordingly, “if ecclesia does not refer to any one social unit such as a nation, ‘nonChristian’ or the stranger beyond ecclesia takes on a very different status.”274
Having established the locus of the divine presence as being unbound with regard
to human social structures, Farley next turns to “the way in which the stranger is present
in the co-intentionalities of redemptive existence.”275 Since the stranger, whoever she
may be, not only shares the innate capacity to refuse chaos and external determination
but also shares a disrupted historical existence, she has met “the only conditions for
participation in ecclesia.”276 That is, Farley argues, ethnic conversion is not required as
an additional condition in order to participate in ecclesia,277 and this is the case because,
from the perspective of the ecclesial community, God is not bound by social or ethnic
constraints. Moreover, not only is ethnic conversion not required of the stranger, but
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ecclesia actually “adapts its social and institutional form to the home-world of the
stranger and not vice versa.”278 Furthermore, Farley maintains that it is only after the
stranger has been present in the co-intentionalities of redemptive existence thus far
described that the ecclesial participant will then be “ready to recall the traditional
language which purports to express ecclesia’s uniqueness, the language of ‘belief in Jesus
Christ.’”279

The Faith Community’s Mediation of Realities: The Basis for Christian Doctrine
A final major component of Farley’s understanding of theological method is his
development of the view that the faith community mediates realities which are present to
those of the faith community and that these realities become the basis for what might be
referred to as doctrine. However, before moving to the development of this view, he first
carries out some additional contextual groundwork by setting forth both his conception of
how the faith community may be conceived of as a determinate social world and his
understanding of an intersubjective theory of appresentation.
The faith community as a determinate social world. The faith community, Farley
argues, is one of many different types of determinate social worlds, all of which “mediate
reality in ways unique to themselves.”280 However, drawing on Husserl,281 he maintains
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that it is impossible to apprehend a determinate social world “in its concreteness,”282
unless one actually participates in that determinate social world.283 The point Farley
makes here reminds me of an account of the children of a missionary family who, after
being abroad for six years, return to their home country and, to their shock and dismay,
find themselves completely out of touch with a culture that has “moved on” without
them. Thus, while still citizens of their homeland, these children were no longer able (at
least temporarily) to apprehend the determinate social world of their homeland, in its
concreteness, because for six years (in the days before the internet) they had altogether
stopped participating in their homeland’s determinate social world. Moreover, Farley
holds that determinate social worlds shape human consciousness, where “consciousness”
is “the locus of perceptivity,”284 by influencing “powers of perception.”285 For example, a
determinate social world can so influence the perceptive powers of a slave that he may
not see something “about slavery which contradicts his being.”286 Thus, Farley
emphasizes that social determinacy does not just offer “a mere perspective on reality; . . .
[rather, it also] is itself a way in which historical being has come to be.”287
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Toward an intersubjective theory of appresentation. Having initially described
how the faith community functions as a determinate social world, Farley intends to then
demonstrate how ecclesia mediates reality; however, before he can pursue this he must
first set forth the groundwork for an intersubjective theory of appresentation.288
Therefore, I turn now to this groundwork, primarily by exploring the way in which Farley
understands Husserl’s notion of appresentation.
Farley maintains that appresentation is an aspect of human perception, and he
holds that in order to perceive any object, one must “mean a unity of some sort.”289 Thus,
for example, to perceive a house (as, perhaps, one is driving down a street) is not simply
to receive an image of the front of a building that is in one’s line of vision. Instead, one
intends a total, unified house.290 That is, “we fill out, in an analogizing act which owes
its possibility to the imagination, the yet un-sensed portions of the object before us.
These un-sensed portions are not directly presented but are appresent.”291 Furthermore,
again relying on Husserl,292 Farley argues that appresentation happens not only with the
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perception of objects like houses but also with the perception of the consciousness of
another person. For instance, he holds that “the heard speech, bodily movements, and
gestures of the other person appresent to us a personal body and consciousness like our
own.”293 In addition, he maintains that “perception not only involves appresented aspects
of the object before us but . . . [also] appresented aspects of that object’s environment.”294
Thus:
I perceive a given tree not as an isolated monad floating by itself in a vacuum but
in connection with its field. . . . One cannot perceive a tree as a tree (conferring
on it the sense tree) without at the same time intending the ‘field’ necessary to a
tree, in which roots grow, on which weight rests, etc. Therefore, if I perceive
only the branches of a tree outside my third story window, I fill out what remains
in a twofold way. I complete aspects of the tree itself which are not directly
presented to me, and I complete the context or field which tree requires.295
With this line of thought, Farley moves toward an intersubjective theory of
appresentation. I will endeavor to show how he completes this theory in the next
subsection.
How the faith community mediates realities. In view of his understanding of the
faith community as a determinate social world and in light of his initial movement
towards an intersubjective theory of appresentation, Farley then proceeds to demonstrate
how ecclesia mediates reality. Towards this end, he begins by arguing that, within the
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faith community, a distinction has often been made between: (1) the “direct” mediation
of reality (as with isolatable “religious experiences”);296 and, (2) the “indirect” mediation
of reality (as with belief in God – by means of trust in Scripture and tradition).297 Then
he maintains that his phenomenological theology “continues but also alters this . . .
[traditional “house of authority”] distinction between immediate and mediate modes of
the presence of reality to faith.”298
With phenomenological theology, Farley holds that a distinction should be made
between: (1') direct apprehensions of “realities at hand” – but only as “these
apprehensions occur in conjunction with the shaping effect of determinate
intersubjectivity rather than . . . [in conjunction with] isolatable biographical
‘experiences;’”299 and, (2') indirect apprehensions of realities which are not “at hand” –
but only as they occur through direct apprehensions of “realities at hand,” since “realities
at hand . . . [can] appresent realities not at hand.”300 Thus, with (1'), Farley conveys
that, for phenomenological theology, direct apprehensions of “realities at hand” can
happen, although not (as with the traditional approach) through isolatable religious
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experiences but only through the shaping effect of (or through the mediation of) the
determinate faith community.301 And, with (2'), he maintains that, for phenomenological
theology, indirect apprehensions of “realities not at hand” can also occur – but only as
they take place by means of direct apprehensions of “realities at hand;” thus, even with
(2'), a direct experience of reality cannot be circumvented.
With this understanding of a phenomenological approach to mediations of reality,
Farley endeavors to show how this approach may be appropriated to justify affirmations
about specific religious events. For instance, he argues that justifying affirmations about
the historical redeemer, Jesus Christ, may be made not simply and solely by appealing to
Scripture or tradition302 – but also by turning to “the realities-at-hand which faith
apprehends; . . . [for these realities-at-hand] present not only themselves; . . . [they also]
appresent other realities . . . [such as the historical redeemer].”303 Moreover, he maintains
that, with this process, one “begins . . . [an] exploration of the way in which faith grasps
the historical redeemer by ‘questioning back’ or uncovering the pre-reflective levels of
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faith.”304 That is, he argues, one “must push beneath the strata of conscious piety,
doctrine, and myth to the linguistic correlates of the modification of human existence
toward redemption (to story and image), and to the pre-reflective co-intentions which
utilize these images to constitute the other human being in ecclesia.”305 As this “pushing
beneath the strata” occurs, one sees (among other things) that the human being’s innate
quality of “obligation expresses . . . conditions necessary for the mutual honoring of the
other’s self-determination.”306 This, in turn, allows one to see that the community of faith
“can never be simply a white community, a black community, a national community, or a
class community,”307 which, in turn, permits one to see “a testimony to the one whose
death and resurrection was the occasion of this negation . . . [of ethnic and social
boundaries].”308 In other words, Farley suggests that, through a process of “digging
beneath” the “at hand” non-discriminatory actions of ecclesia, “the . . . [‘not at hand’]
historical figure who is the subject of . . . [the Christian] tradition is appresent to the
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reality of ecclesia.”309 However, Farley cautions that Jesus Christ’s “historicity is not
‘proved’ by the tradition alone or by appresentation alone. . . . [Rather,] the tradition’s
imagery, the participation in ecclesia, and the appresenting of obligation work together to
appresent a historical rather than mythical figure.”310
In this manner, Farley suggests that, along with numerous “realities at hand,”
various “realities not at hand” (such as the historical redeemer who removed ethnic and
social boundaries) – which have been appresented by “realities at hand” (such as the
“reality at hand” that ecclesia seeks to abolish ethnic and social boundaries) – can
become the basis for what has traditionally been referred to as doctrine.

Conclusion
I have tried to show in this chapter that Farley has some definite and very well
crafted ideas both about what theological method should not be and about what it should
be. What it should not be, he argues, is what he terms the “classical criteriology”
approach that would construct theological doctrines on top of a “house of authority,” with
its two founding presuppositions of salvation history and the principle of identity and its
three loci of sacred Scripture, dogma, and the institutional church. Farley argues that this
house does not stand largely because: (1) its founding axioms allow for both, with
salvation history, an overly strong divine determinism, which leads to insurmountable
theodicy problems, and, with the principle of identity, a misguided notion about the
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capacity of humans to have direct access to God’s acts of willing; and, (2) the first of the
three loci, the Scripture principle, irrationally permits to stand the decision of the early
church to treat Scripture as sacred, which leads to ecclesia having a misplaced social
identity in Scripture (instead of where it should be, in a common experience of salvation).
In contrast, Farley avers that what theological method should be is a method
outside of “the house of authority,” a method that can be described as “ecclesial
reflection.” Drawing on Husserl and often alluding to Schleiermacher, Farley first seeks
to show how, with this method, one can uncover faith’s realities, the “theological
given,”311 as they may be found in the Christian faith community. In part, he holds that
this can be accomplished by means of many of the operative principles of
phenomenology. One of the central operative principles is the reflective method, which
involves: bracketing both church authority and metaphysics; getting beneath the everyday
activities of the church to the deep strata of the faith-world; and, theological eidetics,
where one seeks to uncover the essences of faith’s realities, as these essences occur
between the noemata of (concrete, corporate, historical) faith realities and the noeses of
the consciousness of various ecclesia participants. In addition to the operative principles
of phenomenology, Farley argues that faith’s realities can be uncovered through
theological portraiture. This involves seeking the already given – but still revisable –
ecclesial existence (or ecclesiality), which is available in “the depth sociality, the
determinate intersubjectivity [or co-intentionality] . . . of the . . . [faith] community.”312
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With these tools in hand, especially theological eidetics, Farley indicates,
secondly, that he will show how these tools can be employed (in what amounts to an
initial illustration of their use) by pursuing an eidetics of those structures “of ecclesia
which bear on the problem of faith and reality,”313 and he holds that those structures are
language, redemptive existence, and intersubjectivity. With ecclesia’s language, Farley
argues that a theological eidetics uncovers the corporate intentions (or noemata or
experiences) of the faith community (or of the interhuman) as these intentions have been
made available through the language of story and image (or deep symbols) – and as these
stories and images have, in turn, been conveyed through myths and doctrines. In other
words, he holds that the phenomenological theological “archaeologist” must dig through
the surface layer of myths and doctrines, in order to get to a middle layer of stories and
images, in order to get to the deepest layer of the essence of corporate experiences
(intentions, noemata) of the faith community. Next, with the faith community’s structure
of redemptive existence, he avers that a theological eidetics uncovers how Jesus Christ
and participants in the faith community have worked to modify human existence toward
redemption, especially with regard to helping humanity appropriately refuse not only
chaos (by means of rejecting “idolatry” and “flight” in favor, respectively, of “freedom”
and “obligation”) but also such matters as external determination. Then, with ecclesia’s
intersubjectivity, Farley maintains that a theological eidetics – applied specifically to the
depth ecclesia strata of the faith community, where intersubjectivity occurs preconsciously – reveals: (1) an ecclesial existence where ecclesia participants intend each
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other as those who morally struggle but who have hope of being modified (towards a
refusal of chaos and external determination, etc.) by means of involvement in redemptive
existence; and, (2) the unique manner in which non-ecclesia participants are present to
ecclesia participants – as those who are not required to undergo ethnic conversion in
order to participate in ecclesia (since, with the brackets removed, we see that the God of
ecclesia has no existing social or ethnic conditions).
Third, with the method of “ecclesial reflection,” Farley maintains that the faith
community, as a determinate social world, mediates realities which are present to those
actively participating in the faith community and that these realities becomes the basis for
what might be referred to as doctrine. He begins to develop this line of thought by
arguing that active participants in ecclesia can experience not only direct apprehensions
of “realities at hand” (as these apprehensions take place together with the formative
effect of determinate intersubjectivity) but also indirect apprehensions of “realities not at
hand” – only as they occur through direct apprehensions of “realities at hand,” since
“realities at hand . . . [can] appresent realities not at hand.”314 Therefore, he avers that
one can have access to indirect apprehensions of “realities not at hand” only as they are
mediated through direct experiences of reality. Next, he holds that this
phenomenological approach to mediations of reality can be used to justify claims about
particular religious events. For example, and most significantly, he holds that – assuming
the availability of ecclesia’s imagery and assuming active participation in ecclesia – the
“at hand” non-discriminatory actions of the faith community appresent the “not at hand”
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redemptive historical figure of Jesus Christ. Thus, Farley suggests that both “realities at
hand” and “realities not at hand” (as they are obtained through “realities at hand”) can
become the grounds for what has commonly been known as doctrine.
With this examination of Farley’s theological method of “ecclesial reflection,” I
will now, in chapter 2, turn to a treatment of McClendon’s theological method. Then, in
chapter 3, I will consider the way in which Farley employs “ecclesial reflection” toward
the development of a doctrine of God. Finally, after a similar analysis of McClendon’s
construction of a doctrine of God in chapter 4, I will, in chapter 5, offer a more thorough
evaluation of Farley’s method and doctrine in dialogue with other commentaries on his
work.
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CHAPTER 2
JAMES MCCLENDON’S THEOLOGICAL METHOD
In this chapter I endeavor to set forth and to begin to critique the central aspects
of James McClendon’s theological method. In brief, these aspects are as follows. First,
he argues, together with the philosopher James M. Smith, that individuals and
communities develop convictions (and conviction sets) and that, as conflicts emerge
among various individuals and communities, these convictions (and conviction sets)
should be treated neither as completely eradicable nor as entirely ineradicable but, rather,
as partially eradicable. As part of this argument, he defends (against both a hard realism
and a hard relativism) a soft form of a communal, epistemological relativism. Second, he
avers that there are at least three sources from which Christian convictions (and
conviction sets) may be formed – narrative, experience, and community. Among these
sources, he holds that the dominant one must be narrative, where “narrative” means
primarily the Bible but also the Christian tradition (including biographies of believers
within that tradition). Third, he sets forth a “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutical
principle, by which he means (at least in part) that Scripture “speaks to” the present
Christian community. In other words, for him, Scripture does not just address disciples
in the primitive (or future) church but directly addresses them in the church of “today” as
well.
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Convictional Perspectivism
A cornerstone of McClendon’s theological method is his notion of the degree to
which convictional conflicts among differing individuals or communities may (or may
not) be eradicated. By “convictional conflicts” he means something akin to disputes over
tightly-held, essential beliefs.1 McClendon, along with Smith, sets forth his most
extensive treatment of this notion in Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism;2
however, McClendon further develops it in his three-volume Systematic Theology.3
In contrast to both (1) convictional imperialists – who maintain that “conflicts in
beliefs among persons or communities are . . . completely eradicable”4 – and (2)
convictional relativists – who hold that “convictional differences . . . [are] an inevitable .
. . [and] ineradicable . . . fact of human existence”5 – (3) convictional perspectivists, with
whom McClendon and Smith align themselves, argue that conflicts in beliefs are
“expected, but not inevitable, fundamental but not ultimate, enduring but not inherently
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Religious Convictions (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975),
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Trinity Press International, 1994), 5.
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James William McClendon, Jr., Systematic Theology, vol. 1, Ethics, rev. ed.
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002); idem, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, Doctrine
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994); and, idem, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, Witness
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000).
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ineradicable.”6 That is, to restate in terms of communication: convictional imperialism
leans towards monologue; convictional relativism towards silence or dissonance; and,
convictional perspectivism towards dialogue. In short, according to McClendon’s and
Smith’s convictional perspectivism, one should construct theology at some point between
the view that convictional conflicts are eradicable (the more dominating monologue of
imperialism) and the view that they are ineradicable (the more isolated silence or
dissonance of relativism).
Furthermore, in close conjunction with McClendon’s and Smith’s notion of the
degree to which convictional conflicts among differing individuals or communities may
(or may not) be eradicated is their view that theology should be developed within an
epistemological framework that rests somewhere between a hard realism and a hard
relativism. More specifically, they endeavor to show that while convictional imperialism
embraces a hard realism and convictional relativism a hard relativism, convictional
perspectivism embraces a soft (communal) relativism.7
Accordingly, a key aim of this section is to unfold where exactly for McClendon
and Smith the dialogical and epistemological points of convictional perspectivism rest.

6

Convictions, 9, emphasis mine.
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“Embrace” may be too strong of a term here when it comes to convictional
perspectivism “embracing” a soft (communal) relativism; more accurate, as I’ll try to
show below, might be something closer to “grudgingly embrace.” A core issue, in this
regard, is that while McClendon and Smith seek to include a theory of correspondence
within convictional perspectivism, they concede that they do not have such a theory, as
set forth in Convictions, 77. So, perhaps one could say that they “reluctantly embrace” a
soft (communal) relativism or, as McClendon later implies, an “intermediate . . .
relativism,” as set forth in McClendon, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, Witness, 52.
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To this end I will seek to address the following questions. What do they mean by the
term “convictions?” How do they understand the two poles – the poles of convictional
imperialism and convictional relativism – between which they set their own view?
Finally, how do they understand and develop convictional perspectivism?

Towards a Definition of “Convictions”
By “convictions,” McClendon and Smith mean the beliefs of an individual or
community about a topic or collection of topics – only in those cases where these beliefs
are firmly held. More specifically, they define a “conviction” as “a persistent belief such
that if X (a person or community) has a conviction, it will not easily be relinquished and
it cannot be relinquished without making X a significantly different person (or
community) than before.”8 Thus, a belief merits the status of “conviction,” only if it
meets the criteria of being both “persistent” and “significant.” A “persistent” belief,
McClendon and Smith argue, is a belief that is not just a long-lasting but that will be
tenaciously held, even in the face of severe difficulties or attack.9 Similarly, they
maintain that a “significant” belief is one that “exercises a dominant or controlling role

8

Convictions, 5.

9

Indeed, McClendon and Smith hold that “the most important convictions . . . are
maintained even in the face of death,” as posited in Convictions, 161. However, in
arguing that “convictions” are persistent beliefs, McClendon and Smith do not mean that
“convictions” are unchangeable, for they hold that “even one’s most cherished and
tenaciously held convictions might be false and are in principle always subject to
rejection, reformulation, improvement, or reformation,” as set forth in Convictions, 112.
McClendon elsewhere refers to this latter perspective as his and Smith’s “principle of
fallibility,” as shown in McClendon, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, Ethics, 44, and in
McClendon, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, Doctrine, 472.
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over a number of other beliefs held by . . . [its] believer, or . . . that governs (or
corresponds to) broad stretches of . . . [his or her] thought and conduct.”10 Thus, a belief
merits the status of “conviction,” only if it is consistently held and if giving it up would
substantially change the person (or community) holding it. Accordingly, it seems
intuitive, at least in the contemporary western world, that beliefs concerning “one’s
favorite pizza toppings” (though not technically excluded by McClendon’s and Smith’s
definition) would not typically qualify as “convictions,” while beliefs concerning
knowledge, truth, and God would.11
With this general understanding of “convictions,” McClendon and Smith turn to
some pivotal questions: When convictional differences or conflicts emerge among
persons or communities, how should one regard these differences or conflicts? Are they
completely eradicable, entirely ineradicable, or (a via media) partially eradicable?
Furthermore – within this context of discerning the degree of (in)eradicability of
convictional conflicts – which form of epistemology is most tenable: a hard realism; a
hard relativism; or (another via media) a soft relativism?

Convictional Conflicts Are Eradicable: Convictional Imperialism
Among McClendon’s and Smith’s three theories about the nature of convictions,
the one which espouses that convictional differences are completely eradicable is the
theory they term “convictional imperialism.” According to this theory:
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Convictions, 87.
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The intractability of . . . [convictional] differences is said to be due to ignorance
or perversity rather than to serious differences about what it means to be rational
or humane or reverent or scientific. So if a Marxist and a Christian democrat (or
a Buddhist mystic and a scientific humanist) do not now understand one another
or if they now disagree on any fundamental question, such as the meaning of
reasonableness, it is only because one or the other is (or both are) ignorant of
some facts or incapable of thinking straight.12
In other words, while dismissing as trivial or uninformed any view that differs from his
or her own, the convictional imperialist confidently maintains that given enough time,
communication, and information, everyone (except for the incurably perverse and
ignorant among us) should be able to surmount their convictional differences and come
around to “the one right way of thinking.”
For the convictional imperialist, this overcoming of differences is possible due to
both empirical and rational factors. On the empirical side, the convictional imperialist
maintains that “we all have spread before us the same evidence. The only question . . . is
how to account for that common evidence.”13 Implicit here is that everyone has before
them the same fundamental facts or things; all that remains is to correspondently connect
the appropriate words to these things. On the rational side, the imperialist holds that
reason itself is convictionally neutral.14 That is, for the imperialist, there exists a
common or universal rationality.15 In both cases (the empirical and the rational), what
counts as facts and what counts as reason should be self-evident to all, regardless of any
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particular presuppositions, and may therefore be described as universal and undebatable.
For these reasons, convictional imperialism shows itself to rest upon an epistemology
that I will refer to as a “hard realism.”16
While McClendon and Smith place a broad range of figures under the
convictional imperialist approach, from fundamentalist Christians,17 on the one hand, to
(at least implicitly) the correlational theologian, David Tracy,18 on the other, they
primarily set their sights (at least for purposes of illustrating this approach) on modern
philosophers who champion science as the universally superior – and, ultimately, the
only true – conviction set.19 For instance, they argue that the way in which Karl Popper
develops and uses his theory of falsifiability is a philosophical occurrence of convictional
imperialism. According to Popper’s understanding of falsifiability: 1) a theory is valid

16

I use “hard realism,” rather than “soft realism,” to describe the epistemology of
convictional imperialism because McClendon and Smith portray the empirical and
rational reasons for this approach to resolving convictional conflicts not as hypothetical
postulates but as demonstrable facts. Furthermore, one could perhaps use here the
language of “foundationalism” rather than “hard realism,” as McClendon and Smith
themselves do on occasion (see, for example, p. 10 of Convictions); however, I tend to
use “hard realism” instead of “foundationalism” in part because I see merit in John E.
Thiel’s point that “foundationalism . . . is nearly always a pejorative label that
nonfoundationalists give to philosophical positions found guilty in their court of
criticism,” as shown in John E. Thiel, Nonfoundationalism, Guides to Theological
Inquiry, eds. Paul Lakeland and Kathryn Tanner (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 2.
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See especially, “A Perspective on Nonperspectival Reason,” Chapter Five of
Convictions, where McClendon and Smith endeavor to refute convictional imperialism.
See also the index entry for “imperialism” on p. 220 of Convictions, which sheds light on
their intentions (of refuting convictional imperialism) in Chapter Five.
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until it is falsified by empirical data; and, 2) the theory that is most susceptible to
empirical scrutiny – but still stands – is the superior theory. Along with this
understanding, Popper further holds, according to McClendon and Smith, that some
theories, such as the religious one that “God is love,” are not falsifiable (i.e., cannot be
tested by empirical evidence) and are, therefore, “empty.” McClendon and Smith argue
that this is an instance where one can see convictional imperialism at work: science, with
full certainty, setting the rules for themselves and for everyone else as to what counts as
“valid” and as to what counts as “empty” (trivial, illusory).20
In addition to describing and illustrating convictional imperialism, McClendon
and Smith seek to critique and refute it – largely on the basis that it cannot stand even by
its own rules. For example, to Popper’s theory of falsifiability, they ask whether this
theory itself, in fact, contains “deep-seated (scientific) convictions . . . [that are not
falsifiable].”21 Here, McClendon and Smith have in view such scientific beliefs as: “the
world has some order or other;”22 and, “nature responds uniformly to uniform
experiments.”23 To each of these they would pose: Where is or what would count as the
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Convictions, 137-38. In their treatment of Popper’s views, McClendon and
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empirical evidence by which these beliefs might be tested? And, if there is no such
evidence, should much of science (as it is practiced today) be considered, like religion, as
not falsifiable and, therefore, “empty?” Also, McClendon and Smith argue that it is not
self-evident that everyone has before them the same fundamental facts or things. For
example, they argue that while some see the world as containing only “natural” facts
(which, therefore, require only “natural” explanations”), others see the world as
containing both “natural” facts and “supernatural” facts (that necessitate both “natural”
and “supernatural” explanations).24 Furthermore, McClendon and Smith challenge the
assertion of convictional imperialism that reason can be convictionally neutral. They
hold that this cannot be the case, since when one employs reason (whether in evaluating,
criticizing, or judging), one employs it through “taking stances” or through “getting into
positions” that reflect particular communal systems.25
Whether or not there are any theologians (or scientists) who might fairly be
labeled “convictional imperialists,” it is enough for now simply to note: (1) the central
tenets of convictional imperialism – (a) an insistence that conflicts in fundamental beliefs
are, with time, completely eradicable and (b) an insistence upon the use of a hard
epistemological realism; and, (2) that these tenets are “other than” those to be found with
“convictional perspectivism.” For while McClendon and Smith are concerned to defuse
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Here, McClendon and Smith refer to views of Michael Scriven, Primary
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religious relativism, as the subtitle of Convictions suggests (and as I will show below),
they seem to be just as concerned to defuse and distance themselves from a hard religious
realism, as their argument against “convictional imperialism” suggests.

Convictional Conflicts Are Ineradicable: Convictional Relativism
According to McClendon’s and Smith’s second theory of convictions,
“convictional relativism,” one “regards convictional differences as an inevitable,
ineradicable, and ultimate fact of human existence and denies the existence of any
common element relevant to mutual understanding.”26 That is, with this theory, the
convictional differences among communities are so great that the different communities
“see, think about, and speak about different worlds,”27 so that interpretations of facts and
the understandings of reason in one community are completely different than they are in
another community. Thus, the convictional walls dividing these communities cannot be
scaled under any circumstances. Moreover, according to this theory, “human
communities and their convictions are so constituted that interconvictional persuasion is
impossible; indeed, even communication at any significant level along these lines is
impossible.”28 Thus, the convictional relativist would picture convictional communities
as permanently isolated convictional islands with no real hope of substantial dialogue
with one another.
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McClendon and Smith appear to indicate that only a fairly narrow range of
thinkers share affinities with “convictional relativism.” For here, while they also have in
view such figures as the reader response theorist Stanley Fish,29 their primary focus is
almost exclusively upon the later Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially upon the
Wittgensteinians, Norman Malcolm and D. Z. Phillips.30 In McClendon’s and Smith’s
view, “while the Wittgensteinians are not explicit relativists, they appear to share the
dilemma of all relativism: it implies a world in which we are hopelessly divided by high
linguistic or conceptual walls from one another.”31
Just as they do with “convictional imperialism,” McClendon and Smith endeavor
to critique and refute “convictional relativism.” For instance, they inquire:
How is it that the relativist, one who tells us all truth is relative, can expect us to
believe that relativism itself is true? Perhaps relativism must be relativized as
only the view of a jaded and discouraged community which has lost confidence in
its own way? For as a general theory it seems to say (a) that it is (in general) true,
and (b) that nothing is (in general) true – and both can’t be the case.32
Accordingly, “convictional relativism,” even according to its own rules, contradicts itself
and is, therefore, self-defeating. For, if all truth is relative, how can one take seriously
any truth claims, including those of relativism?
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Convictions, 27. However, in one of his later works, McClendon suggests that
Malcolm and Phillips have sometimes been unfairly characterized as hard relativists, as
set forth in McClendon, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, Witness, 264-69. Hereafter,
references to this work will be abbreviated as Witness.
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As with “convictional imperialism,” it is fair to ask whether or not there are any
theologians (or scientists) who might justly be termed “convictional relativists.” I
suspect that there are very few – for, instead of recognizing various types of
epistemological relativism, McClendon and Smith, at least with regard to their depiction
of “convictional relativism” in Convictions, seem to reduce all types to only a most
extreme variety of hard relativism. One observes this reduction, not least of all, through
their use of absolute negatives – such as: “hopelessly divided . . . [convictional
worlds],”33 and “impossible . . . [interconvictional persuasion]”34 – to describe relativism
in toto.35 Nevertheless, it is sufficient at this point to note: (1) the central tenets of this
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In his later thought, however, McClendon offers a more substantive and nuanced
description of some of the different types of epistemological relativism, as shown in
Witness, 50-55. Here, he turns in part to the following article: Sarah Coakley, “Theology
and Cultural Relativism: What Is the Problem?,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische
Theologie und Religionsphilosphie 21 (1979): 223-43; cited in Witness, 51. On one end
of the spectrum, Coakley describes the hardest type of relativism as “relativism proper,”
in ibid., 227; and, this is very similar to the kind of relativism that McClendon has in
view with his concept of “convictional relativism.” Also, for the same type of selfdefeating reasons to which McClendon points, Coakley refers to “relativism proper” as a
“dead duck,” in ibid., 233. Yet, on the other end of the spectrum, Coakley indicates some
softer types of epistemological relativism. For example, she mentions the frequent
requirement of the social sciences that “social or historical or religious phenomena be
studied at least in the first instance in their own terms,” ibid., 226; cited in Witness, 51.
Then, according to McClendon:
Coakley . . . [goes on to] argue that while of course all truths appear in some
context or other and thus have to do with something besides themselves, and
while of course knowledge develops, grows, so that what was known at one time
is relative to that time and not necessarily to an earlier or later one, and while of
course what is true in one place (it’s raining) may not be true in another so that its
truth is relative to its place; . . . [yet, for McClendon,] none of these truisms adds
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theory of convictions – (a) an insistence that convictional conflicts are entirely
ineradicable and (b) an insistence upon the use of a hard epistemological relativism; and,
(2) that these tenets are “other than” those to be found with “convictional perspectivism.”

Convictional Conflicts Are Partially Eradicable: Convictional Perspectivism
With their third and final theory of convictions, “convictional perspectivism,”
McClendon and Smith hold that one regards “convictional conflict as expected, but not
inevitable, fundamental but not ultimate, enduring but not inherently ineradicable.”36
Thus, with this theory, the one which McClendon and Smith defend,
There are . . . common elements among differing sets of convictions, but to
discover and use them in resolving conflict requires measures that cannot be
limited along convictional lines. Persons or communities with different
convictions will experience, think, and speak about their worlds differently, and
these differences will not necessarily be the result of mistakes or character flaws.
But neither are they walls or electronic scramblers, making communication,
understanding, or even persuasion among worlds impossible.37

up to relativism of the sort that challenges religious convictions (Witness, 51).
Moreover, McClendon avers that between these softer types of relativism that Coakley
mentions and her “relativism proper” (or his “convictional relativism”) “lies a real truth,
and this intermediate reality of relativism is what Coakley believes needs to be discussed:
What is the nature of actual ‘frameworks’? What work is done in the discussion by
‘true’? . . . Finally, how does all this bear upon the theological task?,” as set forth in
Witness, 52. McClendon concurs with Coakley’s assessment, and he suggests that her
notion of an “intermediate relativism” is similar to his concept of “convictional
perspectivism,” which he acknowledges is a kind of “cultural relativity,” as shown in
Witness, 52-54.
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In other words, with “convictional perspectivism,” they endeavor to chart a course
between the above described “convictional imperialism” (with its “hard realism”) and
“convictional relativism” (with its “hard relativism”).
There are several key aspects to the way in which McClendon and Smith chart
this course. One is the manner in which they draw upon understandings of
“perspectivism” as they are developed in the works of H. Richard Niebuhr and Van A.
Harvey. A second is how they comprehend the relationship between words and things
(and, concurrently, how they conceive of a soft, epistemological relativism). A third is
how they understand the possibility for dialogue between differing convictional
communities (that is, how they understand the manner whereby convictional conflicts
may be resolved). A fourth is the particular way in which, relying upon John L. Austin’s
theory of “speech acts,” they suggest convictional perspectivism should be applied in
interpreting religion. A fifth is their argument for the manner in which “conviction sets”
may be justifiable. And, a final aspect is the manner in which McClendon (this aspect is
unique to him) holds not only that “conviction sets” can be re-conceived of as “picture
sets” but also that “speech acts” can be re-conceived of as “language games.”
“Perspectivism” roots in H. Richard Niebuhr and Van A. Harvey. To gain a
richer understanding of how McClendon and Smith chart a course between convictional
imperialism and convictional relativism it is helpful to examine some of the ways their
theory of convictional perspectivism was influenced by the work of both H. Richard
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Niebuhr and Van A. Harvey.38 Therefore, in the paragraphs below, I will first sketch out
some of the central “perspectivist” concepts developed by Niebuhr and Harvey, with a
particular focus on their treatments of: relativism, correspondence between words and
things, and inter-communal dialogue. Then, I will begin to state where McClendon and
Smith stand in harmony with these concepts as well as where they break from them.
In The Meaning of Revelation, Niebuhr maintains that “there does not seem to be
any apparent possibility of escape from the dilemma of historical relativism for any type
of theology.”39 However, for him, “relativism does not imply subjectivism and
scepticism. It is not evident that man who is forced to confess that his view of things is
conditioned by the standpoint he occupies must doubt the reality of what he sees.”40
Thus, Niebuhr maintains that historical relativism and the ability to have correspondence
between words and things are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

38

I am indebted to Terrence W. Tilley for starting me on the path of exploring the
influence Niebuhr and Harvey had on McClendon’s thought. McClendon’s specific
references to these figures are sparse, but those that are made certainly support Tilley’s
insight. This especially seems to be the case (as I will endeavor to show in more detail
below) with McClendon’s and Smith’s treatment of Niebuhr’s distinction between
“inner” history and “outer” history, as shown in Convictions, 67; as well as the way in
which McClendon and Smith point to Harvey’s concept of a “perspectival image,” as
revealed in Convictions, 98. In addition, it is perhaps worth noting here that McClendon
credits Tilley as being one of two figures (the other being Nancey C. Murphy) that “has
probably written most clearly about me [McClendon],” as set forth in James William
McClendon, Jr. to author, 3 May 2000.
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In this context, he proposes that there are really two types of history: (1) “outer”
or “scientific” history; and, (2) “inner” or “poetic” history.41 Taking as an example an
occasion of “a man who has been blind and who has come to see,” Niebuhr illustrates
how these two types of history might be developed:
A scientific case history will describe what happened to his optic nerve or to the
crystalline lens, what technique the surgeon used or by what medicines a
physician wrought the cure, through what stages of recovery the patient passed.
An autobiography, on the other hand, may barely mention these things but it will
tell what happened to a self that had lived in darkness and now saw again trees
and the sunrise, children’s faces and the eyes of a friend.42
While the “scientific case history” and the “autobiography” in this illustration describe
the same event, the two histories offer different perspectives on this event – the former,
an “outer” perspective, and the latter, an “inner” one. “Outer” histories are marked by:
“dispassionate judgment;”43 and, concern with “things,” “propositions,” and “objects;”44
while “inner” histories are characterized by: “blind devotion;”45 and, concern with
“people,” “selves,” and “subjects.”46 In this light, Niebuhr avers, Christian revelation
should be located within “inner” history (and not, as has often mistakenly occurred, in
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“outer” history).47 However, it need not be the case that with a given event, one history
(either the “outer” or the “inner”) must be said to have gotten it right and the other to
have gotten it wrong. Rather, “the distinctions between the two types of history cannot
be made by applying the value-judgment of true and false but must be made by reference
to differences of perspective.”48
Van A. Harvey largely concurs with and builds upon Niebuhr’s views on
“perspectivism;” however, at certain points, he significantly parts from them. Like
Niebuhr, Harvey argues that theology should embrace historical relativism; yet, in The
Historian and the Believer,49 he disagrees with certain features of Niebuhr’s proposal
concerning “outer” and “inner” histories. For instance, against Niebuhr, he argues that
many (or, perhaps, most) “outer” histories are not “disinterested histories.”50 In addition,
looking to the way in which Niebuhr develops the notion that various histories can offer
different perspectives on the same event, Harvey identifies two types of historical
relativism, “Hard Perspectivism” and “Soft Perspectivism” and maintains that it is the
latter which holds more promise.
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The key difference, he argues, between these two “perspectivisms” is that “Hard
Perspectivism” holds as “meaningless . . . [the] distinction between fact and
interpretation in history,”51 while “Soft Perspectivism” does not reject such a
distinction.52 More specifically, according to “Hard Perspectivism,” one’s view of the
“facts” (whatever facts these may be) is so influenced by one’s own hopes and desires
that it is impossible to objectively speak to the “facts.” Due to this impossibility, only
“interpretations” – and not “facts” – are relevant for history. Part of the outcome of the
“Hard Perspectivist” view, according to Harvey, is that self-transcendence is not
possible; that is, since “human beings . . . [are unable to allow the] unpleasant truths [of
“facts” to] . . . counter their treasured hopes and desires,”53 they are not capable of
entering “imaginatively into possibilities of understanding and valuation not their own.”54
In contrast to “Hard Perspectivism,” Harvey holds that with “Soft Perspectivism,”
one’s view of the “facts” may be strongly influenced by one’s own hopes and desires but
not always to the extent that it is impossible to speak objectively to the “facts.” To
illustrate this, Harvey points to a hypothetical case of “a judge who is also the father of a
son accused of a crime, . . . [and he maintains that] although many fathers would
doubtless be prejudiced in the matter, not all necessarily would.”55 Thus, it is possible to
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imagine situations in which one with strongly held interests and concerns might still be
open to unhappy “facts” that could, on occasion, override these interests and concerns.
In view of this possibility, according to Harvey, not only “interpretations” but also
“facts” are relevant for history. And, a corollary for him is that, with “Soft
Perspectivism,” self-transcendence is possible: since “human beings . . . [are able to
allow the] unpleasant truths [of “facts” to] . . . counter their treasured hopes and
desires,”56 they are capable of entering “imaginatively into possibilities of understanding
and valuation not their own.”57 With this capability to “imaginatively enter the
standpoint of another,”58 it follows that under “Soft Perspectivism” various different
perspectives may “frequently overlap,”59 so that “historians will agree at one level but
disagree at another.”60 Accordingly, where dialogue among perspectives is not possible
with “Hard Perspectivism,” it is possible with “Soft Perspectivism.”
A final aspect of “Soft Perspectivism,” according to Harvey, is that the Christian
theologian operating from within this perspective will, in seeking to interpret the
meaning that events have for faith, show a strong preference for “public” (or “common”)
events over “private” (or “unique”) events. The latter type of events should be shunned
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because “there are no criteria for dealing with an event unlike any other.”61 This does not
mean that the “unique” events of the faith must be rejected altogether, but it does mean
“that we put question marks after stories of floating axes, suns standing still, asses
talking, blood raining from heaven, supernatural births, walkings on water, and
resurrections.”62 In contrast, “public” events should be embraced. When they are, the
theologian “avoids special pleading and permits rational assessment so far as statements
about the nature and origins of events are concerned.”63 Such a strategy, suggests
Harvey, “has obvious advantages . . . [over ‘Hard Perspectivism’].”64
Having sketched some of Niebuhr’s and Harvey’s central “perspectivist”
concepts, I can now begin to investigate where McClendon and Smith stand both in
harmony and in disharmony with them. Looking first to Niebuhr, McClendon and Smith
reject his “inner/outer” distinction, not least of all, on the grounds (identical to those of
Harvey) that “outer” (“scientific”) history is just as “shaped by human goals, drives, and
convictions . . . as is ‘inner’ history.”65 However, McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional
perspectivism certainly follows Niebuhr’s path of thinking (as I will explore in more
detail in later sections) not only in regard to his assertion of the inescapability of at least a
certain level of (soft) historical/epistemological relativism for constructing any type of
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theology but also with respect to Niebuhr’s (perhaps contradictory) assertion of the
epistemological assurance persons may have in knowing how words correspond with
things.
Turning now to Harvey, the distinction he makes between two types of relativism,
“Hard Perspectivism” and “Soft Perspectivism,” very closely resembles the distinction
McClendon and Smith make between convictional relativism and convictional
perspectivism. For instance, the position that only “interpretations” (read “words”) – and
not “facts” (read “things”) – are relevant for history would be equally descriptive of both
Harvey’s Hard Perspectivism and McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional relativism.
Similarly, the position that one’s view of the “facts” (or “things”) may be heavily
affected by “interpretations” (or “words” or “language”) but not always to the degree that
it is impossible to speak objectively to the “facts” (or “things”) would be just as
attributable to McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional perspectivism as it is to Harvey’s
Soft Perspectivism.
The same kind of similarities between Harvey (on the one hand) and McClendon
and Smith (on the other) can also be seen in the area of inter-communal dialogue. For
example, the position that, because self-transcendence is unachievable, people are not
capable of entering imaginatively the standpoints of others and are, therefore, prevented
from having dialogue with communities that possess different perspectives might be
attributed just as readily to McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional relativism as it is to
Harvey’s Hard Perspectivism. And, alternatively, the position that, since at least some
manner of self-transcendence is conceivable, people have the capacity to enter
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imaginatively the standpoints of others and are, therefore, not precluded from having
dialogue among communities with different perspectives is no less ascribable to
McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional perspectivism than it is to Harvey’s Soft
Perspectivism.
While much of McClendon’s and Smith’s understanding of convictional
relativism and convictional perspectivism can be traced to Harvey’s notions of Hard
Perspectivism and Soft Perspectivism, this does not suggest that McClendon and Smith
follow Harvey at every turn. Quite to the contrary, they explicitly reject many of the
ideas reflected in Harvey’s central methodological theses. In particular, their
convictional perspectivist views are incompatible with Harvey’s position that the Soft
Perspectivist theologian will show a strong preference for “public” events over “private”
ones in endeavoring to interpret the meaning that events have for faith. Among the
“private” events to be shunned, Harvey lists “resurrections.”66 Far from an event after
which one should “put question marks,”67 McClendon suggests, for example, that the
resurrection of Christ is essential to the construction of at least some Christian
doctrines.68
With this brief consideration of “perspectivism’s” roots in the works of Niebuhr
and Harvey, we are now in a better position to explore in more detail how McClendon’s
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and Smith’s understanding both of the relationship between words and things and of the
possibility for dialogue between differing convictional communities distinguishes
convictional perspectivism from both convictional imperialism and convictional
relativism.
Understanding of the relationship between words and things. Like the
convictional imperialist, the convictional perspectivist, according to McClendon and
Smith, must at least seek for correspondence between words (interpretations, language)
and things (facts): “There is no easy appeal ‘to the facts;’ . . . [yet, if we] take truth
seriously, [we must attempt to do so].”69 That is, with convictional perspectivism, one
should endeavor to justify words (statements, language, etc.) by showing how they
correspond with facts (i.e., with things, objects, or reality-in-itself). Thus, for
McClendon and Smith, one may “incautiously hold that valuations such as true and false
do clearly apply to religious utterances – God either did lead Israel across the Sea of
Reeds or did not.”70 (And, here, with “true and false,” McClendon and Smith appear to
mean “correspondently true and false.”) However, while they rather tenaciously want to
hold to some sort of correspondence, this ultimately remains only a hope for them. For,
in the end, (and this appears to be a significant break with the imperialists) they concede
that they “seem to have no theory of representation at all.”71 Yet, despite making this
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concession, McClendon and Smith do not altogether abandon efforts to show
correspondence between words and things (which, if they were to abandon such an
endeavor, might place convictional perspectivism in the same sphere as convictional
relativism). Rather, these efforts merely begin to take on a different role – in perhaps two
different ways. First, as McClendon and Smith further explore the development of
convictions (and conviction sets), they come to place their main emphasis not upon
correspondence between words and things but upon coherence among words (and other
ways of justification) as the chief means by which to construct convictions. That is, with
convictional perspectivism, on the “front-end” or “development-side” of convictions,
McClendon and Smith come to turn chiefly to language.72 Here, efforts to show
correspondence between words and things are not eliminated, but these efforts appear to
take on a secondary status. Second, however, as McClendon and Smith further explore
the evaluation of convictions (and conviction sets), they suggest that convictions should
be judged not only by their use of language but also by the practices that they yield.
Thus, with convictional perspectivism, on the “back-end” or “evaluation-side” of
convictions, they imply that seeking correspondence between words and things should at
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least be pursued in order to judge the practices that convictions (and conviction sets)
produce.73
Understanding of the possibility for dialogue between differing convictional
communities. Still another central component in McClendon’s and Smith’s charting of a
course between convictional imperialism and convictional relativism has very much to do
with how they understand the possibility for dialogue between differing convictional
communities. More like the convictional relativist than the convictional imperialist, the
convictional perspectivist at least recognizes the existence of various different, yet
potentially legitimate, convictional communities. (The convictional imperialist really
just seems to see only one legitimate community, his or her own.) However, unlike the
hard relativist, who holds that one cannot transcend one’s own perspective (who holds
that “my eyes are the only eyes”) – and who, therefore, rules out the possibility of
dialogue with other convictional communities – the perspectivist maintains that one can
transcend one’s own perspective (that “my eyes are not the only eyes”) – and,
accordingly, holds open the possibility of dialogue with various convictional
communities.74 That is, dissimilar to the hard relativist, McClendon and Smith concur
with William Placher that “rational conversation . . . [between different convictional
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communities] in fact always proceeds ‘ad hoc’: We find that we have this or that or the
other in common (though not everything), and the conversation begins there.”75
Thus far I have examined, in a general manner, McClendon’s and Smith’s
understanding of convictional perspectivism, as well as the way in which it differs from
convictional imperialism and convictional relativism. I turn now to a more direct
analysis of their argument for how, using the perspectivist approach, one should interpret
religion; however, in pursuing this analysis, I will have a particular concern to uncover
those elements that are most relevant for McClendon’s construction of theological
doctrine.
Convictional perspectivism’s approach to interpreting religion. In short,
McClendon and Smith maintain that to interpret religion with the convictional
perspectivist approach one should begin not with experience but with language. Here, in
part, they associate their view with that of William James:
For now we must indicate our own relation to William James, which focuses upon
his link between saying and doing – between attending to what (religious or
antireligious) speakers actually say as interpreted by what they actually do. We
shall find that the saying-doing distinction is not a sharp one: saying is in fact a
kind of doing, and so the question becomes one of interpreting religion by
attending to one kind of doing (namely, saying) as an important clue to all the
rest. In this regard if no other we are Jamesians.76
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Thus, to interpret religion, McClendon and Smith argue that one must begin – not with
experience – but with “sayings,” that is, with language. More specifically, one must
begin with “communal sayings,” since “it is in interpretive communities, not simply in
solitary individuals, that we find characteristic religious speakers.”77
However, McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional perspectivism narrows the
source for interpreting religion still further, as they indicate that the only type of
communal sayings to which one may turn is the category of “speech acts.” Here,
drawing upon the speech-act theory of John L. Austin,78 McClendon and Smith maintain
that within a verbal situation there may be:
(1) “phonetic acts” (i.e., “sounds”);
(2) “sentential acts” (i.e., saying a sentence in a language);
(3) “speech acts” [ i.e., making a verbal move (such as calling or explaining) that
makes a difference – but that may or may not have an effect on other people or
affairs]; and,
(4) “perlocutionary acts” (i.e., speech acts that do have an effect on other people
or affairs).79
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In general, action in sense (4) is dependent upon action in sense (3), and so on; whereas
there can be (1) phonetic acts without (2) sentential acts; (2) sentential acts without (3)
speech acts (“we can just say sentences over like pupils in a reading class”);80 and there
can be speech acts (3) without perlocutionary acts (4) (“in such cases there would be no
effects to be listed”).81
By focusing on “speech acts” (the third category or level of verbal acts indicated
above), convictional perspectivism seeks to target the type of verbal act that, for the
purposes of searching “for the significance of religious utterances,”82 is substantial
enough to count as meaningful (hence, something more purposeful than mere sentential
acts), while remaining simple enough to be manageable (hence, something less farreaching than perlocutionary acts). Thus, to borrow McClendon’s and Smith’s sports
analogy of a referee calling a “time out,” the convictional perspectivist would not be
principally concerned either with the fact that someone has said the words “time out”
(i.e., with the sentential level) or with the consequences of this expression, such as player
and spectator reactions to the “time out” (i.e., with the perlocutionary level). Rather, the
perspectivist would be interested primarily with the “difference-making” capacity that the
referee’s “time out” would have in a game (i.e., with the speech act level).83 So, with
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convictional perspectivism, one can interpret religion through a particular type of
communal sayings that may be termed “speech acts.”
Yet, McClendon’s and Smith’s convictional perspectivism even further specifies
the source for interpreting religion by indicating that one may look only to certain types
of speech acts and not to others. Among the various types of speech acts that the
perspectivist may consider are “requests,” “confessions,” and “explanations,”84 but at
least one type that may not be considered is “statements.” One may not make use of this
latter type of speech act, according to McClendon and Smith, because, in ordinary
speech, making a statement requires being in a certain position of authority with regard to
the subject matter of the statement;85 and, “no human person is ever in position to make
statements about the biblical God.”86
To put convictional perspectivism’s “speech-act-theory-for-interpreting-religion”
to the test, McClendon and Smith analyze the conditions under which the “confession,”
“God led Israel across the Sea of Reeds,” made by a hypothetical person named Aleph,
could be a happy confession – that is, could be a “difference-making” speech act and not
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merely a sound or a sentence.87 The conditions for Aleph’s “God led Israel across the
Sea of Reeds” (henceforth, Aleph’s utterance G) to be a happy confession are as follows:
(1) Aleph must meet specific preconditions. For example, he must have
knowledge of “a common language.”88
(2) Aleph must meet certain primary conditions. For instance, he must “issue a
sentence (perform a sentential act) in the common language.”89 Also, there must
be “a convention of the language to the effect that this sentence is a way of
(performing the speech-act of) confessing.”90 Additionally, “in issuing this
sentence the speaker . . . maintains a certain stance, to which the speaker is
thereby committed.”91 Finally, “in issuing this sentence, the speaker displays, i.e.,
witnesses to, this stance.”92
(3) Aleph must meet specific representative or descriptive conditions. For
example, in uttering “God led Israel out of the Sea of Reeds,” he must “describe
or represent the relevant state(s) of affairs with sufficient exactness to make it
possible for the speaker to take up that stance . . . and to display it.”93 Thus, in
this confession, the relevant states of affairs that “Aleph’s G requires [. . . are]: in
a certain historical context, a certain event (being led across the Sea of Reeds) has
occurred to a certain people (Israel); . . . this event is attributable to the God
acknowledged in this context; [and,] . . . this God exists.”94
(4) Aleph must meet particular affective or psychological conditions. For
instance, he must have “a certain affect, namely, awed gratitude, and in issuing
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this sentence convey his possession of it to the hearer.”95 Also, “the speaker’s
intention in issuing this sentence is to use the language’s convention for
confessing, . . . and he intends the hearer to understand (by his use) that he is so
using it.”96 Finally, the hearer of Aleph’s sentence must (to some degree) “take
up” what Aleph has said.97
To the extent that Aleph’s utterance G meets these conditions, he makes a happy
confession; he accomplishes a “difference-making” speech act.
There are potential difficulties with the third and fourth conditions, and
McClendon and Smith themselves recognize a particular problem with the final one:
Aleph cannot happily confess that God led Israel across the Reed Sea unless he is
in position to do so. To be in position is among other things to possess the affect
we have called grateful awe. Without that attitude neither Aleph nor anyone else
can in this sense confess what God has done. The outsider cannot happily make
that confession (without becoming in the act an insider to Aleph’s confessing
community), but the outsider cannot happily deny that God has so led Israel,
either.98
That is, dialogue over Aleph’s utterance G between Aleph’s community and other
communities with different convictions appears to be impossible because Aleph’s
confession, as well as his description of the relevant state of affairs (including, “this God
exists”) are “insider” affairs. Thus, McClendon and Smith lament, “so far, we seem to be
led toward relativism.”99 But, this problem is perhaps resolved, they suggest, with the
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third condition, for this condition calls for the meeting of “representative conditions.”100
However, upon closer examination, this does not appear to be a very substantial
resolution, since, as McClendon and Smith concede elsewhere, they seem “to have no
theory of representation at all.”101
Nevertheless, McClendon and Smith aver that there is a connection between
speech acts and beliefs and that the conditions stipulated (i.e., primary conditions,
representative conditions, and affective conditions) for determining whether a particular
speech act is unhappy or happy may be employed (perhaps with a few alterations to the
conditions but essentially using them as they are) for determining whether a specific
belief is unhappy or happy.102 Moreover, if the specific belief in view is both “persistent”
and “significant” – that is, if the belief is a “conviction” – then the same basic conditions
could be used to determine whether a particular conviction is unhappy or happy. In this
manner, McClendon and Smith prepare the way for the notion that the unhappiness or
happiness of a religious (or theological) conviction could be ascertained by the degree to
which it might meet all (or some) of the relevant primary, representative, and affective
conditions.
Furthermore, McClendon and Smith argue that since convictions never occur in
isolation but always as part of a broader “conviction set,” that which one must seek to
determine the unhappiness or happiness of – in other words, that which one must
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endeavor to justify – is always a set of convictions.103 In order to illustrate what a
conviction set might look like, they provide the previously mentioned Aleph with the
following hypothetical conviction set:
G

“God led Israel across the Sea of Reeds,”

D

“Jesus said, ‘One thing is needful,’”

E

“Jesus opened the blind man’s eyes,”

J

“God was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth,” and

T

“(This) God exists.”104

Thus, with this hypothetical conviction set, McClendon and Smith indicate that along
with “G,” Aleph might hold: (1) some additional “particular convictions,”105 such as “D”
(read “the conviction that when you find yourself getting too busy, stop and take time to
be in the presence of Jesus Christ”);106 and “E” (read “the conviction that Jesus Christ can
work powerfully in your life”);107 (2) some “doctrinal convictions,”108 such as “J” (read
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“the conviction that God works in Jesus Christ”);109 and, (3) some “presiding
convictions,”110 such as “T” (read “the conviction that God exists”).111
Accordingly, as the hypothetical conviction set above appears to show,
McClendon and Smith posit that a convictional schematism, with a hierarchy of
convictional levels (ranging from lower-level “particular” convictions to higher-level
“presiding” convictions), might be indicative (though not definitive) of at least a small
portion of a typical religious (Christian) conviction set. And, they hold that if such a
schematism has merit, then justification involves examining not only convictions but also
the relations among convictions – all by means of the previously stipulated conditions
(i.e., primary, representative, and affective conditions).112
In addition, McClendon and Smith hold that such an extensive process of seeking
to justify a conviction set – a process that would consider both the convictions and the
relations among the convictions – would have to consider the potential objection that this
process would be impossible since “we can never surely know one another’s thoughts or
meanings.”113 To this potential objection, they acquiesce that one cannot have direct
access to the thoughts of another (such as Aleph); however, they maintain that it is
possible that one could have access to the linguistically shared convictions of the
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community or communities (such as Aleph’s community or communities) of which
another might be a member. That is, according to McClendon and Smith:
Since each of Aleph’s convictions acquires part of its significance form all the
other members of his set and since every member of his set depends for its
understandability upon the language of the community, we cannot understand
Aleph or justify his set of convictions save by reference to the community to
which he belongs. If he participates in more than one community, then we shall
have to consider each. The understanding and justification of Aleph’s
convictions, then, are dependent upon the understanding and . . . the justifiability
of the community’s convictions. It is the community that is logically prior,
however keen may be our interest in the individual and his or her personal faith.114
Therefore, before attempting to justify the conviction set of an individual, they argue that
one must first endeavor to justify the conviction set of the community (or of the
communities) to which the individual belongs. Accordingly, I will turn now to consider,
in more detail, McClendon’s and Smith’s argument for the way in which conviction sets
may be justifiable – primarily for the conviction sets of communities, but also
(secondarily) for the conviction sets of individuals.
The way in which conviction sets may be justifiable. McClendon and Smith
maintain that, whether one faces (or, implicitly, prepares for) intraconvictional or
interconvictional encounters, there are both possible loci of justification as well as
various social matrices of justification of which one may make use in order to determine
(or, implicitly, to anticipate) the unhappiness or happiness of conviction sets.115
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In some sense, these “loci” and “social matrices” of justification seem to further
convey (or perhaps to supplant) what McClendon and Smith had previously expressed as
Aleph’s “conditions” (i.e., his primary, representative, and affective conditions).
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First, they argue that there are various “widely accepted,”116 though not
universal,117 loci of justification – such as “truth, consistency, rationality, eudaimonia,
satisfaction, and righteousness”118 – that one may apply towards seeking to demonstrate
the sufficiency of any particular conviction set.119 McClendon and Smith stress that since
these loci are not universally accepted, not all of them have to be used in the process of
justification. That is, they hold that “anyone can refrain from appealing to any one of
these considerations without being inconsistent or absurd.”120 This appears to be in
harmony with their view that while one must have at least some evidence in order to
support (or justify) a conviction (or other beliefs), it is not necessary to have unlimited
evidence.121
With the locus of “truth,” they aver that “truth” should be approached as a broad
criterion, with an allowance, for instance, that in some circumstances one might evaluate
a conviction set with more of an interest in “‘correspondence’ between statement and
fact, . . . [while in other circumstances one might be] more interested in ‘performative’ or
in ‘pragmatic’ features of truth.”122 Furthermore, they maintain that “‘true’ and ‘false’
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are not the only possible assessments, . . . [since] ‘true’ and ‘false,’ as Austin and others
have reminded us, are members of a class of terms that includes also ‘accurate’ and
‘careless,’ ‘rough’ and ‘exact,’ ‘fair’ and ‘hasty,’ and a host of others.”123
As for the other five representative loci mentioned, McClendon and Smith do not
extensively develop what they have in mind with these concepts; nevertheless, they do
shed some light on their understanding of them. For instance: with the locus of
“consistency,” they seem to have in mind a “coherent” notion of truth;124 by “rationality,”
they appear to have in view broadly perceived conceptions of reason but not a universal
notion, since, for them, reason is not “conviction-free;”125 with “eudaimonia,” they mean
to ask whether the particular conviction set or “conviction in question contributes to
living a good life;”126 by “satisfaction,” they mean to explore if “the life . . . produced . . .
[by the conviction set is] really the most satisfactory life possible;”127 and, with
“righteousness,” they seem to have in mind an examination of whether “the life that
embodies . . . [the conviction set under consideration is] a life of justice.”128
In addition to these loci of justification, McClendon and Smith hold that there are
various social matrices of justification that one may employ as well in order to determine
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or to show the adequacy of conviction sets. They argue that this aspect of the
justificatory process can be especially helpful in situations involving “sharply
differentiated convictional communities, . . . [where] something more than a simple
appeal to ‘ultimate criteria’ . . . [such as the six ‘widely accepted’ loci of justification
(addressed in the above paragraphs) may be] required.”129 In particular, they suggest that
this aspect of the justificatory process involves matrices such as “reform” and
“interconvictional encounter.”130
According to McClendon and Smith, “reformers are . . . confronted with the task
of showing that the conviction set is or can become meaningful,”131 and they often
employ one or both of the following methods to accomplish this task: persuasive
definition and paradox (or parable).132 With persuasive definitions, reformers “propose a
(more or less covert) shift in the descriptive force of a term of phrase while maintaining
its affective force unchanged.” As examples of this method, McClendon and Smith point
to the manner in which the Apostle Paul sought to redefine what it meant to be a “Jew”
(as entailing not compliance with circumcision and dietary regulations but “having faith
like Abraham’s faith”);133 and, they point to the way in which some contemporary
theologians have endeavored to redefine what it means to be a “real Christian” (as
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involving “not so much one who goes regularly to church . . . as one who sides with
oppressed peoples”).134 Furthermore, McClendon and Smith argue that with paradox (or
parable), reformers seek “to bewilder, puzzle, and silence their hearers.”135 For instance,
they maintain that Jesus used this method (with parables like “The Good Samaritan”) to
cause shifts in the meaning of such key concepts as “neighbor.”136
Another social matrix of justification that McClendon and Smith investigate is the
“interconvictional encounter.” They argue that these encounters are “ones in which
representatives of distinct convictional communities meet one another in such a way that
one or both parties are thereby convictionally changed.”137 And, looking to William
Christian,138 they maintain that a central component of a successful interconvictional
encounter is for representatives of convictional communities to seek substantial clarity
regarding areas of disagreement (before looking for points of agreement).139 As an
example of how such an interconvictional encounter might take place, they suggest that if
a Christian were to enter into a interconvictional encounter with a Jew, she would be
more likely to achieve a substantially clear disagreement by issuing a confession like
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“confession, . . . B, ‘Jesus is the one whom God promised to send to redeem Israel,’”140
than she would by issuing a confession like “confession, A, ‘Jesus is the Messiah.’”141
However, by achieving a clearer disagreement with confession B, McClendon and Smith
hold that, as counterintuitive as it may seem, she would be more apt to obtain a
successful interconvictional encounter (than she would have if she had issued the not-asclear-to-both-parties confession A).142 Along with representatives of convictional
communities pursuing clarity with areas of disagreement, McClendon and Smith argue
that another component of a successful interconvictional encounter occurs as “each
member of the dialog . . . [seeks] to discover and to show how their original convictions .
. . [are] related to their other convictions and to whatever each . . . [knows] to be the case
about the world.”143
The above considerations of McClendon’s and Smith’s notions regarding both the
“widely accepted” loci of justification and the social matrices of justification have a
bearing upon McClendon’s understanding of theological method, since, for McClendon,
the aim of theology is both to describe doctrine and to persuade others regarding the
credibility of doctrine.144 Or, as McClendon and Smith put it: “Our belief . . . [is] that
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theology not only is but ought to be prescriptive as well as descriptive; it must propose as
well as describe.”145
“Conviction sets” as “picture sets” and “speech acts” as “language games.” In
addition to developing together with Smith not only a notion of “conviction sets” (and of
ways in which they may be used and justified) but also a notion of “speech acts,”
McClendon elsewhere, relying upon the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein,146 reconceives of these notions as “picture sets” and “language games,” respectively.147
His impetus for the first of these re-conceptions, the one from “conviction sets” to
“picture sets,” is his view that the narrative of Scripture often expresses teaching, at least
about some themes, through word pictures – and that these word pictures (which, as they
are, stay the same and do not change) can be (and very often are) interpreted in different
manners.148 In light of these various interpretations of the “same” word pictures,
McClendon draws upon a Wittgensteinian-informed idea of “picture thinking,” by which

55; and Doctrine, 48.
145

Convictions, 185.
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With these developments, McClendon refers to primarily the following works
by Wittgenstein: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe, 3d ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1968); idem, Lectures
and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967); idem, On Certainty, ed. G.
E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (New
York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1972).
147

McClendon treats: the notion of “picture sets” especially in Doctrine, 75-77;
and the notion of “language games” particularly in Witness, 249-60.
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Doctrine, 75.
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McClendon means, in part, that “in certain circumstances, every seeing is a ‘seeingas.’”149 Along these lines, McClendon points to Wittgenstein’s use of a well-known
duck-rabbit illustration that can be seen as a rabbit’s head or as a duck’s,150 and, with his
own rendition of this illustration, McClendon implies that different people (or
communities) could see the same picture in different ways (or from different
perspectives).151
With this understanding of “picture thinking” in hand, . . . McClendon suggests
that, in particular situations – as with some of the various events described in Scripture –
“what distinguishes those who believe in . . . [these events] from those who do not is not
different chains of reasoning, but radically different pictures of how in general the world
goes.”152 In this context, McClendon associates “pictures” with “convictions;”153 thus, a
particular “picture set” would be another way of expressing a particular “conviction set.”
Furthermore, just as he maintains that the sufficiency of “conviction sets” can be
demonstrated through the application of some – though not necessarily all – broadly
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Doctrine, 76. Here, McClendon refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, 197.
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Doctrine, 76. McClendon has in mind the duck-rabbit illustration set forth in
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 194. Wittgenstein, in turn, cites Joseph
Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton, Mifflin and
Company, 1900), and he gives Jastrow credit for the original duck-rabbit illustration, as
revealed in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 194.
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Doctrine, 76.
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Doctrine, 77. By placing certain words in bold, such as “pictures” in this
citation, I am following the style of text used in the book being referenced.
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Doctrine, 77.
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adhered to loci of justification, like “truth, consistency, rationality, eudaimonia,
satisfaction, and righteousness,”154 so also does he imply that the adequacy of “picture
sets” can be shown through the application of similar loci of justification.155 In addition,
just as he holds that one of the requirements for a belief to be a “conviction” is that it be
significant,156 he argues, again following Wittgenstein, that a substantial “picture,” “once
it is grasped, is ‘enough to make me change my whole life.’”157
With the second of these re-conceptions, the one from “speech acts” to “language
games,” McClendon makes an explicit connection between Austin’s concept of speech
acts and Wittgenstein’s concept of language games.158 While he holds that “Austin’s
account of speech acts is more exact and more readily displayed . . . [than Wittgenstein’s
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Doctrine, 77. Here, McClendon cites Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, 57, emphasis
McClendon’s.
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Witness, 253. Although they both wrote on the philosophy of language at
approximately the same time and in roughly the same place, and although Austin has
often been referred to as a “Wittgensteinian,” the extent to which the slightly earlier
Wittgenstein (who lived from 1889-1951) directly influenced Austin (1911-1960) has
been debated among scholars. Mats Furberg, for one, concludes that “there is, then, no
need and no reason to suppose that Austin formed his basic ideas under Wittgenstein’s
influence,” as set forth in Mats Furberg, Saying and Meaning: A Main Theme in J. L.
Austin’s Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), 52. Nevertheless, the fact that
there are abundant similarities between the thought of the two philosophers seems to be a
matter upon which there is common agreement, which is not surprising since they were
both working within the same milieu of early twentieth century British philosophy of
language.
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account of language games],” in his later work, both in Doctrine and especially in
Witness, McClendon increasingly turns to the thought of Wittgenstein, not least of all, it
seems, because of the relationship McClendon perceives between Wittgenstein’s thought
and life.159 Along these lines, relying upon Wittgenstein, McClendon argues that the
“pictures” of a particular community need to be evaluated – not by some supposedly
universally available “sense data”160 – but by that same community’s own “languagegames and practices,”161 which is similar to the way in which McClendon and Smith
maintain, looking to Austin, that one should seek to justify “convictions” (such as
Aleph’s utterance G) only by means of the “speech acts” that a specific community (such
as Aleph’s community) recognizes as being legitimate.162
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McClendon recognizes that several scholars (such as William Warren Bartley
III, James C. Edwards, Norman Malcolm, Brian McGuiness, and Hans-Johann Glock)
either minimize or deny the view that Wittgenstein demonstrated any sort of authentic
Christian faith, as set forth in Witness, 261-67; however, McClendon avers that
Wittgenstein, during his service in World War I, “in reading Tolstoy’s Gospel [in Brief] .
. . was converted,” as shown in Witness, 237; here, McClendon refers to Ray Monk,
Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Free Press, 1990), 115f. And,
while acknowledging that Wittgenstein “was no ‘Christian philosopher’ and . . . offers us
no ‘Christian philosophy,’” as revealed in Witness, 269-70, McClendon argues that,
through his actions (over the rest of his life), Wittgenstein consistently demonstrated that
his faith was genuine. For McClendon this is important, since he holds that
Wittgenstein’s religious claims were shown to be authentic due to the practice of “the
Christian life Wittgenstein lived,” as set forth in Witness, 269.
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Doctrine, 259.

161

Doctrine, 257. Here, McClendon cites Wittgenstein: “Just as something is a
blunder in a particular game and not in another,” as set forth in Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, 59.
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Three Sources for Christian Convictions – Narrative, Experience, and the Church
In addition to arguing, from the vantage point of convictional perspectivism, that
communities have sets of “convictions” or “pictures” and that these firmly held beliefs
can be supported by appeal to criteria such as loci of justification or a particular
community’s language games, McClendon maintains that convictions (or pictures) must
have their roots in some source(s) or context(s).163 Moreover, he avers that “Christian
convictions” may be found in at least the following three sources: narrative, experience,
and the church,164 and, he holds that the first of these, narrative, must be the primary
source. In the sections below, I will examine the way in which he comprehends these
three sources and the manner in which he feels they may be appropriated to form
Christian convictions.

Narrative as a Source for Christian Convictions
McClendon argues that the main source for Christian convictions must be
narrative. In an effort to unfold his understanding of this source, I will first briefly
explore the distinction he draws between: (A) the view that convictions need not have
any narrative sources and (B) the view that convictions must have at least some narrative
sources. Next, I will, within the context of Christian convictions, endeavor to consider
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James William McClendon, Jr., “Narrative Ethics and Christian Ethics,” Faith
and Philosophy 3 (October 1986): 385.
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With the concept of “Christian convictions,” McClendon has in view something
different than “Christian doctrines,” for he defines “doctrines” as “the formal, conceptual
restatement of convictions,” as set forth in James William McClendon, Jr., “Narrative
Ethics and Christian Ethics,” Faith and Philosophy 3 (October 1986): 385.
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how broad the concept of “narrative” is for McClendon. Finally, I will examine
guidelines he gives for determining which narratives might be most suitable for forming
Christian convictions.
Non-narrative and narrative sources for convictions. According to McClendon,
for non-narrativists – whom he identifies, on occasion, as “decisionists,”165 and,
elsewhere, as “propositionalists”166 – values, principles, propositions, and definitions can
all be known apart from narratives. In fact, for many non-narrativists, stories or
narratives are merely “local adaptations of . . . universal [understandings of values,
principles, propositions, and definitions].”167 The significant limitation of this view,
McClendon avers, is that when one detaches theological and ethical convictions (infused
as they are with values et al.) from narratives, these convictions “become sterile because
they are ignorant of their own roots.”168
Against the non-narrativist view, McClendon maintains that, for narrativists, there
are no values, principles, propositions, or definitions that make any sense apart from a
narrative context (whether or not one acknowledges this context). That is, for
narrativists, values, principles, and similar entities depend upon narratives for their
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meaning. To illustrate this narrativist perspective, McClendon points to the way different
narratives might lead to distinct meanings for a term such as “self-sacrifice:”
Nobody should be surprised if ‘self-sacrifice’ or ‘love’ turns out to have, in
William James’s homely phrase, a different ‘cash value’ for seventeenth-century
Puritan armies intent upon overturning royal authority than it would for sixteenthcentury Swiss Brethren, full of the discovery of a new way of life within the body
of Christ. If in either case definitions of ‘self-sacrifice’ are developed, their
meaning and force must depend upon the social world that is their context, and
thus upon the imbedded narratives of that world.169
That is, the narratives of the more belligerent seventeenth-century Puritans and the
narratives of the more pacifistic sixteenth-century Swiss Brethren would tend to generate
markedly different definitions of concepts like “self-sacrifice.” Thus, for McClendon,
attending to the way in which theological and ethical theories (infused as they are with
values) have their roots in particular narratives is what allows these theories to have any
meaning at all.
Within a Christian context, what counts as “narrative” for McClendon. For
McClendon, Christian convictions (including those of Christian ethics and theology) are
“linked to (at least one) narrative, and that narrative is the Christian story: the story of
Israel, and of Jesus called the Christ, and of the church that followed him.”170 In other
words, he holds that the narrative of Scripture as well as the narrative of tradition
combine to form a narrative source for Christian convictions.
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One might expect that the latter part of this narrative source – the narrative of
tradition – would receive scant attention from a Baptist theologian. To the contrary,
however, McClendon makes ample use of this type of narrative, particularly through
what he terms “biography as theology,”171 which could, by way of introduction, perhaps
be described as sort of a contemporary “lives of the saints.” For instance, in his work,
Biography as Theology, he employs biographies of Dag Hammarskjöld, Martin Luther
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James William McClendon, Jr., Biography as Theology: How Life Stories Can
Remake Today’s Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974), 14. In his preface to this
first edition of Biography as Theology, McClendon suggests that “biography as
theology” should not fall within the realm of the narrative of tradition:
There is currently a stir among students of religion about ‘narrative theology’ –
the way or ways in which the ideas of religion may be expressed in story form. It
seems likely that this book will be regarded as one aspect of that flurry of interest,
and it will probably do no harm for it to be so regarded, unless it is therefore seen
as an abandonment of serious inquiry into the truth of religious stories, or their
adequacy to the facts. What I have done here, however, is not in any sense a
bundling up of the several sorts of ‘story theology.’ For that sort of survey one
must look elsewhere (Ibid., 7).
Yet, in his preface to the new edition of Biography as Theology, he indicates –
presumably because the trend of “narrative theology” had progressed to the point that it
more clearly showed that it did not altogether disallow “serious inquiry into the truth of
religious stories, or their adequacy to the facts” – that “biography as theology” should
perhaps fall within the realm of the narrative of tradition. A question he poses to his
reviewers in the new preface reflects this revised stance: “Why so little recognition that
Biography as Theology fell into the class of Christian doctrinal theology, displaying the
task of biographical (and therefore ‘narrative’?) theology by illuminating one Christian
doctrine, the reconciling work of Christ?” as revealed in James William McClendon, Jr.,
Biography as Theology: How Life Stories Can Remake Today’s Theology, new ed.
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1990), ix.
Against the way I have here interpreted McClendon, one could argue that he
places “biography as theology” not within the realm of the narrative of tradition but
within the realm of experience. However, this may amount to splitting hairs, since, as I
will show below, McClendon maintains that, at least in certain contexts, “we might see
‘experience’ as a narrative word,” as set forth in McClendon, Doctrine, 461.
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King, Jr., Clarence Leonard Jordan, and Charles Edward Ives as some of the main
resources from which he constructs a doctrine of atonement.172 Similarly, in Ethics, he
makes use of biographies as resources to assist in the development of various ethical
views: the lives of Sarah and Jonathan Edwards in the sphere of organic (or personal)
ethics; the life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the realm of communal (or social) ethics; and,
the life of Dorothy Day in the sphere of anastatic (or resurrection) ethics.173 He also
incorporates biographies into his theological constructions in Doctrine, but to a lesser
degree.174
For McClendon, the narrative of tradition is not limited to just “biography as
theology;” he also looks significantly to the theological writings of such figures as:
Augustine, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, Bushnell, Rauschenbusch, Karl
Barth, and H. Richard Niebuhr. However, his “biographies” play a substantial and
somewhat unique role in his constructive endeavors.
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James William McClendon, Jr., “Dag Hammarskjöld – Twice Born Servant,”
chap. in Biography as Theology, new ed., 24-46; idem, “The Religion of Martin Luther
King, Jr.,” chap. in Biography as Theology, new ed., 47-66; idem, “The Theory Tested:
Clarence Leonard Jordan – Radical in Community,” chap. in Biography as Theology,
new ed., 89-113; and, idem, “Expanding the Theory: Charles Edward Ives – Theologian
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James William McClendon, Jr., “Sarah and Jonathan Edwards,” chap. in Ethics,
119-138; idem, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer,” chap. in Ethics, 193-212; and, idem, “Dorothy
Day,” chap. in Ethics, 279-99.
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In the preface to Doctrine, he indicates that he had intended to more fully
incorporate biographies into this work, but he laments that “it was not to be – too much
had to be reported and argued through and clarified, so that the biographical chapters
have come to be only sections or paragraphs on Hans Hut and Roger Williams and
Georgia Harkness and others,” as set forth in Doctrine, 7.
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While McClendon holds that the narrative of tradition should be a significant
narrative source for Christian convictions, he argues that the primary narrative source
must be the narrative of Scripture. For, according to him:
The Bible does have some of the qualities of a mantra, of a code, of a classic. But
that is not where its authority lies. Rather the Bible is for us the word of God
written; . . . it is for us God speaking. . . . Such a claim made by a book upon a
people is radical and unsettling – an authority subversive of all sorts of
competing, other, human authorities.175
That is, McClendon holds that since – for Christians – the Bible is (through humans)
“God speaking,” the Bible is the sine qua non among all narratives. Moreover, he
maintains that the Old and New Testaments have a unity that cannot be denied;176 yet, he
implies that Scripture itself suggests that within Scripture there is a certain ascendancy in
authority (moving from lowest to highest): first, all of Scripture; then, the New
Testament; and, finally, the crucifixion-resurrection accounts within the New
Testament.177 Hence, he claims, “the picture of the Lamb standing as one that has been
slain – the picture of the crucified and risen one – is the master picture by which we can
learn to see all the rest.”178
However, with this “high view” of Scripture, McClendon does not suggest that
the Bible should be read uncritically. To the contrary, he argues that “an indispensable
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feature of Bible reading in our day is the use of historical-critical exegesis.”179 He clearly
rejects non-critical approaches, pejoratively associating them with “fundamentalist”
readings of the Bible.180 At the same time, looking to Hans Frei,181 McClendon frowns
upon approaches that “give up the . . . idea that the biblical narratives mean what they say
. . . [in favor of efforts to] reconstruct . . . [a] ‘scientific history’ to which the narratives
are said to refer – or . . . [to locate] some other more ingenious ‘meaning’ located beneath
the surface of the text.”182 That is, he suggests that, by all means, historical-critical
exegesis should be employed and that this approach will, of course, yield appropriate and
helpful results, such as the presence of various layers or kerygmas within Scripture;183
yet, he seems to further hold that these various layers or kerygmas should still be treated
as meaning what they say and as being given to the churches by God,184 or, more
specifically, by the Holy Spirit.185
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Guidelines for determining which narratives might be most suitable for forming
Christian convictions. While, within a Christian context, McClendon holds that one can
and should turn to the narratives of Scripture and tradition as sources for developing
Christian convictions, he also maintains that one must simultaneously be concerned to
make use of “true” rather than “false” narratives and, where possible, of “more true”
rather than “less true” narratives. Towards these ends, he suggests at least three
guidelines.
The first guideline he sets forth is that one should examine whether or not the
narrative under consideration aims for correspondent truth.186 That is, one should inquire
whether the narrative at hand is a “fictional narrative” (a narrative that does not seek to
correspond with “external facts” or “actual history”) or a “realistic narrative” (a narrative
that does endeavor to correspond with “external facts” or “actual history”). In
developing Christian convictions, McClendon avers, “realistic narratives” are much to be
preferred to “fictional narratives.” Thus, one may make use of the Gospels, since they
endeavor to “tell a true story,”187 rather than “a false or fictional one.”188 And,
McClendon implies (though he does not make this explicit) that the same principle would
pertains to “the narrative of tradition” as well. That is, he suggests, that more weight
should be given, for example, to “realistic” biographies than to “fictional” ones.
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he has “no theory of representation,” as revealed in Convictions, 77.
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The second guideline he indicates is that one should examine whether or not (or
the degree to which) the narrative under consideration is coherently true. More
specifically, he argues that one should test the way in which (1) “character,” (2) “social
setting,” and (3) “circumstance or incident” converge together within the narrative at
hand. In the context of seeking to show how Christian convictions can be formed,
McClendon holds that each of these three elements consist of certain features. For
instance, using the Gospels (taken as a whole) as an example: (1) “character” would
primarily be “the identity of Jesus Christ” but also “the identity of disciples” (past and
present); (2) “social setting” would be “the kingdom or rule of God;” and, (3)
“circumstance or incident” would be “the plot-line of salvation” and “the creation of
disciples” (past and present).189 To the degree that these three elements successfully hold
together and cohere within the narrative under consideration, the narrative may be said to
be “more true” or “less true,” with the former to be preferred when considering which
resources to use in the development of convictions.190
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Doctrine, 40. McClendon’s reason for including “present” disciples will
become more apparent when I consider below his “this is that” and “then is now”
hermeneutical principle.
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McClendon somewhat reflects these three elements, “character,” “social
setting,” and “circumstance or incident,” through the macro-structure of Doctrine. The
three major parts of this work are: “Part I: The Rule of God” (read “social setting”); “Part
II: The Identity of Jesus Christ” (read “character”); and, “Part III: The Fellowship of the
Spirit” (read “circumstance or incident”). He does something similar (though more
clearly) with the macro-structure of Ethics. The three major parts of this work are: “Part
I: Embodied Witness” (read “character”); “Part II: Community of Care” (read “social
setting”); and, “Part III: The Sphere of the Anastatic” (read “circumstance or incident”).
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The third guideline McClendon sets forth is that the narrative(s) under
consideration should be continually submitted to “a tournament of narratives.”191 That is,
narratives should be allowed, in some sense, to compete with one another, so that those
narratives which point to the “more true” might become evident. To illustrate this point,
McClendon examines what the realm of romantic literature conveys about sexual love.
He takes under consideration a broad range of works in this genre, from twelfth-century
Tristan poems, to Erich Segal’s Love Story, to John Updike’s Marry Me and Couples,192
and he reaches the following conclusion:
Stories of love can collide, and can obscure one another from view. We exist as
in a tournament of narratives; nowhere is there a story-free ‘love’ to be
discovered; our Christian hope lies rather in finding the banner of those true
stories of love that will set us free from the less true and from the false.193
McClendon further argues that what holds for romantic literature should also hold for
theological literature – and that even the narrative of Scripture must be allowed to joust
with the various other theological narratives or “tales” that we encounter. Accordingly,
from McClendon’s perspective, whenever the Bible speaks, “its story not only supports
and conserves, but challenges, corrects, and sometimes flatly defeats the tales we tell
ourselves about ourselves.”194
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Experience as a Source for Christian Convictions
A second source for Christian convictions, according to McClendon, is
experience, or, more precisely, religious experience. However, the only type of religious
experience that McClendon recognizes as having even a proximate or secondary
authority for forming Christian convictions are those experiences that occur as a response
to Christian narrative (Scripture and the Christian tradition) [as that narrative is
interpreted within the context of the Christian community (the church)].195 For
McClendon, “to represent religious experience as an independent authority in its own
right (the foundationalist move) . . . [would be a] logically and conceptually confused
[endeavor],”196 since, he avers, the religious community (or individual) is not “the hound”
who seeks Christian narrative but “the hare” that is sought by Christian narrative.197 So,
while he acknowledges that one should turn to religious experience as an essential source
for Christian convictions, he maintains that one may only authentically look to this type
of experience as it happens in reaction to Christian narrative.
Moreover, recognizing that through the centuries “theologians . . . [have]
construed Christian (or religious) experience in a variety of ways,”198 McClendon seeks
to clarify his particular understanding of religious experience by contrasting it with some
ways in which others have understood this concept. For example, he argues that, “for the
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young Schleiermacher, . . . [religious experience] had been the epistemically primitive
awareness (Gefühl) of the whole, or the All, an awareness differently colored in different
religious traditions but definitely the same in each.”199 Accordingly, McClendon
continues, for Schleiermacher, “the primary reference of theology was to the experience
itself, and theological statements (including those of Scripture as well as those of the
Glaubenslehre) are always and necessarily secondary. Experience alone was authority,
and even the grace of God only an inference from that.”200 Against this
Schleiermacherean understanding of religious experience as an independent and primary
source of authority for forming Christian convictions, McClendon maintains that, “apart
from that triad [of experience, Bible, community], . . . Christian experience could not
exercise even proximate authority.”201
Having set forth his view that religious experience is a secondary authority for
developing Christian convictions and having distinguished this view from others, such as
Schleiermacher’s, that would treat religious experience as a primary authority,
McClendon further maintains that religious experience itself, properly understood, has a
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narrative form.202 More specifically, he holds that the experience of human response to
God (i.e., to God’s love, holiness, etc.) – as God has revealed Gods’s self in Christian
narrative – may be rightfully said to have a narrative form of its own. That is, he argues
that “we might see ‘experience’ as a narrative word,”203 since Christian experience may
be said to become part of the ongoing Christian story. This is because “in Christian
circles to relate one’s experience means not to divulge a timeless intuition, but to tell the
story of one’s journey in faith.”204

The Church as a Source for Christian Convictions
In addition to arguing that narrative and experience are sources for developing
Christian convictions, McClendon maintains that the church is also a source for
developing these convictions. With the concept of “church,” he includes theologians;
pastors and deacons; and, “members of the Christian body just because they are
members,”205 but, when considering the church as an authority for forming Christian
convictions, he seems to have in mind not so much these people – and their stories and
their teachings (which would both be included within his concept of “narrative”) – as he
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Doctrine, 480. Moreover, in this context, with “church,” McClendon has in
view the “universal church,” in the very broad sense of “the entire new people of God,”
as set forth in Witness, 335.
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does the practices of the church.206 As examples of practices of the church, he points to
some of its various activities, such as its economic practices, its practice of prayer, its
practice of evangelism, and so on.207
Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of the above discussion regarding experience, he
holds that the practices of the church have “a proximate not an ultimate authority,”208 for
the development of Christian convictions. That is, he avers that the church is an essential
but secondary source for forming Christian convictions – secondary, in part, because, in
the most general sense:
The church teaches by what it is and by what it does. All its practices interact
with its teaching. . . . Yet there is an argument against founding doctrine upon
any one of these practices, or any combination of them – or, as with Liberation
Theologies, building it primarily upon the church’s practice (praxis) vis-à-vis the
wider society: Since each powerful practice is subject to distortion, even to
demonic abuse, . . . doctrine based directly upon it is likewise liable to abuse.209
A more significant reason, though, according to McClendon, for why the church should
be viewed as a proximate authority is because while “society [including the society of the
church] . . . may take many forms, . . . it must be narrative to be a society.”210 That is, one
cannot address the practices of the church, whatever they may be, apart from the
narrative that describes them. Thus, for him, the practices of the church are a secondary
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authority. However, this is not to suggest that he maintains that the church is anything
approaching an insignificant source for Christians convictions. Quite to the contrary, he
argues that Christian convictions cannot be formed without having the church as one of
its sources.211 And, he holds, “the wise church, in the formation of its teaching
[convictions], . . . looks to practices that resist perversion.”212 Nevertheless, for
McClendon, the leading partner in the relationship between (1) “the practices of the
church” (and the narratives that describe these practices) and (2) “the narratives of
Scripture and tradition” is the latter, not the former, partner. Accordingly, for him,
“theology [which is based upon ‘the narratives of Scripture and tradition’] . . . is the
mirror in which today’s church is confronted with her potential convictions, the mirror
which asks if in this set she recognizes herself not as she is but as she must be.”213
Furthermore, as part of his treatment of the church and theological method,
McClendon considers the long-standing theological discussion “about the ‘essence of
Christianity,’ . . . [or] the problem of identifying what is irreducibly and normatively
Christian.”214 Yet, drawing on the work of Walter Gallie and Stephen Sykes, McClendon
maintains that “the essence of Christianity (or real or authentic Christianity) is itself ‘an
essentially contested concept,’ one that by its very nature cannot be agreed on by all
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sides.”215 Therefore, since “there is no universal agreement,”216 he concludes that he is
simply going to endeavor to make clear his own (perspectival?) view of the essence of
Christianity.217 However, for McClendon, the “essence of Christianity” is not a
methodological resource for constructing theological doctrine; rather, for him, it is a
theological product that emerges as a result of “doing theology.”218 Thus, while he values
the pursuit of seeking to define “the essence of Christianity,” since he holds that it can be
a helpful means by which Christian theology can attempt to address contemporary
culture,219 “the essence of Christianity” is not, strictly speaking, part of his theological
method.

The Hermeneutical Principle of “This Is That” and “Then Is Now”
Another essential feature of McClendon’s theological method is his
hermeneutical principle of “this is that” and “then is now.” Whereas his views on how
conviction sets may be justified and on how narrative, experience, and the church can
serve as sources for Christian convictions might be said to have broader, more cross-

215

Doctrine, 43. McClendon refers to: Walter B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested
Concepts,” chap. in Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, 2d ed. (New York:
Schocken Books, 1968), 157-91; and Stephen Sykes, The Identity of Christianity:
Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth (Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1984), 251-56.
216

Doctrine, 43.

217

Doctrine, 44.

218

Witness, 313.

219

Witness, 310, 366.

143
denominational relevance, his notion of “this is that” and “then is now” is more
particularly Baptist – or, as McClendon prefers (making use of a lower-case “b”), more
particularly “baptist.”220 In fact, it is within his development of his “baptist vision” that
he begins to point to what he means by the “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutic
principle:
I call it “the baptist vision” after the sixteenth-century Christian radicals. Neither
Catholic nor Protestant, spurned by both sides, they called themselves simply
‘brothers and sisters,’ or Täufer, ‘baptists.’ The baptist vision is the way the
Bible is read by those who (1) accept the plain sense of Scripture as its dominant
sense and recognize their continuity with the story it tells, and who (2)
acknowledge that finding the point of the that story leads them to its application,
and who also (3) see past and present and future linked by a ‘this is that’ and
‘then is now’ vision, a trope of mystical identity binding the story now to the story
then, and the story then and now to God’s future yet to come.221
McClendon declares that the third element of this “baptist vision” may otherwise “be
expressed as a hermeneutical motto, which is a shared awareness of the present Christian
community as the primitive community and the eschatological community.”222 In other
words, by the “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutical principle, he means, in
general: (1) that Scripture addresses or speaks to Christians in “this present church” just
as much as it addressed them in “that primitive, first century church;” and, (2) that
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Scripture addresses or speaks to Christians now in “this present church” just as much as it
will, then, in “the future, eschatological church.” And, this aspect of McClendon’s
theological method has significant implications for the way in which he develops
doctrine. For example, it leads him to form Christological perspectives such as the
following: “This is that – the Christ who meets us now in worship is ‘that same Jesus’
who lived and died and lives again. Then is now – the Messiah who will return is also
present now in succor and judgment.”223
After setting forth his general understanding of the “this is that” and “then is
now” hermeneutical principle, McClendon then further unfolds what he means by the two
motifs within this principal. For instance, looking at how the first motif of “this is that”
might be applied towards the development of a doctrine of the church, he argues that this
motif “requires that the reading method by which the first Christians once approached the
Bible (a method they learned from the Bible itself) be again employed by Christians
today so that their understanding of Christian community is framed, shaped, by that
original bench mark of understanding.”224 Influenced by Lesslie Newbigin’s book, The
Household of God,225 McClendon maintains that with this Bible reading method, a
particular emphasis of the “baptist vision,” one endeavors to read Scripture with the Holy
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Spirit’s “gift of discernment.”226 And, he avers, a result of seeking to apply such a
method is that the “features [yielded from such a reading of Scripture] . . . are not fixities
of canon law or tradition, but will if true be discerned independently as the living church
reads afresh.”227 Therefore, “such a church is by nature provisional, subject to correction
arising from further Bible reading.”228
In addition, McClendon elaborates upon the second motif, “then is now” – and, as
with the first motif, he does so in view of how it might be applied towards the
development of a doctrine of the church. He holds, for example, that according to the
“then is now” motif:
The church on judgment day, the church that must give final answer only to Jesus
the Lord, is already present – it is the church today. Thus the church sees itself
not only in a frame of biblical narrative, but also in a frame of biblical
expectation. It reckons that God has only begun to do what God will do.229
And here as well, with this motif, McClendon holds that one may see “evidence of the
provisional nature of the present church: the church must change, for God is on the move,
and the end is not yet.”230
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to show the main facets of McClendon’s
understanding of theological method. One key facet is his and James Smith’s notion of
conviction sets and of how one can seek to justify these conviction sets. To build
towards this notion, they first define a “conviction” as a closely guarded and persistent
belief that one (an individual or a community) holds about a significant matter – a belief
that, on the one hand, would be something for which a person or a community might even
be willing to die, but that, on the other hand (if new evidence were to prove sufficiently
persuasive), could be altered or perhaps relinquished (but only at the cost of the
individual or community holding it being substantially changed). Next, they distinguish
among three different theories of convictions – imperialism, relativism, and
perspectivism – and the various ways in which these theories approach convictional
conflicts with individuals or communities. Between “convictional imperialism” – with
its reliance upon a hard epistemological realism, and with its insistence that convictional
differences are ultimately completely eradicable – and “convictional relativism” – with
its dependence upon a hard epistemological relativism, and with its demand that
convictional differences are completely ineradicable – McClendon and Smith argue in
favor of “convictional perspectivism” – which employs a soft epistemological relativism,
and which maintains that convictional differences are at least partially eradicable. Then,
presupposing “convictional perspectivism,” they maintain that the unhappiness or
happiness of particular “conviction sets” (from which individual convictions are derived)
can be determined (or anticipated) by ascertaining the degree to which these conviction
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sets meet at least some – but not necessarily all – widely accepted loci of justification
(such as truth and consistency) and various social matrices of justification (such as
reform and interconvictional encounter). Also, McClendon later restates this argument
essentially as follows: the unhappiness or happiness of particular “picture sets” can be
determined (or anticipated) by ascertaining the degree to which these picture sets comply
with the “language games” of a specific community.
A second key facet of McClendon’s understanding of theological method is his
view that all convictions must be grounded in some source(s) or context(s) and that
Christian convictions, in particular, should be grounded primarily in narrative but also in
experience and the church. By “narrative,” he means both the narrative of Scripture and
the narrative of tradition. With the first of these narratives, he argues that the Bible is
“God speaking.”231 Therefore, while he stresses that this divine speaking occurs through
humans and that Scripture should be read using the methods of historical-critical
exegesis, McClendon maintains that the Bible should be the highest authority for forming
Christian convictions. Moreover, McClendon suggests that the Bible itself indicates that
certain parts of the Bible, such as the New Testament and especially the crucifixionresurrection accounts within the New Testament, should be privileged. With the
narrative of tradition, he has in view not only the writings of various theologians but also,
uniquely, biographies. Furthermore, by “experience,” he means the religious experience
of communities and individuals, and, by “church,” he has in view primarily church
practices, such as its economic practices and prayer. While McClendon holds that
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experience and the church are essential sources for developing Christian convictions, he
clearly argues that they should have a secondary role next to narrative, especially the
narrative of Scripture. More specifically, he implies that, in forming Christian
convictions, one should consider religious experience and the church as significant
resources – but only as these resources, in turn, are grounded upon and reflect the
primary resource of Christian narrative.
Finally, a third key facet of McClendon’s understanding of theological method is
his notion of the “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutical principle. This principle,
which is related to McClendon’s view that Scripture is “God speaking,”232 contains a
mystical element that he acknowledges: “[The] . . . ‘this is that’ and ‘then is now’ vision .
. . [is] a trope of mystical identity binding the story now to the story then, and the story
then and now to God’s future yet to come.”233 So, for example, he holds that, in a
mystical manner, when the Gospel of John conveys Jesus’ telling Peter to “feed his
sheep” (in John 21), Jesus is not just saying this to his first century disciple; he is also
(“this is that”) directly (?) saying this to his disciples who exist two millennia later – as if
they were “right there” by Peter’s side. Similarly, McClendon maintains, that, in a
mystical way, when the Book of Revelation expresses a vision of Jesus’ telling John that
he will give to the thirsty “drink without cost from the spring of the water of life” (in
Revelation 21), this is not just a vision of something that Jesus will say to future
disciples; he is also (“then is now”) directly (?) saying this to his disciples who exist in
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the present – as if they were “right there” by John’s side. For McClendon, this
hermeneutical principle underscores his view that, with spiritual discernment, Scripture
continually speaks anew in a way that potentially subverts all other authorities.
With this analysis of McClendon’s theological method that might generally be
referred to as “convictional perspectivism,” I will – following a treatment of Farley’s
doctrine of God in chapter 3 – turn to a consideration, in chapter 4, of the way in which
McClendon makes use of his theological method in his construction of a doctrine of God.
Then, in chapter 5, I will set forth a more complete evaluation of McClendon’s method
and doctrine in conversation with others who have offered commentaries on his work.
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CHAPTER 3
EDWARD FARLEY’S DOCTRINE OF GOD
One of my main concerns in this dissertation is to explore the way in which two
different types of theological methods (Farley’s and McClendon’s) inform and shape
theological doctrines. Various doctrines could have been selected for this task, but I have
chosen to consider the doctrine of God, largely because it is a central – if not the central –
doctrine of the Christian faith. Therefore, in this chapter, I will strive to examine
Farley’s doctrine of God, with a particular concern to show how his understanding of this
doctrine relies upon his theological method of ecclesial refection (which I treated in
chapter 1).
The essential features of this theological method can be summarized as follows.
Farley argues that the goal of ecclesial reflection is to uncover faith’s realities as they can
be discovered through the Christian faith community. This can be accomplished, in part,
he avers, through a reflective method, in which one: brackets church authority and
metaphysics; probes beneath the everyday activities of the church to the deep strata of the
faith-world; and, uses theological eidetics to uncover the essences of faith’s corporate
realities (or experiences), as these realities occur within the deep strata of the faith-world.
Moreover, he holds that within the process of a reflective method, active participants in
ecclesia can experience both direct apprehensions of “realities at hand” and indirect
apprehensions of “realities not at hand” – but only as these latter apprehensions occur
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through direct apprehensions, because “realities at hand . . . [can] appresent realities not
at hand.”1 And, he suggests that these realities can become the basis for what has often
been referred to as doctrine.
With this understanding of his theological method, the task at hand, in this
chapter, is to examine Farley’s doctrine of God and to demonstrate the ways in which his
development of this doctrine builds upon his notion of ecclesial reflection. My primary,
thought not exclusive, resource for considering his doctrine of God will be his
monograph on this topic, Divine Empathy: A Theology of God.2 In this work, Farley
develops this doctrine in three major parts. First, he briefly explores how God can be
known. More specifically, he looks at how we can know what God means and how we
can know that this meaning pertains to something that is real (i.e., to the actual God).3
Second, he delves into the matter of how we can speak of God. That is, he investigates
how we can have “a symbolics of God,”4 and, here, within this investigation, he begins to
set forth his notion of who God is: Redeemer, Creator, and the Holy One.5 Third, he
extensively addresses the issue of thinking the relation between the world and God. Or,
more concretely, he constructs a paradigm of the works of God, and here he further
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unfolds his notion of who God is.6 In my analysis of Farley’s doctrine of God, I shall
proceed in the same order, considering: first, his notion of how God can be known; next,
his concepts of how we can speak of God and who God is; and, finally, his understanding
of the relation between the world and God.

How God Can Be Known
With the development of his theological method, Farley argues that the starting
point for constructing doctrine should occur by means of the Christian community
seeking to retrieve the essence of faith’s realities (through noematic-noetic analysis).
With this methodological starting point, as he approaches the development of a doctrine
of God, Farley indicates that he wants to see if there is a way for the Christian
community to discover how “God comes forth as God, thus evoking a meaning of God
that is at the same time an evidence.”7 In other words, he intends to determine if there is
a way, through reflection on faith’s realities, for the Christian community to discover
how God comes forth as God, so that we can know not only what God means but also
that this meaning for God pertains to something real – that is, pertains to the actual God.8
Farley acknowledges that the Christian community (at least in its current form) cannot
directly experience God coming forth as God. However, he holds that the Christian
community can directly experience the process of human redemption – and that this
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experience (the process of human redemption) can, in turn, point to the one who enables
the process of human redemption and to how this one comes forth.9 And, this, of course,
is an application of that aspect of Farley’s method of ecclesial reflection, through which
he indicates that faith community participants can experience indirect apprehensions of
“realities not at hand” [in this case, the one who enables the process of human
redemption and how this one comes forth] – but only as they occur through direct
apprehensions of “realities at hand” [in this case, the process of human redemption],
since “realities at hand . . . [can] appresent realities not at hand.”10
Accordingly, Farley posits the thesis: that God does come forth as God to the
Christian community as this community reflects on the reality of the process of human
redemption (i.e., on the reality of the process of humans being “transformed in the
direction of some good”);11 and, that the dynamic of God coming forth as God – through
the process of redemption – not only allows us to know what God means but also gives
us evidence for the reality of God.12 More succinctly, what Farley works towards is the
idea that, although the Christian community cannot directly experience God, it can
directly experience the process of human redemption (i.e., transformation from evil to
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good, in some sense), and this experience of redemption points to whatever or whoever
might be the ground of redemption.13
Central to this thesis is Farley’s understanding of the redemption process. He
extensively unfolds his understanding of this process as part of his doctrine of
anthropology in his work, Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition.14 In this
work, he maintains: (1) that there are three spheres of human reality – the individual
(personal agent); the interhuman (interrelation); and, the social (institution); (2) that
entities within each of these spheres are capable of experiencing corruption (in various
ways); and, (3) that entities within each of these spheres have the potential to experience
redemptive transformation.15 For purposes of this chapter, I will consider only one type
of redemptive transformation that Farley describes, the one from “idolatry” to “freedom,”
as it occurs in only one of the three spheres of human reality, the individual human
agent.16
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The redemptive transformation from idolatry to freedom that can occur within the
individual human agent takes place within the dynamics, Farley maintains, of the
elemental passions that exist within each person and the way in which these passions may
be adequately fulfilled only by an infinite, eternal horizon.17 Since, as the Christian
community knows from the faith realities which it retrieves, no finite resource can
completely fulfill the elemental passions – which include “the passion of subjectivity,”18
“the passion of the interhuman,”19 and “the passion for reality”20 – that which can
adequately fulfill them, therefore, must be an inexhaustible, “infinite resource, an eternal
horizon.”21 Unfortunately, though, since “human life is a mixture of satisfaction and
sufferings,”22 and because these sufferings lead to “discontent,”23 humans will sometimes
endeavor to end their discontent by “substituting a mundane good [at hand] . . . for the

from “wickedness” (i.e., a desire to harm the enemy for my sake alone, with no respect
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eternal horizon,”24 and this particular substitution may be described as “idolatry.”25
Furthermore:
In idolatrous mood the human being would exact from these goods something
they cannot deliver, a security against the tragic. In idolatrous mood the human
being treats the selected goods as if they were themselves the desired eternal
horizon rather than what they are – vulnerable, finite, and relative entities much
like the human being itself.26
When the idolatrous mood consumes a human being – that is, when a human being
persistently seeks a false securing through a mundane good at hand – a significant cost
occurs. “To pretend that the idol can secure, the human being must deny its relativity and
vulnerability and transform it into something absolutely good and powerful; . . . [and,]
the human being . . . will do anything and everything . . . [to] guarantee the security of the
idol itself, . . . [including] interhuman violence.”27
However, humans can be redemptively transformed from seeking a false securing
through an idol. Farley maintains that “the one thing that can undercut the drive for a
false securing is . . . the actuality of genuine securing. And the one and only thing that
can do that is the desideratum, the eternal horizon, incarnated into a bonum adeptum, an
actual fulfillment.”28 Accordingly, he further argues, “if redemption does take place and

24

Good and Evil, 135.

25

Good and Evil, 135.

26

Divine Empathy, 66, emphasis mine.

27

Divine Empathy, 66.

28
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if its condition is a founding by the one and only thing that can found, the eternal horizon
as actual, then redemption is the basis of the believer’s belief-ful conviction of the
actuality . . . of God”29 – or of “the ‘ground’ of being (Paul Tillich) . . . [or of] the eternal
Thou of moral experience (Martin Buber).”30 In other words, the process of redemption
allows the Christian community not only to know, at least to some degree, what God
means – “God is the actuality through which redemption takes place”31 – but also to be
provided with evidence for the reality of God, since “in the actuality of redemption as an
idolatry-reducing, freedom-giving founding, the nonpresentational God comes forth, not
into presentation, but into the determinate designation of that which redemptively
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founds.”32 Yet, Farley cautions that not too much should be claimed here. When a
human being has been redemptively founded (or secured) by the eternal horizon as
actual, this “does not mean that God comes forth into presentation or even that God is
‘experienced;’”33 rather, this means that God (or the “ground” of being or the eternal
Thou of moral experience) is the “causality” through which redemption has occurred.34

Speaking of God: Ciphers of Who God Is
Having endeavored to show how God can be known through the process of
redemption, Farley explores how one can speak about God, and he then begins to set
forth at least some of his concepts about who God is through the means of “ciphers.”
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on how God can be known through redemptive transformation, Farley indicates that
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of Schleiermacher’s understanding of redemption. For instance, Farley holds that what
he means by the undesignated “eternal horizon” (or infinite resource) as the referent of
the elemental passions is similar to what Schleiermacher has in view with his concept of
the generalized “Whence” as the referent of absolute dependence. [And, here, Farley cites
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, § 4, p. 16.] However, Farley argues that a
difference occurs in that where Schleiermacher would point to utter dependence “as the
dynamics of the human being’s pre-redemptive relation to an undesignated eternal, . . .
[he would point, instead, to desire or passion as the dynamics of this relation],” as set
forth in Divine Empathy, 72, emphases mine. Farley does not completely reject
Schleiermacher’s notion of dependence; rather, in his schema, he relocates it: “In my
judgement, dependence becomes an explicit theme when the eternal horizon ceases to be
a mere horizon and is manifest as the sacred, that which in some way does ground and
fulfill the passions,” as shown in Good and Evil, 113.
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How We Can Speak of God
Farley argues that progress towards the possibility of speaking about God may be
accomplished by seeking to “establish and justify . . . symbolic bespeakings of God,”35
and he maintains that potential for symbolic bespeakings of God develop in connection
with the way redemption occurs with the three spheres of human reality, the individual,
the interhuman, and the social.36 Furthermore, he avers that the path to speaking about
God should be pursued in a manner that provides for the mystery and otherness of God to
be retained. Along these lines, he develops a concept of “ciphers,” and he suggests that
they should be used in place of the more mystery-reducing “attributes” that have
traditionally been employed to speak of God.37
A basis for a symbolics of God. According to Farley, the individual can be said to
speak of God only in a very strange sort of sense. His starting point along this path is the
assertion that speaking of God, if it is not to be entirely subjective, can only happen “if it
is rooted in some kind of discernments.”38 And, in keeping with that aspect of his

35

Divine Empathy, 79.

36

Divine Empathy, 82.

37

Divine Empathy, 113-114. Farley argues that Schleiermacher was “a seminal
figure . . . [in] denying that attributes express knowledge (Erkenntnis) of God’s nature
(Wesen), . . . [at least, according to Schleiermacher, until] the experience of redemption
through Christ opens up the way to attributive language,” as set forth in Divine Empathy,
86. Here, Farley refers to Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, §§ 50-52, pp. 194-206.
38

Divine Empathy, 95.
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theological method which calls for the rejection of “the house of authority,”39 he argues
that discernments of the divine cannot be authentically provided simply by pointing to
biblical citations. That is, “to cite an authoritative text from Ezekiel or the Gospel of
John is not to answer the question but to repose it. How does it come about that Ezekiel
and John discerned anything about God?”40 For Farley, the only divine discernments that
count are the ones that arise as the believing individual, as part of the larger Christian
community, experiences the process of redemption – that is, as the believer perceives, to
some extent, that only God could have been at work in a particular situation of
redemptive transformation.41
However, even if such discernments are possible, Farley asks, “how is it that
human beings assign any content to God given the fact that God is never as such a direct
meaning referent?”42 In response, he argues that, while the individual cannot directly
experience God, “the human being . . . [can] experience an idolatry-breaking founding, . .
. [and] a content arises here because only that specific fulfiller-founder (God) could
found with respect to that specific freedom.”43 Yet, Farley stresses that, “in this situation

39

Farley offers an extensive description and critique of “the house of authority” in
ER, chaps. 1-7 passim. I began to analyze his treatment of “the house of authority” in
chapter 1 above, and I will set forth a more detailed evaluation of certain central aspects
of it in chapter 5.
40

Divine Empathy, 95.

41

Divine Empathy, 95-97.

42

Divine Empathy, 99, emphasis mine.

43

Divine Empathy, 100, emphasis mine.
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God is not the direct but indirect referent of an act of meaning.”44 Therefore, through the
redemptive process, one may say that God is implied or appresented.45 Yet, according to
Farley, “if appresentations are at work here, they are of a very peculiar sort. . . . The
most we can say is . . . that the meaning act that leads to a symbolics of God is something
like appresentation.”46 Furthermore, the reason why a believing individual may endeavor
to attribute to God – in an indirect or qualified way – a “content” that emerges from the
redemptive process is because, he argues, “as world ground, God cannot be identical with
that which is grounded,”47 and “if redemption frees the human being from the hold of
idolatry, the through-which of redemption cannot be one of the finite goods (idols) that
exercised that hold.”48 In other words, Farley suggests that only something other than

44

Divine Empathy, 100.

45

With the concept of “appresentation,” as I discussed in chapter 1, Farley seems
to mean a “filling-out” or a “unity-giving” intentionality that occurs through the
relationship of the intending human consciousness with the noema of an object – an
intentionality that is required in order to perceive any object. For instance, he may mean
the kind of intentionality that would result in the intention of a whole house, even while
actually only seeing the “front-side” of it. That is, the “back-side” of the house would be
appresent, as set forth in EM, 196. Or, as Farley summarizes elsewhere, he may have in
view that the “present aspects of things appresent other nonpresented aspects. The tree’s
facade appresents its other side, its interior, its root system, etc.,” as shown in Divine
Empathy, 99. Thus, it appears to me, as I have also previously indicated in chapter 1,
that there is a certain ambiguity in Farley’s understanding of appresentation – as to
whether he holds that it stems primarily: from the subject (or from the intention of human
consciousness); from the object (or from the noema of the object); or, from the
relationship between the subject and the object.
46

Divine Empathy, 101, emphasis mine.

47

Divine Empathy, 101.

48

Divine Empathy, 102, emphasis mine.
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what is finite can redeem human beings from the finite; therefore, only the infinite can
redeem, and the infinite can only be identified with the divine. Thus, he avers that it is
the element of the infinite appresented to the believing individual through the retrieval of
the redemptive process which permits a basis for at least a qualified symbolics of God.
Farley holds that, in addition to the individual sphere of human reality, the sphere
of the interhuman (of interrelation with other human beings) and the sphere of the social
(of institutions) can also be said to give rise to symbols of God. This is the case, he
maintains, since these two spheres, “like individuals, . . . are open to redemptive change, .
. . [and] if redemptive change does affect these . . . [two additional] spheres, they too
indicate something about God and God’s activity.”49 For instance, with the interhuman
sphere, the Christian community observes redemptive transformation taking place from
“alienation . . . [to] unrestricted agape, reconciliation, and communion,”50 and with the
social sphere, the same community observes redemptive transformation taking place from
“self-serving, local politics . . . [to] justice that has no restriction.”51 In both cases, with
both spheres, “the ‘one and only’ thing that summons [such redemptive transformations] .
. . is what the religious community calls God.”52 And, to the extent that these
transformations occur in the interhuman and social spheres, Farley maintains that a
qualified symbolics of that one and only summoning power – that is, of God – emerges in

49

Divine Empathy, 109.

50

Divine Empathy, 109.

51

Divine Empathy, 110.

52

Divine Empathy, 110.
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connection with them,53 where again, he implies, one understands that “God is not the
direct but indirect referent of an act of meaning.”54
From “attributes” to “ciphers.” In addition to showing how progress towards
the possibility of speaking about God may be accomplished by endeavoring to ground
and support a symbolics of God in connection with the way redemption occurs with the
three spheres of human reality, Farley argues that the path to speaking about God should
be undertaken in a way that allows for the mystery and otherness of God to be retained.
For him, this means, in part, that “attributes” should not be used to speak of God, since
the manner in which attributes have traditionally been employed in theological
undertakings has consistently allowed for the risk of “reducing God to one of the entities
with which we negotiate in the everyday world.”55 So, instead of attributes, he proposes
the use of “ciphers” to speak of God,56 where “ciphers” may be understood as something
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Divine Empathy, 110.

54

Divine Empathy, 100.

55

Divine Empathy, 113.

56

Farley indicates that he is making use of Karl Jaspers’s term, “cipher,” as
revealed in Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans. E. B. Ashton (New
York: Harper & Row, 1962; reprint, London: Collins, 1967), part 4; and, as set forth in
idem, Philosophy, trans. E. B. Ashton, vol. 3, Metaphysics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1971), part 1; cited in Divine Empathy, 113. Jaspers does not make the
exact same contrast between “ciphers” and “attributes” that Farley does; however,
Jaspers holds that in “thinking in ciphers, we think in the direction of Transcendence and
hear its language, intensely but never entirely,” as revealed in Karl Jaspers, Philosophical
Faith and Revelation, 92. Thus, in his use of the concept of “cipher,” Farley seems to
have in view an understanding of “cipher” that is quite similar to the way in which
Jaspers conceives of this notion. In addition, Farley avers that “‘words of power’ or
‘deep symbols’ are phrases that may communicate what Jaspers means by ciphers,” as set
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significantly less direct (or complete) than “attributes.”57 In other words, ciphers should
convey at least a component of “a mystery yet to be fathomed.”58

Ciphers of Who God Is
Farley avers that there are three overarching “ciphers that converge in the name
God: redeemer, creator, and the Holy,”59 and, he indicates that the first two of these
overarching ciphers actually contain various sub-ciphers, so that it would be appropriate
to speak of multiple ciphers of redemption and multiple ciphers of creativity.
Furthermore, through his development of all of these major ciphers and sub-ciphers, he
simultaneously provides an introduction to his understanding of what the Christian
community means by God.60 Finally, after treating these three overarching ciphers, he
explores to what extent, if any, there might be a connection between these three major
ciphers and traditional developments of the doctrine of Trinity.
Ciphers of redemption. Farley sets forth his concept of the overarching cipher of
redemption in view of the three spheres of human reality. Thus, with the sphere of the
individual, he argues that redemption means founding and that, through this founding,

forth in Divine Empathy, 113.
57

Divine Empathy, 113.

58

Divine Empathy, 114.
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Divine Empathy, 112.

60

Divine Empathy, 124.
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“God comes forth . . . as the founder of being-founded.”61 Accordingly, the cipher of
God manifest here is “the cipher of redemptive founding.”62 Next, with the sphere of the
human relation, Farley holds that redemption means repentance and forgiveness breaking
the corruptive power interhuman alienation,63 and “that which calls the alienated into
mutual reconciliation . . . is simply love.”64 Therefore, the Christian community “has
sensed in the mysteries of human reconciliation a cipher of God, namely Creativity as
reconciling love.”65 Then, with the third sphere of human reality, the social, he maintains

61

Divine Empathy, 125.

62

Divine Empathy, 126. As discussed in the section above, by “founding,” Farley
draws on the notion that “being-founded” occurs, in a sense, when “the eternal horizon . .
. locates the human being in the face of chaos,” as set forth in Good and Evil, 144.
However, he clarifies that, actually:
The eternal horizon as such does not found since it is simply the term for the
undesignated referent of the elemental passions. The eternal horizon founds . . .
only in the form of actual presence, or in other words, the sacred. Being-founded
occurs, then, in the presencing of the sacred, the creative ground of things (as
shown in Good and Evil, 144).
Theologians working under “classical criteriology” or “the house of authority” might
refer to this experience as “God saving the human being;” yet, in keeping with his
method of seeking to phenomenologically describe the depth strata of corporate faith
realities, Farley maintains that “in redemption human beings are founded not in the false
securer (the idol) but in the one and only thing that can found, that which the elemental
passions desired all along,” as revealed in Divine Empathy, 125.
63

Divine Empathy, 129.

64

Divine Empathy, 130.

65

Divine Empathy, 130. Farley indicates that he will “speak of Creativity
(capitalized) when it is a term for God Godself, God as Creativity, and . . . [that he will]
use uncapitalized terms to express God as creative, the creativity of God, etc.,” as shown
in Divine Empathy, 115. Moreover, as to why he here uses the term “Creativity,” Farley
reasons as follows:
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that the Christian community sees justice taking place when redemption occurs within
this sphere, and, correspondingly, the cipher of God revealed here is the cipher of
justice.66
Not only does Farley identify three ciphers of redemption: founding, reconciling
love, and justice, but he also maintains that these three ciphers “converge into a way of
envisaging God in a name and that name is Spirit.”67 However, with the term “Spirit,” he
does not intend to make “a claim that God is a ‘person’ or personal;”68 rather, for him, at
least in this case, he merely endeavors to point to “that in which individual agency,

The facticity of redemption initially appresents God as the one who redemptively
founds. What is this that founds? What is God as such? The answer must be
some sort of world-pervading creative activity. God as such, the reality of God, is
the Creativity on which the world depends (as set forth in Divine Empathy, 115).
Thus, he uses the term “Creativity” by first questioning back from the facticity of
redemption to God as Redeemer, and then by further questioning back from God as
Redeemer to God as Creativity. In other words, for Farley, the facticity of redemption,
which is “at hand” for the corporate faith community, appresents God as Redeemer, who
is “not at hand,” and God as Redeemer further appresents God as Creativity, who is also
“not at hand.” However, this double or extended appresentation, so to speak, still seems
to meet Farley’s methodological criteria, since the starting point is with a reality (the
facticity of redemption) that is directly present to the active faith community. In
addition, it is in harmony with the method of “ecclesial reflection” that he uses the term
“Creativity” here – and not a term such as “Father” (at least not as a primary term) –
since terms like “Father” would more readily originate from overly speculative efforts
under the “house of authority” than they would, Farley implies, from the shared
experience of the faith community, as set forth in Divine Empathy, 115, 130, 149.
66

Divine Empathy, 131.

67

Divine Empathy, 132.

68

Divine Empathy, 132.
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interhuman reality, and sociality merge.”69 Moreover, he asserts that, in his usage here,
the term or the name “Spirit” does not “contain a claim that God is a ‘person’ or
personal,”70 since, with the Christian community:
The act of worship . . . [does not] require God as a personal entity. God is the
worshipful precisely because God is not an entity alongside others whose
psychology we can envision or linguistically express. We are content then to say
that the ciphers of redemption (founding, love, justice) appresents the character of
the Creativity we worship.71
With this assertion, part of Farley’s intention seems to be to leave a space (or a mystery
or a reverent distance) between the character of God and God Godself.
Ciphers of creativity. Farley discovers “three ciphers at work in the symbol or
metaphor of (divine) creativity: empowering, eternality, and aim.”72 With the cipher of
empowering, he means something that is short of complete determination but that is
nevertheless a significant force. For instance, he argues that the Christian community
observes with the individual redemptive process that human agents “are empowered . . .
[but not determined] in their struggle amidst tragic finitude toward empassioned
freedoms.”73 With the second cipher of creativity, eternity, he argues that this “is simply

69

Divine Empathy, 132.

70

Divine Empathy, 132.

71

Divine Empathy, 133.

72

Divine Empathy, 138.

73

Divine Empathy, 139.
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the divine . . . time.”74 Finally, with the cipher of aim, he implies something less than the
traditional attribute of providence but something more than “simply a random process.”75
Cipher of the Holy. The cipher of the Holy is unique. On the one hand, “as with
all ciphers, . . . [the cipher of the Holy is] born in human experience, . . . [but] the
negative function of . . . [the cipher of the Holy] is to display the poverty of all ciphers.”76
This negative function includes showing the limitations of the ciphers of redemption and
creativity.77 However, the cipher of the Holy involves more than just this negative
purpose. When viewed in connection with “how God comes forth as God in redemption,
. . . [the cipher of the Holy points to a] divine otherness . . . [that] unswervingly aims to
(creatively) redeem.”78
The Trinity? With his treatment of the three overarching ciphers – redeemer,
creator, and the Holy79 – each of which appresent in different ways the character of the

74

Divine Empathy, 139.

75

Divine Empathy, 140. Farley’s understanding of “empowering” and “aim” is in
harmony with his critique of the “house of authority’s” founding axiom of salvation
history, which, he argues, posits an overly strong divine determinism.
76

Divine Empathy, 141.

77

Divine Empathy, 141.

78

Divine Empathy, 142-43.

79

Farley indicates that “because of the facticity of redemption, . . . [these] names
[and ciphers] . . . come forth in a certain sequence,” as set forth in Divine Empathy, 124.
Therefore, in contrast to theologians working under “the house of authority,” who might
often place creator first, Farley begins with redeemer.
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divine, Farley inquires as to whether or not this endeavor might be an indirect path to a
newly conceived construction of the doctrine of the Trinity.80 To a certain extent, he
acknowledges that his threefold naming of God shares some limited similarities with
traditional constructions of the Trinity. For example, he indicates that “insofar as the
trinitarian Symbol means a notion of internal differentiation in God, my analysis is in
continuity with that Symbol.”81 Yet, with this particular example, he clarifies that what
he has “not done is what trinitarian proposals try to do, namely, show that God’s
internally differentiated structure coincides with the threefold liturgical formula of
Father, Son, and Spirit, a task that calls for great inventiveness and not a little bit of
speculation.”82 In addition, he stresses that most efforts to construct doctrines of the
Trinity are “like the Wandering Jew . . . eternally searching for a conceptual homeland,”83
This is the case since:
According to the ecumenical creeds, God is eternally structured by three
hypostases (personae) whose distinguishability does not eliminate God’s unity; . .
. [and] if these are the minimal contents and distinctions of the doctrine, . . .
[Farley finds] no author in the New Testament who thinks of God in that way,
even those who think that God was incarnate in Jesus or that the sanctifying Spirit
of Pentecost was divine.84
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Divine Empathy, 144.
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Divine Empathy, 149.
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Divine Empathy, 149.
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Divine Empathy, 147-48.
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Divine Empathy, 145.
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Therefore, Farley suggests that since the New Testament does not make use of such
creedal terms as “hypostases,” that “Trinity is a kind of blank tablet, an invitation for
each new generation of interpreters to say what it means.”85 And, he indicates that his
treatment of the three overarching ciphers – redeemer, creator, and the Holy – should not
be construed as yet “another attempt to fill . . . [this] blank tablet.”86

Thinking the Relation between the World and God:
A Paradigm of the Works of God
After setting forth his concepts of how God can be known and of how we can
speak of God, Farley then offers the final and most extensive aspect of his doctrine of
God – his understanding of the activity or work of God in the world. He argues that
“since we have no direct access to this activity, we can only think it by constructing a
paradigm.”87 Therefore, he constructs a paradigm of the works of God, and within this
construction he more fully conveys not only his concept of what God does but also his
notion of who God is.
Farley maintains that a paradigm of the divine activity should involve an
uncovering of three central components: (1) the divine aim (the purpose and the content
of the works of God); (2) the divine strategy (the means through which the divine aim of
God has been and should be carried out); and, (3) the kind of environment in which the
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Divine Empathy, 147.
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Divine Empathy, 148.
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Divine Empathy, 216.
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divine activity occurs.88 In short, he argues: (1') that the divine aim is God’s intention to
empathize with and to redeem the world;89 (2') that the divine strategy is “the objective
(historical) mediation of redemption, . . . [accomplished primarily through] the event of
the suffering messianic teacher;”90 and, (3') that the kind of environment in which God’s
activity takes place is the “world” (broadly conceived), “creation,” or “whatever is,”91 as
the “world” is perceived from a combination of scientific, philosophical, and theological
perspectives.92
In the sections below, I will explore each of these three central components of
Farley’s paradigm of the works of God, and since he treats these components in reverse
order I will as well. That is, I will first consider his notion of the divine environment;
then, I will investigate his understanding of the divine strategy; and, finally, I will
examine his concept of the divine aim. However, before moving to a consideration of
these three components of Farley’s paradigm, I will briefly analyze the manner in which
he seeks to situate this paradigm between metaphysical and anti-metaphysical
perspectives.
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Divine Empathy, 175-78.
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Divine Empathy, 296.
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Divine Empathy, 178.
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Divine Empathy, 177.
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Divine Empathy, chaps. 13-16 passim.
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Situating the Paradigm between Metaphysical and Anti-metaphysical Perspectives
With his construction of a doctrine of God and particularly with his development
of a paradigm of the divine activity, Farley has a concern to appropriately place his
efforts on a spectrum of metaphysical outlooks, ranging from the metaphysics often
associated with “the ‘theism’ of the classical Catholic theology of God . . . [to the antimetaphysics frequently allied with] the anti-theism of twentieth-century Jewish
philosophy and negative and deconstructive theologies.”93 He argues that for proponents
of the former outlook, “metaphysics is both possible and necessary for the theology of
God . . . [and that for those] on the other side, . . . attaching metaphysics to theology is
like throwing an anchor to a drowning person.”94
Within this spectrum, Farley summarizes his own view as follows: “Anti-theist
critiques of metaphysics chasten and qualify but do not eliminate metaphysics.”95 One of
the main areas where the anti-theists chasten with some merit, he avers, is with the
charge of “totality,” in other words with the charge that metaphysics seeks to offer an
explanation of everything.96 Farley acknowledges the legitimacy of this charge for many
different types of metaphysics, but he holds that this is not the type of metaphysics that
he undertakes with his paradigm of the works of God. That is, he maintains that he
employs “a generally descriptive metaphysics that makes no claim to ‘explain’ world
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Divine Empathy, xv.
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Divine Empathy, 154.
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Divine Empathy, 290.
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Divine Empathy, 163-65.
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totality.”97 Thus, for him, “while totality metaphysics . . . [is] incompatible with the
theology of God, metaphysics as descriptive ontology . . . [is] not.”98 Moreover, Farley
seems sympathetic with the view of some metaphysical theologians that “if we prefer
coherent bespeaking of God to contradictory, vague, and muddled discourse, then a
metaphysical explication is unavoidable,”99 and, when it comes to the so-called
“objectification” aspect of metaphysics, in which “metaphysical theologians . . .
[supposedly] ‘objectify’ God,”100 he implies that “objectification . . . seems to be as much
a part of antimetaphysical as of metaphysical theologies of God.”101
In short, Farley indicates that his paradigm of God’s activity in the world does
“contain a metaphysical element”102 – but only the more tempered variety of a descriptive
metaphysics that seeks to offer a coherent ontological explanation of the divine activity
that can be known – and not of the more extreme version of metaphysics, such as a
totality metaphysics, that would aspire to offer an exhaustive explanation of all divine
activity.
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Divine Empathy, 171.
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Divine Empathy, 172.
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Divine Empathy, 157. Although he does not treat their metaphysical views in
detail, Farley here refers to process theologians such as John Cobb, as set forth in Divine
Empathy, 156.
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Divine Empathy, 161.
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Divine Empathy, 162.

102

Divine Empathy, 168.
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The World: The Environment for the Works of God
With this perspective of a descriptive metaphysics, Farley holds that, since the
“world” is where the works of God occur, any paradigm that endeavors to offer a
comprehensive understanding of the divine activity must seek to show “what the world is
and how it works.”103 Therefore, one of the major components of his paradigm of God’s
works is an account of the environment or the “world” in which these works occur. He
argues that “the world is not reducible simply to what the various sciences . . . deliver to
us, but . . . [that it is] also something available in broader discernments. Showing itself in
these discernments are such features as eventfulness, autonomy, tragic structure,
competition, and cooperation.”104 In order to convey this fuller sense of “world,” he
indicates that he will “use the term world without the article. World without the article is
a term like being, time, space, history, or nature.”105 And, to offer further clarification, he
compares “world” with “cosmos,” suggesting that “like cosmos, world connotes a totality
but, unlike cosmos, this totality is open-ended . . . rather than bounded.”106
Furthermore, Farley maintains that “the complexity and very facticity of world
overreach all specific, focused projects of research.”107 That is, for him, world is so vast
and multifaceted that no one perspective – even the scientific perspective – is capable of
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adequately addressing all the ways in which people know and participate in world.
Therefore, in an attempt to more fully uncover world or the environment in which divine
activity takes place, he offers treatments of various different perspectives on world. First,
he sets forth separate treatments of the scientific and the philosophical perspectives on
world. Then, drawing from both of these perspectives, he constructs a brief scientificphilosophical description of how the world proceeds. Finally, he sets forth a faith
perspective on world. Accordingly, I will consider each of these developments in turn.
Scientific world. With scientific world, world consists, Farley argues, of three
main spheres or systems: cosmos, nature, and history.108 These systems may be
“distinguished by the kinds of entities, behaviors, and even structures we find in them.”109
Farley holds that “cosmos names the inclusive, astrophysically, and quantum and
mathematically apprehended epochal system of space-time that began with the Big
Bang.”110 In other words, “cosmos names what we sometimes call the world, the spacetime aggregate of clustered galaxies.”111 Significantly, he notes, not only does cosmos
change over time (in a directional manner), by way of both expansion and entropy,112 but
also, especially in the particle world, there seems to be “spontaneous activity toward
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Divine Empathy, 177, emphases mine.
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Divine Empathy, 184.
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organization . . . [within cosmos] that resists explanation.”113 Therefore, for these and
other reasons, he avers that there is an aspect to cosmos , particularly with its origins, that
is incomprehensible and impenetrable to us.114
The second system of scientific world is nature. Here, Farley argues that “nature
names the planetary ecosystem, the biosphere of living things as they are bound up with
the nonliving conditions on which they depend.”115 Importantly, according to Farley, at
different levels within nature, and even at the level of cellular activity, one can observe
“various kinds of accidental or random events.”116 For example, a cell can “entertain
novel contents;”117 that is, it can appear to spontaneously respond or adapt when new
elements have been introduced to it.118 Thus, Farley holds that, as with cosmos, there is
an aspect to nature that presents a boundary or a mystery to us.119
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Divine Empathy, 190.
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Divine Empathy, 193. Farley rejects much of the notions of contemporary
physicists, such as those of P. W. Atkins and Stephen Hawking, on matters pertaining to
the origin of the universe. For instance, Farley indicates that “Hesiod’s account of the
origin of the world from chaos in terms of the struggle of the titans and their children
makes as much sense to [him] . . . as the pretense . . . [of Atkins and Hawking] that
‘nothingness,’ ‘dust points,’ and ‘quantum fluctuations’ are exhaustively explanatory,” as
revealed in Divine Empathy, 191. Here, Farley refers to P. W. Atkins, The Creation (San
Francisco, California: W. H. Freeman, 1981); and, to Stephen Hawking, A Brief History
of Time: From the Big Band to Black Holes (New York: Bantam Books, 1988).
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Finally, Farley maintains that history, the third system of scientific world, “names
the sphere of activities that take place in connection with the human populations of our
planet, activities made possible by the traditioning power of language and institutions.”120
In addition, he avers that several themes emerge when one endeavors to comprehend the
unique historical passage of corporate human reality. For instance, with this historical
passage, one observes: both continuity and newness; both conflict (of powers) and
mutual respect; and, (especially when conceiving of historical passage as a series of
distinct but overlapping histories) both patterns and directions.121 Yet, as with cosmos
and nature, Farley argues that “history is ambiguous,”122 and, therefore, “has an underside
of mystery.”123
Philosophical world. In addition to the scientific perspective on world, Farley
argues that there is also a philosophical outlook on world. In seeking to unfold this
philosophical outlook, he turns to three sources, “common sense orientation, scientific
inquiry, and philosophies of world,”124 and he maintains that these sources yield three
major themes and four basic elements of philosophical world.
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For Farley, the three central themes of philosophical world are: chaos, order, and
direction.125 First, with chaos, he holds that factors such as indeterminancy – that is, the
manner in which an entity can change its surroundings by the way it “responds to its
environment, initiates action, and brings about the new”126 – indicate “a chaos that is not
simply an interdependent aspect of order.”127 Thus, it follows that “ultimate chaos is an
uncreated obstacle that yields to ordering or creativity . . . but is not thereby
eliminated.”128 Second, with regard to order, he maintains that “world is in some sense
ordered,”129 and he argues that this order is “the necessary presence of continuity,
coherence, and systematic interdependence in whatever is actual.”130 And, third, with
direction, he avers that “world contains directional processes that include the
development of the conditions of life, the dispersal of energy, . . . [and] the teleonomic
behavior of living entities.”131
Furthermore, for Farley, the four basic elements that constitute philosophical
world are: entities, relations, events, and environments. He maintains that each of these
elements have certain unique features. For instance, entities are “collections of energy . .
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. [that] are able to influence what is around them.”132 Relations constitute entities and
enable both attraction and competition (and, therefore, suffering) to occur among them.133
Events are “new and distinguishable states of affairs . . . [in the day-to-day lives of
people].”134 And, environments are “the systems of relations . . . in which entities and
events are located.”135
A scientific-philosophical description of how “world” proceeds. In addition to
setting forth separate treatments of scientific and philosophical perspectives on world,
Farley draws from both of these perspectives in order to construct a brief description of
how world proceeds. To this end, he argues that the working of world involves four
interrelated themes that “are present in sciences and philosophies of the world: entities,
openness, tragedy, and cooperation.”136 First, he holds that world consists of entities that
act in a certain manner.137 For instance, he avers: that “to be an entity at all is to respond
to the environment;”138 that “entities always exist . . . in relation to and interdependent
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with other entities;”139 that “to be an entity at all is to exist in the mode of eros (need,
desire, struggle);”140 and, that entities “sense to some degree the perils and possibilities of
their situation.”141 Second, he maintains that “openness is a term for the world’s temporal
proceeding into novelty.”142 In support of this notion, Farley points to “the indeterminacy
of the particle world, the random character of the operations in microbiology, and the
unpredictable complexities and ambiguities of history.”143 Third, he holds that “because
the world is open (a flexible realm of spontaneous action and indeterminancy), it is also
tragic.”144 Fourth, he argues that “‘world’ . . . also requires a kind of cooperation. That
is, . . . it is comprised of entities and environments that have obtained a sufficient unity or
synthesis of aspects to endure over a period of time.”145
Moreover, according to Farley, “when . . . [one] puts these . . . [four] themes
together, . . . [one sees that] we have a world made up of . . . spontaneously acting but
vulnerable entities that exist in systems which themselves are ever threatened but that
exhibit tendencies in certain directions; that is, toward further syntheses, and toward the
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urge to unite with or cooperate with other entities and even types of entities.”146 In other
words, Farley argues that the sciences and philosophies envision a world that is moving
toward greater unity and cooperation.
Faith world. Farley holds not only that sciences and philosophies have a
perspective on world but also that faith does as well. Moreover, he suggests that faith
does not simply seek to “fill in the gaps” with whatever it might be that sciences and
philosophies do not cover; on the contrary, he maintains that faith has an entire world
orientation of its own.147 This view reflects Farley’s methodological principle of
positivity, which is the principle that “each general stratum undergoes transformation
when it is incorporated into the strata more determinate than itself.”148 Therefore, in
light of this principle, “a theology of world cannot assume that world is synonymous with
the aggregate of general features proposed by the sciences or ontology.”149
Faith’s starting point for constructing its notion of world is, according to Farley,
with the Christian community’s retrieval of redemptive experiences in the individual,
interhuman, and social spheres of human reality. With this retrieval, it becomes evident,
he holds, not only that world is presupposed by these three spheres but also that the
redemptive activity of God is present within each of these spheres without any
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restrictions. That is, the activity of the divine is not restricted or limited to any “territory,
. . . stratum, . . . type of entity, . . . [or] environment.”150
Furthermore, Farley holds that “this nonrestriction . . . [of God’s redemptive
activity in world] . . . has several implications.”151 For instance, one implication is that
God “can be neither one of the world’s entities nor the world totality itself, . . . [since]
there would be no redemption at all if the redeeming power were some piece of the
world.”152 In other words, if God works redemptively – throughout the entire world,
without restriction – it follows, according to Farley, that God must, at least in some
sense, be other than world (otherwise we would be left with a situation where that which
is idolatrous or corrupt itself would be seeking to redeem that which is idolatrous or
corrupt, which would be absurd). Another implication of the non-limitation of God’s
redemptive activity in world is that God “cannot be an alien to that world.”153 That is, if
God works redemptively throughout all of the world (without limitation), then God must,
at least to some degree, be involved in the happenings of world. Or, more precisely, God
“must be the power or creativity of the world itself.”154 In view of these implications,
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Farley argues that “the traditional symbol of this general relation of the world to God is
world as creation.”155
Farley then endeavors to unfold what, in his view, the Christian tradition has
sought to convey with this symbol of creation. He maintains that the symbol of creation
has simultaneously expressed not only world dependence on God but also world
independence from God. He reasons that, on the one hand, “as something that is not
God, has no absolute or ultimate status, and has its own reality, world is independent, . . .
[and that, on the other hand,] existing because of divine creative activity, it is
dependent.”156 Therefore, in terms of its relation to God, world is both independent and
dependent. One of the implications of this dynamic, according to Farley, is that world “is
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his understanding of creation, Farley indicates that he differs somewhat with
Schleiermacher’s perspective. Schleiermacher, according to Farley:
Assigns the doctrine . . . [of creation] not to the way piety is determinate under
the conditions of redemption but to the general piety that redemption presupposes.
He thus argues that the structure of utter dependence (piety) in the immediate
self-consciousness is inseparable from the human being’s sense of world
entanglement. Thus, the individual’s sense of dependence on God coexists with a
sense that the whole world order depends on God (as shown in Divine Empathy,
241; and, here, Farley refers to Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, §§ 36-41, pp.
142-56.)
However, Farley states that he has “departed from this approach because of . . . [his own]
privileging of redemption as the way God comes forth as God. Accordingly, . . . [for
Farley,] the sense of the world as dependent on God comes not with the general structure
of piety but with the transition of the human being from the hold of idolatry to freedom
by way of being-founded,” as set forth in Divine Empathy, 241.
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not simply determined by God;”157 but, at the same time, neither is it completely separate
from God’s influence.158
Moreover, Farley argues that deeper reflection upon the world as the dependentindependent creation of God reveals at least four implied themes about the status of
world, along two polarities. The first polarity is that world has the character of both
mystery and significance. Here, with this polarity, Farley stresses that “because world is
creation, it has the sort of significance something has that is valued or willed . . . [but that
this significance] . . . of world does not . . . reduce its mystery.”159 That is, he emphasizes
that since God intentionally created world, we know that world must have value; but, this
value or significance does not mean that humans are capable of knowing everything there
is to know about world. The second polarity is that world has the character of both
goodness and tragedy. Here, he holds that “any world whose entities have the character
of independence will have a tragic side;”160 however, “a world entity is good insofar as its
very constitution enables it to be receptive to the divine attempt to draw it into
harmonious cooperation with others.”161 In other words, he maintains that, as an
inescapable corollary of world’s independence from the divine, there will always be a
tragic element to world (as that independence is abused); yet, as an unavoidable corollary
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of world’s dependence on the divine, there will also always be an underlying element of
good with world, since the divine works powerfully and creatively to influence (but not
to determine) the entities of world to cooperate with each other. In short, while Farley
allows for mystery and the tragic, he suggests that, because of God’s redemptive activity,
the Christian community can retrieve the reality that world-as-creation, has significance
and goodness as its primary characteristics.

The Means: The Strategy for the Works of God
Thus far in my examination of Farley’s understanding of the works of God I have
considered one of three parts of his paradigm of the divine activity – that is, his notion of
world as the kind of environment in which the activity of God occurs. This aspect of my
examination has endeavored to show that, for Farley, while world is marked by mystery
and tragedy, it is essentially a good and a valued-by-the-divine kind of environment that
is moving towards greater unity and cooperation. In addition, in the following section of
this chapter, I will endeavor to analyze a third part of this paradigm of the divine activity
– that is, the divine aim of the works of God, which Farley argues, as I will strive to
show, is God’s intention to empathize with and to redeem world. The thrust of this
present section, therefore, will be to explore what occurs “between” the divine aim to
redeem, on the one hand, and the location (God’s good and valued world) where this
redemption occurs, on the other hand. In other words, I will consider in this section the
second part of Farley’s paradigm of the divine activity, the part having to do with the
divine means or the strategy through which the redemptive aim of God will be carried out
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in world. That is, I will consider what Farley argues actually takes place so as to bring
about God’s redemptive aim in world.
The Christian community as the “through-which” of redemption. Farley avers
that the path to uncovering the divine strategy should be made by turning not to “the
house of authority” but, instead, to the Christian community’s retrieval of the divine
strategy. As this community undertakes such a retrieval, it realizes that redemption “does
not spontaneously generate in human hearts and societies.”162 On the contrary, it realizes
that the “through-which of historical redemption (at least for the Christian movement) is
the new community . . . [that] came about in the wake of Jesus’ life and death”163 – a
community which is unique in that it offers “a universalized form of the faith of Israel”164
– that is, a form of Israel’s faith that “does not absolutely require the existence of any
particular ethnicity but can be present to any and all.”165 In other words, Farley suggests
that while the Christian community cannot observe redemption taking place
spontaneously, it can observe redemption occurring as a result of its own activities,
which includes the offer of redemption to all people.
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The person and ministry of Jesus as the “through-which” of the Christian
community. Moreover, while the “through-which” of redemption (at least for
Christianity) is the new community that arose with the ministry of Jesus, the “throughwhich” of this new community, Farley argues, is “the figure and activity of Jesus.”166
This is the case because the early faith community understood Jesus – not just as symbol
but as a historical reality – to be the center and the “through-which” of its very
existence.167 This raises the issue of what was “the significance of the event of Jesus as
Christ.”168 And, this significance, according to Farley, “turns on the use . . . of historical
method toward the materials of the New Testament collection, which materials provide
the only access we have to the event and figure of Jesus.”169 Accordingly, “this sets for
the . . . [New Testament] interpreter the ‘archaeological’ task of determining what is
primitive and what is late, what actually happened to Jesus and what did not, what Jesus
actually taught or preached and what the kerygmas of the later community attributed to
him.”170
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What the kerygmas of the New Testament reveal about the significance of Jesus.
According to Farley, the kerygmas of the New Testament reveal much about the
significance of Jesus.171 For instance, he holds that the kerygmas, taken together, make
the case that “the radicalism of Jesus is this ‘innocent’ life of faith and trust before
God.”172 That is, he argues that the kerygmas present a portrait of Jesus as one who was
genuinely unique in the way in which he so fully relied upon God – almost to the degree
that we was essentially oblivious to the religious and political powers and institutions that
surrounded him.173 In addition, Farley maintains that the kerygmas “give expression to
three fundamental Christological convictions,”174 and he holds that these convictions may
be summarized as follows: “‘God raised him from the dead;’ ‘Christ died for our sins;’
and ‘God was in Christ.’”175 These three convictions become the framework for the

171

Farley argues that “there seems to be no single kerygma which serves as the
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majority of Farley’s understanding for what the kerygmas reveal about the meaning of
Jesus.
With each of these convictions, he offers a two-step analysis. First, he briefly
indicates his notion of how they are present in the various New Testament kerygmas,
through the lens of a combination of historical method and theological method;176 then,
he offers a “theological reinterpretation . . . [of what these convictions express about the
meaning of Jesus].”177 With this theological reinterpretation, Farley’s purpose is “to
discover how the event of Jesus as Christ is the through-which of the new community and
thus of redemption.”178 And, along these lines, he acknowledges that his reinterpretative
endeavors involve a “speculative dimension,”179 but he holds that this is unavoidable

176
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Farley does not seem to be entirely clear about what he means with this concept in this
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since, in part, he does not feel that he can assume that the Bible or the Christian creeds
“necessarily contain or express truth.”180 In addition, he maintains that his
reinterpretative endeavors work “in synthetic fashion attempting to identify the way in
which certain contents and symbolisms of the ancient historical event and figure [of
Jesus] . . . are correlated with the conditions of redemption in the new community”181 –
again acknowledging that “this is surely . . . a kind of speculation.”182 Therefore, in the
sections below, I will consider Farley’s treatment of each of these three convictions,
giving attention to this two-step analysis.
God raised him from the dead. The first conviction present in the various New
Testament kerygmas, according to Farley, is that “the event of Jesus issued in . . . a
victory powerful enough to give rise to the new community; . . . [and] the way the
kerygmas expressed this conviction was to say that ‘God raised him from the dead.’”183
Farley maintains that the application of historical method to the kerygmas does not
uncover with clarity “‘what really happened’ . . . [with the resurrection];”184 however, he
holds that theological method can allow us to ask about the meaning of the proclamation
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of the resurrection in the kerygmas.185 And, with the use of theological method, motifs
such as the following emerge: the resurrection “vindicates Jesus’ life and mission;”186 it is
“the presupposition of the rise of the new community;”187 and, it “gives grounds for hope
in the face of death.”188
Moreover, through his theological reinterpretation of this conviction, “God raised
him from the dead,” Farley holds that Jesus was unlike any other in terms of his radical
trust in God. This trust was so complete that Jesus essentially ignored “the
paraphernalias of religious traditions.”189 It was this extreme trust manifested in Jesus’
life and teaching, Farley argues, that created the possibility for “a universal form of the
faith of Israel.”190 And, the manner in which the early faith community gave expression
to this new faith, he further holds:
Was to speak of an event that turned the despairing and defeated followers of
Jesus into the nucleus of the new community, namely the resurrection of Jesus,
followed by the coming of the Spirit. Whatever event of resurrection is in itself, it
is present in the memory of the church as the catalyst of the new community.191
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Therefore, Farley suggests that while there may be no way of knowing what actually
occurred with the resurrection event of Jesus,192 what can be retrieved is that this event –
whatever it might have involved – was not only the means through which the early
Christian community could give expression to the unique and radical reliance upon God
that Jesus exhibited during his (earthly) life but was also the basis for the start of a new
community that would seek to expand the faith of Israel across all ethnic boundaries.
Christ died for our sins. A second underlying conviction of the New Testament
kerygmas is that Jesus died “for us;” yet, Farley argues that the application of historical
method to the kerygmas does not show in any unified way “what the ‘for us’ means.”193
In fact, he suggests, that it is only within the larger context of the reversal of Jesus’
suffering through the resurrection that we can have any reason to consider that Jesus’
suffering itself has any significance “for us.”194
Furthermore, with his theological reinterpretation of this conviction, Farley
maintains that Jesus was unique because of the way in which he suffered for others.
There is common consensus, Farley holds, that Jesus’ life ended with a humiliating
execution,195 and he argues that this death was due, in part, to the almost innocent radical
trust that Jesus demonstrated toward God and to his corresponding apathy towards

192

Divine Empathy, 269.

193

Divine Empathy, 270.

194

Divine Empathy, 270.

195

Divine Empathy, 276.

193
existing political and religious authorities.196 Moreover, according to Farley, the way in
which Jesus suffered was unlike that of any other person in at least three ways. First,
Jesus’ suffering was a response to the suffering of his people – not because they were his
people “but simply because they suffered.”197 That is, Farley suggests that a unique
aspect of Jesus’ suffering was his motive; he suffered for his people not out of some sort
of ethnic loyalty but simply out of an empathy for the suffering that his people had to
endure. Second, Farley avers that Jesus’ suffering was unique since his empathetic love
was not just internally felt but also publicly expressed.198 As a result of this public
expression, he further argues, Jesus’ life “evoked a resistance so determined that it would
be satisfied with nothing less than a humiliating execution.”199 Thirdly, he holds that
Jesus’ suffering was unparalleled because it helped to bring about the church, that is, “the
new community of universal redemption.”200 And, it is along these lines, according to
Farley, that one may claim “that ‘Christ died for our sins.’”201
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God was in Christ. A third underlying conviction of the various New Testament
kerygmas is that “‘God was in Christ.’”202 Farley implies that the employment of
historical method to the kerygmas does not clarify what “God was in Christ” actually
means.203 Moreover, he avers that with the use of theological method, such (apparently
accurate) themes as the following come forth:
To say that he is God’s anointed (Christ) is to voice the conviction that he is sent
by God, that God is at work in his life and mission. To speak of him as emptying
himself and taking on the form of a servant only to be exalted connects him with a
divine preexistence, and to say that he is the Word that became flesh and lived
among us is to say that his very existence embodies that which is divine.204
Yet, Farley stresses that the above themes “are not precise conceptual formulations of the
meaning of ‘God was in Christ.’”205
However, as he puts forth his theological reinterpretation of this final conviction,
Farley argues that Jesus was (in a different way) unique because “God . . . [was] ‘in’
Jesus in whatever sense . . . [was] necessary to bring forth the new, universalized form of

202

Divine Empathy, 270.

203

Divine Empathy, 270-71.

204

Divine Empathy, 271.

205

Divine Empathy, 271. For instance, Farley argues that “the notion of Jesus as a
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.[and] it obscures what actually happened in the event of Jesus as Christ,” as shown in
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becomes evident that Jesus could not have been a preexistent divine being).
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the faith of Israel.”206 As to the meaning of “whatever sense was necessary,” Farley
holds that, since the kerygmas of the New Testament reveal that Jesus’ “public activities
took place in connection with his relation to God,”207 God must have been “in” Jesus
enough to lead him to publicly and consistently demonstrate empathetic concern “to any
and all he met.”208 Farley reasons that a demonstration of empathetic concern to such a
degree could only be accomplished by “the divine empathy;”209 therefore, “Jesus . . .
appears to . . . [have been] one with the divine empathy.”210 In other words, he maintains
“that it is . . . in suffering empathy that God and Jesus are united.”211

The Content: The Aim of the Works of God
In this section I will turn to a third part of Farley’s paradigm of the works of God,
the part in which he addresses the aim of the divine activity. In the sections above I
explored his understanding of the other two parts of his paradigm. First, I examined his
notion of “world” as an environment that, while containing aspects of tragedy and
mystery, is primarily good and valued-by-the-divine. Then, I analyzed his understanding
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both of the Christian community as the “through-which” of the divine aim and of the
figure and activity of Jesus as the “through-which” of the Christian community. Now, in
this section, I will examine his concept of the aim of the divine activity.
Farley’s concept of the aim of God’s works is succinct but quite clear. He argues
that the divine aim may be expressed with the concept of “divine empathy.”212 In order
to unfold what he means by “divine empathy,” he begins by turning, in part, to Edith
Stein’s work, On the Problem of Empathy,213 and to the way in which she conceives of
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Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (The Hague, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964; reprint, Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989).
This work is largely a revision of her dissertation of the same title, which she completed
under Husserl in 1916. In addition, Stein either studied under or worked for Husserl,
sometimes intermittently, from 1913 to 1918, as set forth in Donald Borchert, ed.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Detroit, Michigan: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), vol.
9, 2d ed., s.v. “Stein, Edith (1891-1942),” by Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz.
Furthermore, perhaps worthy of note is that while Farley heavily relies upon Husserl’s
phenomenological thought in the development of his theological method, as I have
endeavored to show in chapter 1, he does not appear to consider Husserl’s notions
concerning religion in the construction of his doctrine of God. This is the case even
though Husserl seems to have had some religious inclinations and even though some of
his writings addressed religious topics. For instance, with regard to his religious
inclinations, according to one scholar, while Husserl was “consolidating his
philosophical vocation, he found himself attracted to Christ after reading the New
Testament in 1882,” as shown in Angela Ales Bello, The Divine in Husserl and Other
Explorations, trans. Antonio Calcagno, Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of
Phenomenological Research, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, vol. 98 (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Springer, 2009), 70. Also, one of Edith Stein’s biographers notes that Stein
“learned that Husserl, on his deathbed, had turned back to God,” as set forth in Waltraud
Herbstrith, Edith Stein: A Biography, trans. Bernard Bonowitz (San Francisco,
California: Harper & Row, 1985), 78. In addition, in terms of his writings, Husserl
addresses, for example, the need to suspend the transcendence of God as part of the
process of developing a phenomenological perspective, as shown in Husserl, Ideas:
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, 173-74. While this is an admittedly thin
example, there would be no call for such a suspension, of course, without the
concomitant view that there was a transcendence of God to be suspended.
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empathy as “a transcendentally based capacity to perceive the other in its experiencing
(Erleben).”214 Then, starting with Stein’s notion of empathy, he goes on to make
distinctions among empathy, sympathy, compassion, and love, as follows:
Empathy is a transcendentally based capacity to perceive the other in its
experiencing. . . . Sympathy . . . is not just a perception of but a participation in
the life of the other. Compassion is a participation in the suffering or misery of
the other. . . . Love is an unqualified suffering self-impartation of one’s being to
or for the sake of the other.215
Farley maintains that “as metaphors for the divine activity, . . . [these four concepts] tend
to merge.”216 That is, when Farley employs the term “divine empathy,” he intends to
combine together: “participative suffering, self-impartation, perception of our
experiencing, and compassion.”217
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Divine Empathy, 295; here Farley makes a general reference to Edith Stein, On
the Problem of Empathy. Such a conception of empathy coheres with how one of the
translators and interpreters of Edith Stein’s works, Waltraut Stein (who is also Edith
Stein’s great-niece), argues that On the Problem of Empathy “is a description of the
nature of empathy within the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology as presented
mainly in Volume I of Ideas,” as shown in Waltraut Stein, preface to On the Problem of
Empathy, by Edith Stein, trans. Waltraut Stein (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964; reprint, Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989), xiii. Moreover,
Waltraut Stein adds the following helpful explanation to place On the Problem of
Empathy in the proper context: “Many years after the completion of E. Stein’s work on
empathy, Husserl presented his Cartesian Meditations. . . . In this work, however,
Husserl is emphasizing a somewhat different aspect of the problem of empathy; the
possibility of the other rather than the phenomenological description of this other. Thus
Cartesian Meditations is more in contrast with his earlier conceptions than similar to
them. This also means that E. Stein’s work on empathy is in contrast with Cartesian
Meditations,” as set forth in ibid., xiv.
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Moreover, Farley holds that the connection between Jesus and God sheds light on
the nature of this divine empathy. Accordingly, he suggests that since Jesus so radically
trusted in God and because Jesus demonstrated a suffering significant enough to serve as
a catalyst for the launching of the new community of universal redemption, it follows that
“the empathy of God is also a pathos, a ‘fellow-feeling’ that suffers.”218 In addition: just
as Jesus’ empathy was not just internally experienced but publicly conveyed,219 so also
the empathy of God “not only feels with another but would ease the other’s suffering and
promote the other’s well-being;”220 just as Jesus’ empathy was without restriction,221 so
also the empathy of God “cannot say, ‘thus far and no farther;’”222 and, just as Jesus’
empathy led to the universalization of the faith of Israel,223 so also the empathy of God
“is ever an operation of enlargement.”224
Furthermore, Farley maintains that (1) divine empathy (as the divine aim) works
through (2A) the event of the suffering of Jesus as the through-which of (2B) the new
universalized community of faith (as the divine means) in a manner that impacts (3)
world (as the divine environment) in the direction of greater unity and cooperation.
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Specifically, he holds that the divine empathy “pushes . . . [entities] toward synthesis and
cooperation;”225 or, more broadly, he avers that the divine empathy inclines and
empowers “world process in directions of synthesis, cooperation, and novelty.”226
Moreover, he argues that, since these creative goals (synthesis, cooperation, and novelty)
are so similar to God’s redemptive goals [founding (with the individual); reconciling love
(with the interhuman); and, justice (with the social)],227 it must be that God’s creative aim
is the same as God’s redemptive aim; and, therefore, it must be that “the God who
redemptively comes forth as God is the Creativity that disposes the world.”228 Thus,
Farley suggests that the central feature of God’s creative and redemptive works is God’s
aim of divine empathy (where “empathy” is broadly understood as including
“participative suffering, self-impartation, perception of our experiencing, and
compassion”229) and, therefore, that the central feature of God’s character is divine
empathy.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have endeavored to demonstrate both Farley’s understanding of
the doctrine of God and the extent to which this doctrine stems from his theological

225

Divine Empathy, 303.

226

Divine Empathy, 303.

227

Divine Empathy, 125-31 passim.

228

Divine Empathy, 300.

229

Divine Empathy, 296.

200
method of ecclesial reflection. With his doctrine of God, he first seeks to show how God
can be known by examining the process of redemptive transformation. Towards this end,
he examines, for instance, within the individual sphere of human reality, how individuals
can experience having their elemental passions fulfilled. Through this examination, he
demonstrates that, while finite resources cannot genuinely accomplish this fulfillment, an
infinite resource (or an eternal horizon) can. Then, he employs his methodological
principle that realties-at-hand can appresent realities-not-at-hand, in order to argue that
the reality-at-hand of the Christian community’s direct experience of individuals having
their elemental passions genuinely fulfilled appresents the reality-not-at-hand of God,
where one conceives of God as the authentic eternal horizon or as the “causality” through
which this fulfillment (or redemption or “founding”) has taken place. Thus, he maintains
that the faith community’s experience of redemption not only allows for knowledge of
what God means but also provides evidence for the reality of God.
Next, Farley explores how one may speak of God. He argues that one may do so
only by grounding speaking of God in discernments that occur as the believer, as part of
the larger faith community, recognizes that only the divine could have been at work in a
specific situation of redemptive transformation. In addition, with these discernments, the
believer can assign “content” to God, since only God could have redeemed (fulfilled or
founded) in any of the three spheres of human reality, for example: from “idolatry” to
“freedom” (in the individual sphere); from “alienation” to “communion” (in the
interhuman sphere); or, from “self-serving politics” to “justice without restriction” (in the
social sphere). However, in line with his theological method, he holds that this “content”
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can only be appresented (or indirectly assigned) to God because God cannot be a direct
meaning referent. In light of this criterion of only being able to indirectly assign content
to God, Farley further holds that “ciphers” – which better allow for an aspect of mystery
and otherness than (the more traditional notion of) “attributes” – are the symbolics that
are most appropriate for speaking of God. Among the various ciphers, he suggests that
there are three overarching ones (each of which come from human experience) that name
God: redeemer, creator, and the Holy. For instance, with regard to the first of these
major ciphers, redeemer, he maintains that God’s redemptive activity in the three spheres
of human reality manifests redemptive sub-ciphers of founding, reconciling love, and
justice – and that, taken together, these three redemptive sub-ciphers may be said to
converge, as a way of considering God, in the name “Spirit,” which, since it is a nonpersonal name, leaves room for the mystery of God. Similarly, God’s creative activity
(which is known because of God’s redemptive activity) shows creative sub-ciphers of
empowering, eternality, and aim – none of which permit total divine determination. The
third of these major ciphers, the Holy, is unique in that it demonstrates the limitations of
all the other ciphers. Moreover, Farley avers that his threefold naming of God – as
redeemer, creator, and the Holy – is similar to traditional understandings of the Trinity
only to the extent of reflecting an internal differentiation in God and not to the degree of
coinciding with the description of God as Father, Son, and Spirit.
Then, in view of his perspective that one cannot have direct access to the divine
activity, Farley develops a paradigm of the relation between the world and God,
maintaining that this paradigm should interweave three central features: (1) the type of
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environment in which the divine activity occurs; (2) the divine strategy (the means
through which the divine aim of God has been and should be carried out); and, (3) the
divine aim (the purpose and the content of the works of God). In addition, he indicates
that this entire paradigm will make use of a descriptive (but not a totality) metaphysics.
First, with regard to the type of environment in which God’s works take place, he
argues that “world” – by which he means something akin to the open-ended, unbound
universe – is so vast that no one perspective has the capacity to adequately speak to all
the ways in which it can be known. Therefore, he indicates that he will offer scientific,
philosophical, and faith perspectives on world. With his treatment of the scientific and
philosophical perspectives (which he considers first separately and then together), he
concludes that, while they show that world presents such features as chaos, tragedy, and
mystery, they also show that world presents entities that have been increasingly moving
in the direction of greater unity and cooperation with one another. In addition, with his
treatment of the faith perspective – which, in view of his methodological principle of
positivity, he maintains has an entire world orientation of its own – he finds that it
becomes evident that the redemptive activity of God is present in each of the three human
spheres of reality without any restrictions. And, he maintains that two of the implications
of this limitless divine redemptive activity are that God is other than world and that God
cannot be alien to world – implications, therefore, that, taken together, have traditionally
been referred to by the symbol of “creation.” Accordingly, for Farley, from the faith
perspective, “creation” simultaneously conveys that world is both dependent on God and
independent from God; thus, world cannot be entirely determined by God (because world
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is independent), but neither can world be completely separate from God’s influence
(because world is dependent). Furthermore, Farley implies that deeper reflection upon
world as the dependent-independent creation of God shows (in harmony with scientific
and philosophical perspectives) that while world demonstrates themes of mystery and
tragedy, it chiefly demonstrates themes of significance and goodness.
Second, in terms of the divine strategy through which the redemptive aim of God
will be carried out in the world, Farley argues that this “through which” is the authentic
Christian community, that is, the community which is a universalized form of the faith of
Israel, without any ethnic boundaries. Moreover, he maintains that the “through which”
of this community is Jesus of Nazareth. This leads one to inquire, he avers, about the
significance of Jesus. And, he holds that this significance (or uniqueness) can be found
by examining three central Christological convictions that are contained in the kerygmas
of the New Testament – by means of a two-step analysis, involving, first, a mixture of
historical and theological method and, second, a speculative theological reinterpretation.
Also, he notes that the second step of this two-step analysis involves not a method of
phenomenologically-based ecclesial reflection but a method of speculative
reinterpretation. However, he suggests that this methodological shift with this aspect of
his doctrine of God coheres both with his view that the kerygmas of the New Testament
provide the only access to person and activities of Jesus and with his view (which is in
line with his rejection of the “house of authority”) that one cannot presume that Scripture
necessarily conveys truth.
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With his examination of the conviction “God raised him from the dead,” he
concludes that Jesus was unique in terms of his radical trust in (or reliance upon) God –
and that this extreme trust created the possibility for the universalization of Israel’s faith.
Also, he argues that the way the early church gave expression to both Jesus’ radical trust
in God and to how this trust enabled a new community without ethnic boundaries was to
speak of Jesus’ resurrection (whatever that event might have involved). With another
conviction, “Christ died for our sins,” he finds that Jesus was unique in how he suffered
for others: by being motivated to suffer for others not out of ethnic loyalty but simply out
of empathy; by empathetically loving others not just internally but also through public
expression; and, by suffering for others to a degree that helped to inspire the beginning of
the new faith community that came to be known as the church. Finally, with the third
conviction, “God was in Christ,” he finds that Jesus was unique in that God was “in”
Jesus in “whatever sense was necessary” to enable him to publically show empathetic
concern to all others that he encountered; thus, Farley concludes that divine empathy
must have been “in” Jesus.
Third, with regard to the aim of the works of God, the final feature of Farley’s
paradigm of the relation between world and God, he holds that the divine aim may
expressed with the concept of “divine empathy,” where this empathy includes the notion
of participative suffering and self-imparting love. Also, in view of the connection
between Jesus and God, Farley argues that, like Jesus, God’s empathy seeks to ease
suffering and to promote greater unity and cooperation among all others. Therefore, he
maintains that since God’s creative goals (of greater unity and cooperation among all
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entities, including humans, in world) are so similar to God’s redemptive goals (of
founding, with the individual sphere of human reality; reconciling love, with the
interhuman sphere; and, justice, with the social sphere), it must be: that the redeeming
God is also the creative God; that the main aspect of God’s creative and redemptive
actions is God’s aim of divine empathy; and, that the main aspect of God’s character is
divine empathy.
Thus, throughout his development of a doctrine of God, Farley demonstrates, to a
significant degree, that he builds upon his theological method of ecclesial reflection.
Numerous examples of this reliance have been shown above, but, by way of summary, I
will recapitulate some key components. For example, with his doctrine of God, he
endeavors to bracket church authority. This is perhaps most clear in his bracketing of
Scripture (as that which does “necessarily contain or express truth”);230 however, this is
also apparent, for instance, in his bracketing of his understanding of the “house of
authority’s” founding principle of salvation history, as – with the development of his
faith perspective on an entire world orientation (which is only possible because of his use
of his theological method of the principle of positivity) – he stresses that since world is
not only dependent on but also independent from the divine, we can know that, while
God influences, God does not overly determine the entities of world. Farley also
endeavors to bracket metaphysics. He does so effectively, until he begins to set forth a
paradigm of the works of God – but, even here, he argues that he engages merely in a
descriptive metaphysics.
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While he does not use Husserlian terms such as eidetics, noeses, or noemata,
Farley does seem to employ some of the concepts these terms reflect in the construction
of his doctrine of God, as he seeks to “dig beneath” the everyday activities of the church
to the deep strata of the faith-world and to use at least a form of theological eidetics to
uncover the essences of faith’s corporate realities (or experiences) that take place within
these deep strata. This is evident, for instance, with his treatment of how God can be
known, as he strives: first, to uncover the depth strata of redemptive transformation, by
analyzing how individuals can have their elemental passions fulfilled only by an eternal
horizon; and, second, to suggest that, through a process of discernment (where
“discernment” could possibly be otherwise described as “a form of free variation”),
individuals can distinguish between inauthentic eternal horizons and the authentic eternal
horizon (where distinguishing “authentic” eternal horizon could perhaps be otherwise
depicted as a form of uncovering the “essence” of eternal horizon).
In addition, Farley clearly makes use of his of methodological principle that,
within the process of a reflective method, active participants in ecclesia can experience
both direct apprehensions of “realities at hand” and indirect apprehensions of “realities
not at hand” – but only as these latter apprehensions occur through direct apprehensions,
because “realities at hand . . . [can] appresent realities not at hand.”231 An instance of his
use of this principle is also apparent within that part of his doctrine of God in which he
analyzes how God can be known. Here, he employs this principle to aver that the realityat-hand of the ecclesia’s direct experience of individuals having their elemental passions
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authentically fulfilled appresents the reality-not-at-hand of God, where one conceives of
God as the genuine eternal horizon or as the “causality” through which this fulfillment
has taken place.
With this investigation of Farley’s doctrine of God and of how his development of
this doctrine builds upon his theological method of ecclesial reflection, I will now, in
chapter 4, turn to a similar treatment of McClendon’s doctrine of God and of how his
construction of this doctrine relies upon his theological method. Then, in chapter 5, I will
more fully evaluate the way in which central aspects of Farley’s and McClendon’s
doctrines of God have been formed by their respective theological methods. Also, I will
offer a comparative analysis both of Farley’s and McClendon’s theological methods and
of their doctrines of God.
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CHAPTER 4
JAMES MCCLENDON’S DOCTRINE OF GOD
Having considered Farley’s doctrine of God in the previous chapter, I will now
examine McClendon’s treatment of the same doctrine in this chapter. Also, as with my
analysis of Farley’s development of this doctrine, I will seek to investigate how
McClendon’s doctrine of God has been influenced and molded by his theological method
– a method that might be summarized as “convictional perspectivism” (upon which I
focused in chapter 2).
The main features of McClendon’s theological method can be summarized as
follows. First, together with James Smith, McClendon maintains that individuals and
communities have “convictions” – that is, strongly held beliefs that are both persistent
and significant. However, they determine not only that convictions always take place as
part of a broader “conviction set” but also that, while one cannot have direct access the
thoughts of an individual, one may have direct access to the linguistically shared
convictions of communities. Therefore, McClendon and Smith chiefly come to focus on
communal conviction sets (or on what McClendon, in his later works, alternatively refers
to as communal picture sets) and on how they may be justified (and, implicitly, on how
they may be formed). Furthermore, alongside these developments, they argue in favor of
a certain outlook on communal conviction sets (and also on individual conviction sets as
well as on individual convictions) that they term “convictional perspectivism” – as a
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stance that falls in between outlooks that they term “convictional imperialism” and
“convictional relativism.”1 Between these two extremes, they suggest that “convictional
perspectivism” (which they describe as relying upon a soft epistemological relativism)
conveys that various communities may have access to some – but not to all – of the same
facts (or things) as one another and that various communities may have some – but not
total – overlap in their perception of reason. Thus, for the convictional perspectivist,
justification (and formation) of communal conviction sets would involve a matter of each
community seeking to justify (or to found) their communal conviction sets on the basis of
various loci of justification (such as truth, consistency, rationality, and satisfaction) that
seem most appropriate to them in order for their conviction sets to be happy, with at least
the hope that some – but probably not all – of these loci will be shared (in various ways)
with other communities. For instance, some communities might employ loci of

1

On the one hand, “convictional imperialism” (which they describe as relying
upon a hard epistemological realism) suggests that all communities have access to the
same facts (or things) and that all communities perceive reason in the same manner.
Thus, for the convictional imperialist, justification (and formation) of communal
conviction sets would simply involve a matter of correspondently (and clearly) lining up
all words with all things, so that it would become evident to all which communal
conviction sets are true. Ultimately, therefore, for the convictional imperialist, there
would be just one true collection of communal conviction sets; the other collections
would essentially be illusions stemming from ignorance or perversion.
On the other hand, “convictional relativism” (which they describe as relying
upon a hard epistemological relativism) implies that each community has access to its
own unique facts and to its own unique reason (or, more precisely, to its own unique
interpretations of facts and reason). Accordingly, for the convictional relativist,
justification (and formation) of communal conviction sets, if necessary at all, would
never be more than an internal matter for each community. And, ultimately, for the
convictional relativist, there could conceivably be a near-endless multiplicity of
collections of communal conviction sets that would be entirely incommensurable with
one another, though, McClendon and Smith maintain, these various communities would
have no way of knowing of this incommensurability.
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correspondence and satisfaction, while others might favor loci of coherence and
rationality. Ultimately, therefore, for the convictional perspectivist, there would likely be
the potential for numerous communities to have collections of communal conviction sets
which could each contain various degrees of truth. For McClendon and Smith, this
means – coupled with their “principle of fallibility” (that is, the view that the conviction
sets of one’s own community may be wrong and are capable of revision or even
rejection) – that, while a community might strive to maintain its conviction sets even to
the point of being willing to die for them, questions regarding the truth of convictions
should theoretically remain an open matter and that authentic dialogue (and potential for
persuasion) regarding some – but not all – inter-communal commonalities is conceivable
between two or more particular communities on an “ad hoc” basis.
Second, McClendon argues that Christian communal conviction sets (and, indeed,
all Christian convictions) should be rooted in the following sources: narrative,
experience, and the church. With the source of narrative, he has in view both the
narrative of Scripture, which for him is the voice of God conveyed through humans, and
the narrative of tradition, which for him includes various theologians throughout the
history of the church as well as biographies. With experience, he means the religious
experience of communities and individuals, and with the church, he primarily has in mind
various ecclesial practices such as prayer. Among these three sources, McClendon avers
that narrative, particularly the narrative of Scripture, should be the primary source for
forming Christian communal conviction sets. Moreover, he maintains that experience
and the church, while secondary, are nevertheless essential sources in this regard.
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Third, McClendon sets forth a “baptist” hermeneutical principle of “this is that”
and “then is now.” Through this principle, he means that, in a mystical way, Scripture
addresses (or speaks to) Christians in the present church – just as much as it addressed
believers in the first century church – and just as much as it will address Christ’s
disciples in the future, eschatological church.
In view of this understanding of his theological method, my task in this chapter is
to investigate McClendon’s doctrine of God and to show how his construction of this
doctrine stems from McClendon’s concepts of: communal conviction sets (from the
viewpoint of convictional perspectivism); three sources of Christian convictions –
primarily narrative, but also religious experience and the practices of the church; and, the
“this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutical principle. My main resource for
considering his doctrine of God will be his work, Doctrine, the second volume of his
systematic theology.2 Doctrine consists of three major sections: “The Rule of God;”
“The Identity of Jesus Christ;” and, “The Fellowship of the Spirit,” and, as the titles of
these major sections reveal, McClendon constructs a doctrine of God throughout almost
the entirety of this work. Also, while he states that none of the major parts of Doctrine
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McClendon indicates that what he is actually striving to set forth in Doctrine is
not the first-order task of “doctrine” (which are the shared communal convictions that
preachers preach and Sunday school teachers teach) but the second-order task of
“doctrinal theology,” as set forth in Doctrine, 24. However, he also conveys that
doctrinal theology “merges into the primary church practice is supports. Its near goal
remains the same – declaring what the church must teach to be (here and now) the
church,” as shown in Doctrine, 48. Thus, because his understanding of the difference
between “doctrine” and “doctrinal theology” is so slight, I will in this chapter, for
purposes of simplicity, refer to what he develops in Doctrine as “doctrine” rather than as
“doctrinal theology.”
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derive from another major part3 – and, to a large degree, I concur with this statement – it
is also the case that at least some of his most significant themes further build upon
previously established constructive efforts. In particular, his concept of the identity of
Jesus Christ (developed in Part II) assumes much of his earlier constructive efforts
regarding the rule of God (set forth in Part I). Therefore, in my analysis of McClendon’s
doctrine of God, I shall – with the one exception of treating his doctrine of the Holy
Spirit (which he develops in Part III) before examining his trinitarian concepts (which he
sets forth at the end of Part II) – follow the same general pattern that he employs in
Doctrine. That is, I will first consider his notion of the rule of God, where he treats
eschatology, salvation, and creation. Then, I will analyze his understanding of the
identity of God, including his doctrines of the person and work of Christ and his doctrine
of the Holy Spirit. Simultaneously, drawing on my study of McClendon’s theological
method in chapter 2, I will also attempt to show how his doctrine of God builds upon –
and is shaped by – his theological method.

The Rule of God:
Seeing God’s Present Kingdom by Means of the Future and the Past
As part of his theological method, McClendon holds, as has already been seen,
that the beginning point for developing doctrine should take place primarily by means of
turning to the Bible, where one understands Scripture as “the word of God written . . . [or
as that through which] God speaks.”4 Within this context, McClendon discerns that
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Scripture sets forth the rule of God (or the kingdom of God) as the goal or “the end
toward which everything . . . [such as creation and history] tends.”5 And, for him, this
rule (or dominion) means, in part, that God is not distant from but is “immediately with
his people.”6 Also, he holds that far from taking anything away from “human freedom,
this dominion . . . [has] always stood over against oppression by earthly rulers.”7 Thus,
McClendon perceives the biblical comprehension of God’s kingdom to include the
notions that God is near to God’s people and that God seeks to liberate them.
With this general understanding of God’s rule, he further argues that Jesus added
the following three components to kingdom expectation:
(1) Its coming was no longer indefinitely future, but was ‘at hand’ (Mark 1:15
par.), so that it could be ‘entered’; (2) the character of the expected realm was to
be a new order of interactive love – God’s love to people, and people’s love one
to another, even to enemies (Matt. 5:1-12, 43-48), as exemplified by Jesus
himself; (3) the cost of the kingdom, . . . was a cross, to be borne first by Jesus
and then by all who were his.8
While each of these three components play a significant role in the development of
McClendon’s doctrinal tasks (as I will seek to demonstrate in the sections below), the
first component, in particular – which maintains, that for Jesus, the rule of God was “at
hand” – helps to shed light on McClendon’s reason for underscoring the notion that
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Doctrine, 67. As previously indicated, by placing certain words in bold, such as
“coming,” “character,” and “cost,” in this citation, I am following the style of text used in
the book being referenced.
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God’s kingdom is not just a future but also a present phenomenon. And, by a present
phenomenon, he means present during Jesus’ earthly ministry as well as present to Jesus’
disciples two millennia later. In addition, McClendon takes this notion of a present rule
of God, and he couples it with that aspect of his “baptist” (or “prophetic”) vision which
contains the “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutic principle. Held together, these
two concepts – the present rule of God and the “this is that” and “then is now”
hermeneutic principle – form the basis for McClendon’s view that, in order to grasp the
full biblical meaning of the God’s rule, “authentic Christian faith . . . [must] see the
present [rule of God by] . . . construing the present by means of the prefiguring past
(God’s past) while at the same time construing it by means of the prophetic (future).”9
Thus, to adequately endeavor to see God’s rule now, the Christian faith must look to a
time frame that covers God’s activity from the distant past to the far future. Accordingly,
for McClendon, the doctrines of creation, salvation, and eschatology are sister doctrines,
all under the mother doctrine of the rule of God.10 In light of this, I will briefly turn to his
treatment of each of these doctrines, with the primary concern to explore how these work
to shape his doctrine of God.
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Eschatology: The Future Christ Reigns Now
Under the mother doctrine of God’s rule, McClendon “takes a cue from Jürgen
Moltmann . . . [and] begins from the end – that is, he begins with eschatology.”11 And, as
McClendon seeks to develop his doctrine of eschatology, he holds that, since “much of
the New Testament teaching about the last things is expressed in word pictures,”12 he will
undertake his constructive efforts by looking to the various “end-pictures” that appear
within the New Testament, “end-pictures” of such concepts as: the last judgement; Jesus
Christ returning; resurrection; death; hell; and, heaven.13 And, here (as discussed in
chapter 2 above) McClendon draws upon a Wittgensteinian-informed idea of “picture
thinking,” by which McClendon means, in part, that “in certain circumstances, every
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Carl E. Braaten, “A Harvest of Evangelical Theology,” First Things 63 (May
1996): 48. Braaten has in mind Jürgen Moltmann’s groundbreaking work, Theology of
Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology, trans. James W.
Leitch (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1993), and Braaten argues that
McClendon’s move in starting his overall doctrinal construction with eschatology “is
rooted in the Baptist experience of church as a Spirit-filled, mission driven community of
eschatological expectation,” as set forth in idem, “A Harvest of Evangelical Theology,”
48. However, with the possible exception of William Boyd Hunt’s monograph,
“Redeemed! Eschatological Redemption and the Kingdom of God (Nashville, Tennessee:
Broadman Press, 1993), I am not aware of any other Baptist theologian who places such
an emphasis on eschatology. In any case, McClendon recognizes the starting point he
shares with Moltmann; however, he distances his work from that of the German
theologian, arguing that “Moltmann’s emphases [at least in Theology of Hope] . . . deal
with the future, yet rarely with the end of history,” as revealed in Doctrine, 74. And,
perhaps worthy of note is that McClendon’s Doctrine was published in 1994, two years
before Moltmann’s The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology was published in English
in 1996.
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seeing is a ‘seeing-as.’”14 He draws on this idea of “picture thinking” in order to suggest
that, in particular situations – as with end-time events such as the last judgment – “what
distinguishes those who believe in . . . [events like] the last judgment from those who do
not is not different chains of reasoning, but radically different pictures of how in general
the world goes.”15
With this understanding of “picture thinking” in hand, the “end-pictures” that
McClendon addresses that most pertain to his overall doctrine of God are the biblical
“end-pictures” of the last judgment and of Jesus Christ returning. According to him, the
New Testament, in passages such as “1 John 4:17, Heb. 9:27; . . . [and] Jude 6,”16 paints a
picture set of the last judgment in which Jesus returns to judge human beings as “the
King . . . of God’s kingdom].”17 Moreover, McClendon interprets other New Testament
passages, like “‘this same Jesus’ . . . [in] (Acts 1:11 KJV),”18 as a means of providing
visual depth to this picture set by revealing “the continuity of the one returning with the

14

Doctrine, 76. Here, McClendon refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3d ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1968), 197.
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Doctrine, 77.
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Doctrine, 78.
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Doctrine, 80. McClendon further argues that Jesus will judge the characterrevealing actions of human beings, since “they reflect the relation between those who are
under judgment and that One . . . [Jesus],” as set forth in Doctrine, 80. However,
McClendon’s primary point here is that Jesus judges as King.
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Doctrine, 82.
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one they . . . [past and present New Testament readers] already know.” 19 That is, he
holds that the New Testament sets forth that “it is ‘this same Jesus’ . . . who will come in
all his comings – in our Lord’s day worship, in history’s course as yet unfinished, at our
last end, and at the last end, it is ever Jesus Christ who comes.”20
One of the next key steps in the development of McClendon’s eschatology is the
way in which he combines this picture of Jesus returning to judge as King with the
second half of the “this is that” and “then is now” baptist hermeneutical principle.21 The
second half of this principle – the “then is now” half – he restates, in this context, as
follows: “disciples learn . . . to see . . . [the present] . . . under the form of the prophetic
future, so that the future ‘is’ also coming now.”22 Thus, McClendon argues, from the
perspective of Christ’s disciples, the Jesus Christ who will be King in judgment is also
the Christ who reigns now. And, for McClendon, it follows, therefore, not only that
“Christ is the center of history,”23 but also that he intends to advance in conquering the
present world – although not through military might but through a suffering, sacrificial
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Doctrine, 82.
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Doctrine, 82.
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McClendon sometimes refers to this entire hermeneutical principle as “the
prophetic vision,” as set forth in Doctrine, 92.
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Doctrine, 92. In addition, as part of this argument, McClendon seeks to address
what is sometimes referred to as the problem of the delay of the Parousia. He counters
this problem by suggesting that in the New Testament, “the time between what is near
and the last things is compressed in order to give due weight to those last events.
Without such foreshortening, what comes last might be perspectively projected into the
far future and thus into insignificance,” as shown in Doctrine, 90.
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love,24 thereby to form “a new race of human beings, a race made of all races, a people
made of all peoples.”25 Accordingly, the task of Jesus’ disciples is to join him in this
pursuit of growing his kingdom – and to do so in the same manner, “not by human
conquest but by the radical politics of the cross;”26 that is, by the same type of suffering,
sacrificial love that Jesus has demonstrated.27 McClendon acknowledges that this path is
not an easy one for Christ’s disciples to take since such “suffering for a righteous cause .
. . can fail . . . and sometimes in the short run does fail.”28 However, he holds that these
disciples can nevertheless maintain real hope because “in the heavenly realm the final
outcome is certain, for there the Lamb has already passed his power to his people.”29

24

Doctrine, 97-99.
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Doctrine, 98-99. The influence of the Mennonite theologian, John Howard
Yoder (who McClendon would respectfully seek to include as a lower-case “b,” “baptist”
theologian) in this aspect of McClendon’s constructive efforts is prevalent. He makes
reference here to a sermon Yoder delivered “announcing ‘the politics of the Lamb,’”
Doctrine, 98, citing John Howard Yoder, “The Politics of the Lamb,” in Seek Peace and
Pursue It, Psalm 34:14: Proceedings from the 1988 International Bapitst Peace
Conference, Sjovik, Sweeden, August 3-7, 1988, ed. Wayne H. Pipkin, by the Baptist
Peace Fellowship of North America (Memphis, Tennessee: Baptist Peace Fellowship of
North America, 1989), 69-76. In addition, it is perhaps worth noting that in the preface
to his work, Doctrine, McClendon indicates that Yoder’s book, The Politics of Jesus,
“changed his life,” as revealed in Doctrine, 8. See John Howard Yoder, The Politics of
Jesus, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1994).
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Thus, for McClendon, eschatology and Christology are closely interwoven with
one another. In other words, “the Christian doctrine of last things exists as part and
parcel of the doctrine of Christ Jesus; its necessary pictures take doctrinal form exactly
within the frame provided by his crucified, risen, ongoing history.”30 And, in this
manner, McClendon indicates a general pattern to his constructive efforts – his doctrine
of last things informs his doctrine of Christ, which, in turn (as I will seek to demonstrate
below), informs his doctrine of God.

Salvation: A Process through which God Enables Human Faithfulness to God’s
Rule
According to McClendon, a second “sister doctrine” under the mother doctrine of
God’s rule is the doctrine of salvation.31 He introduces this doctrine by laboring to show
how clusters of salvific terms catachrestically emerge within the New Testament,32 in
order to indicate what “salvation” – or what “made ‘new in Christ’”33 – means. Among
the various clusters of salvific terms he considers, he gives particular attention to three of
them, loosely associating each of these clusters with specific salvific emphases he feels
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Doctrine, 101.
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That is, McClendon holds that “salvation is . . . an eschatological or kingdom
concept,” as set forth in Doctrine, 105.
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McClendon holds that the New Testament frequently employs catachresis, that
is, “the deliberate (as opposed to accidental or mistaken) use of language drawn from one
sphere in order to indicate something in another sphere that eludes existing speech,” as
shown in Doctrine, 107. Moreover, he avers that the “sphere” from which the New
Testament authors drew such language was “mainly . . . the Scriptures” . . . [or the Old
Testament],” as revealed in Doctrine, 106.
33
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have been made by major Christian traditions.34 Next, he explores the meaning of sin, in
order to more fully show what salvation in Christ means. And, finally, in light of this
broader notion of salvation, he seeks to demonstrate how the clusters of salvific terms
relate to the process of salvation in the lives of individual believers.
Clusters of salvific terms. First, he argues that with the cluster of terms, “just,
justify, justification,” the New Testament authors drew upon the Old Testament concept
of “JHWH’s justice, . . . [that] consisted not in the ‘rights’ of modern jurisprudence but in
keeping or restoring right relations, ‘rightwising’ between each and his or her neighbor,
and (preeminently) rightwising relations between each and God,”35 so that they could
convey that one aspect of salvation is for Christ to enable “right relations” to occur both
between believers and other people and between believers and God. McClendon loosely
connects this cluster with what he believes has been a Protestant emphasis on salvation
particularly involving “right relations uniting Christ . . . and Christians.”36
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In addition, while McClendon acknowledges that there is a corporate dimension
to salvation, he intends to focus here on “what the new in Christ must mean to each . . .
[individual follower of Jesus] today,” as set forth in Doctrine, 109.
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Second, looking to Rudolf Otto’s work, The Idea of the Holy,37 McClendon
maintains that with the cluster of terms, “sanctify, sanctification, and holy ones,”38 the
authors of the New Testament drew upon the Old Testament notion that “that which is in
contact with the Deity is by contagion holy,”39 in order to express that another aspect of
salvation is for Christ, with the Holy Spirit, to empower believers to become “holy ones”
by placing them in contact with God.40 McClendon associates this cluster with what he
feels has been a Catholic stress upon salvation involving “the presence of Christ . . . [in
the life of the believer].”41
And, third, he holds that with a cluster of terms including “the way,”42 the New
Testament authors drew upon such Old Testament notions as “the contrast of two ways
(cf. Psalm 1),”43 so that they could convey that still another aspect of salvation is for
Christ to enable to believers to radically turn from “walking” or following in “man’s
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McClendon cites Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquire into the Nonrational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. J. W.
Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), 1-41 et passim, as shown in Doctrine,
114.
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way” to walking in “God’s way.”44 He loosely connects this cluster with what he
believes has been a baptist emphasis on salvation involving abiding in “the new way of
Jesus.”45
With the retrieval of these clusters of New Testament salvific terms, McClendon
does not intend to suggest “chronological steps in an ordo salutis;”46 rather, his purpose
is to “provide . . . alternate windows upon the new in Christ, . . . [that is, to point to
various] ways of speaking the unspeakable gift of God in Christ.”47 In other words, he
does not argue that, within the process of salvation: first comes justification; then comes
sanctification; and so on. On the contrary, he holds that these clusters of salvific terms
are simply different perspectives (among others) that the New Testament authors have
used to try to describe various elements of the one process of what happens when one
experiences newness in Christ.
Moreover, having assembled these clusters of salvific terms, McClendon then
proceeds “to relate these three neighbor clusters to one another and to today.”48 Yet,
before undertaking this task, he first turns to the matter of what sin means, so that he can
more fully endeavor to show what salvation in Christ means. Accordingly, I will briefly
treat McClendon’s understanding of the doctrine of sin, and then I will examine the way
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in which he endeavors to relate the above mentioned clusters of salvific terms to the
process of salvation.
Sin in view of salvation. McClendon argues that Jesus, as fully human, lived “a
life of full faithfulness . . . [in God],”49 ultimately demonstrated by his submission to the
cross,50 and he holds that because he did so, Jesus “declared . . . [through the actions of
his life and death] the true anthropology promised in creation.”51 That is, according to
McClendon, by Jesus’ actions of complete faithfulness, Jesus “proved himself true
anthropos . . . that fulfilled the promise to Adam . . . and to Eve, . . . the promise that in
their human family God’s own image would appear (cf. Gen. 3:15).”52 In light of this,
McClendon avers, sin is not a “creaturely limitation, a necessary feature of our created
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Doctrine, 123. McClendon more completely unfolds his understanding of Jesus’
life of full faithfulness within his construction of a doctrine of atonement (which he
undertakes in chapter five of Doctrine) – as I will examine below.
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Doctrine, 237.
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Doctrine, 124.
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sensuous nature;”53 rather, Jesus’ faithfulness shows that “sin is whatever falls short of . .
. the way of faithfulness to God’s rule embodied in Jesus Christ.”54
McClendon goes on to work out further the details of his doctrine of sin;55
however, the brief point indicated above – that sin is not an integral aspect of our created
being but is, instead, whatever falls short of Jesus’ full faithfulness to God – is perhaps
enough to get to the core of McClendon’s understanding of sin in relation to salvation.
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Doctrine, 124. Here, McClendon references the following works, that, in his
view, reflect such an understanding of “sin” as a necessary feature of at least some aspect
of humanity: Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J.
S. Stewart, trans. D. M. Baillie, W. R. Matthews, Edith Sandbach-Marshall, A. B.
Macaulay, Alexander Grieve, J. Y. Campbell, R. W. Stewart, and H. R. Mackintosh
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), §§ 5, 79-80, pp. 18-26, 325-30; Albrecht Ritschl, The
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, vol. 3, The Positive Development
of the Doctrine, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (Clifton, New Jersey:
Reference Book Publishers, 1966), 380; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2,
Existence and the Christ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), chap. 1; and,
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vol. 1,
Human Nature (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941), 181.
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Doctrine, 124, emphasis mine. Though McClendon does not here explicitly
refer to the work of Karl Barth, his understanding of sin in relation to Christ’s
faithfulness appears, in some ways, to echo similar conceptions found in Karl Barth,
Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley, vol.
4, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, part 1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), 358-413.
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For example, he maintains that “original sin” is “not the teaching of Scripture,”
as set forth in Doctrine, 124. [And, elsewhere, he argues that “original sin” “must be
replaced with the concept of social sin, which passes from generation to generation, but
requires each generation to answer to Christ not for its ancestor’s but for its own fault,”
as shown in Doctrine, 145.] Also, he avers that, when additionally nuanced, sin can be
seen to contain the following three elements: (1) sin as “the vacant refusal of Jesus’
offered way,” as demonstrated in Doctrine, 130; (2) sin as a “rupture . . . [in solidarity
among believers] in Christian community,” as revealed in Doctrine, 132; and, (3) sin as a
refusal to keep our various God-given drives from becoming too aggressive, which, when
unchecked, can “destroy our bonds with nature and with one another,” as set forth in
Doctrine, 134.
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With this concept of sin, if accurate, he intends to convey that “we must not identify
human being with sinful being; we must not erect the doctrine of sin into a barrier to
goodness not even Christ can overcome.”56 In other words, McClendon intends to
express that – because the actions of the fully human Jesus demonstrated that sin is not an
innate part of being human – we, the rest of humanity, while marred by sin, are not
beyond redemption; because sin is not inherently a part of us, we have real hope of being
made new in Christ. And, it is with this understanding of sin – as something that Jesus
could and did overcome – that McClendon then proceeds to set forth his notion of how
the previously assembled three clusters of salvific terms (regarding justification,
sanctification, and “the way”) relate to one another and to the present-day situation in
which humans find themselves.
Salvation as a process. In setting forth his doctrine of salvation, McClendon
argues that this doctrine “must relate all these . . . [cluster terms – having to do with
justification, sanctification, and “the way” – and other New Testament salvific cluster
terms as well] to the full reality to which each bears partial witness.”57 To a certain
degree, McClendon carries this out, and in doing so, especially since he loosely
associates his three central salvific clusters with major Christian traditions, he implicitly
shows support for an ecumenical understanding of salvation. However, at the same time,
he acknowledges that he gives priority to the cluster that shares the most affinity with his
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own baptist tradition – the cluster that emphasizes that salvation in Christ enables
believers to radically turn to living in God’s way.
In this vein, McClendon argues that salvation is a process involving at least four
stages, with “limitless variation in detail . . . [for each believer’s experience],”58 and, in
keeping with that aspect of his theological method which stresses that the practices of the
church are a secondary but essential source for forming Christian convictions, he holds
that this process can be described in connection with “a sequence of . . . [four] significant
communal practices in the church . . . [that] mark the progress of the pilgrim on the
Christian journey.”59 He terms the first stage “preparation,”60 and he maintains that with
this stage:
Gospels as well as Epistles offer us the model of Jesus, and later of the apostolic
missionaries, laboring long to ready women and men for the newness that God
was sending among them in Christ. If today’s preparation once again anticipates
that newness, if it proceeds believing that by way of formation God is at work and
will act to transform nascent disciples into faithful Christians, it will bear its fruit
in due season.61
Also, he associates this first stage of salvation with the faith community’s practice of
teaching or instructing. At least in the baptist tradition, such a practice would often be
carried out through such programs as “Sunday school.”
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He refers to the second stage of salvation as “conversion,” and he argues that this
is “the turn of turns,”62 brought about by “the God who is its source, the Spirit who is its
companion, the Christ who is its goal,”63 in which the pilgrim moves toward “the new
way of Jesus, the new relation with God the Father and thus with all creation, . . . [and]
the new selfhood born of the Spirit.”64 This stage in particular, therefore, reflects the
three clusters of salvific terms (examined above) as well as the three major Christian
traditions McClendon associates with these terms. He connects this second stage of
salvation with the practice of baptism, albeit he seems to have in mind the baptist
understanding of “believer’s baptism.”
He terms the third stage “following,” and, here, arguing against “the revivalist
tradition in America . . . [that] seemed to treat conversion as the end of the affair,”65 he
holds that the new way in Christ usually involves a lengthy spiritual trail and that the
spiritual hikers who take it will sometimes become “footsore . . . [and will sometimes]
falter.”66 However, he maintains that, through the faith community’s practice of the
Lord’s supper, Christ can remind these hikers that “the climb is not too hard and that
there is relief ahead.”67
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Finally, McClendon refers to the fourth stage as “soaring,”68 and he avers that
salvific “soaring” involves “the task of recognizing vocations, acknowledging and
encouraging gifts, and helping the gifted to see their role within the rule of God.”69
He associates this last stage of salvation with the ecclesial sign of “communal
discernment”70 – not so much in the “negative” sense of “dealing with notorious sin in the
church”71 – but more along the “positive” lines of the way in which, for example, the
faith community works to discern and “select . . . [church] officeholders.”72
Accordingly, with his doctrine of salvation, McClendon sheds additional light on
his overall doctrine of God. Specifically, with this sub-doctrine of God’s rule, he
conveys the concepts: that God seekas to be present with, to guide, and to establish right
relations with people; that Jesus of Nazareth was fully human and that, as such, was
completely faithful to God; that God did not create human beings as necessarily sinful
beings; and, that God enables the salvation of human beings to occur (as a process).
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Creation: Does God Suffer in God’s Creative Actions?
McClendon holds that the third “sister doctrine,” under the mother doctrine of
God’s rule, is the doctrine of creation.73 He develops this doctrine in several diverse and
far-reaching ways;74 however, my task will be to concentrate on those aspects of this
doctrine that most bear upon his overall understanding of a doctrine of God. Along these
lines, one of his main concerns, within his treatment of the doctrine of creation, is to
explore whether or not God suffers in God’s creative actions. Accordingly, I will focus
chiefly here on his exploration of that theme.
Posing the question: Does God suffer in God’s creative actions? By way of
introduction to the doctrine of creation, McClendon turns to Revelation, chapter 4, and he
argues that this “passage displays features that the Christian doctrine cannot surrender,”75
for example: the notion that “God is . . . [not only] the origin and source . . . [of creation
. . . but also the] terminus or goal . . . [of creation];”76 and, the notion that “creation is . .
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For instance, McClendon explores challenges to the doctrine that have emerged
with the shift to science (and away from theology) as an authoritative resource for the
origin and destiny of the cosmos and challenges that have emerged in the wake of the
increasing over-emphasis on humanity within this doctrine (to the neglect of the rest of
creation), as set forth in Doctrine, 150-52. And, for example, he examines the issue of
miracles and whether they are better conceived of as “breaking” natural law or as
something more akin to instances of God acting “(where he is already present) to . . .
[more] vividly display the divine intention for nature,” as shown in Doctrine, 186.
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. God’s ongoing blessing.”77 Within this broad context, McClendon then, similar to the
manner in which he set forth his doctrine of eschatology, turns to “available . . . biblical
‘pictures’ of creation, . . . [so that he can] relate these to the ongoing creative work of
God.”78
In considering biblical “pictures” of creation, McClendon looks to George
Hendry’s work, Theology of Nature, where Hendry “urges that five ‘models of creation’
be taken into account: molding, struggle, design-and-execution, expression, and
generation,”79 and McClendon examines each of these models in view of relevant
scriptural passages. Yet, the second of these models – the one having to do with
“struggle” – is the one most pertinent to the matter of whether or not God suffers in
God’s creative activities. Here, McClendon observes: first, that creation involves
ongoing conflict between God and other powers, ranging from “Leviathan . . . [to]
Satan;”80 and, second, that all acts of creation “take . . . [their] toll upon the artisan.”81
And, in light of this latter observation, he poses the question: “In this vein, does God, too,
find creation and suffering inseparable?”82 In other words, if all creation involves
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suffering, should it not follow that the God also suffers in God’s creative activities? For
this to be case, though, McClendon suggests that one must also examine whether or not
suffering can occur apart from such phenomena as “guilt . . . [and] punishment,”83
phenomena which he implies could not be attributes associated with the creative activity
of God. As a commentary on the possibility of guilt-free, punishment-free suffering,
McClendon maintains that at least for the Anabaptist Radical Reformer, Hans Hut,
suffering (in general) can be linked not with “guilt, suffering and punishment . . . [but
simply with] ongoing creation: . . . [for] to exist is to suffer.”84 This leads McClendon to
speculate that perhaps some suffering “might be related, not to past misconduct, but to
creation’s purpose and future glory.”85
Assembling resources for a response: Science, Romans 8, and chaos. Up to this
point in his examination of the particular biblical “picture” (or model) of creation as
“struggle,” McClendon has primarily sought to more clearly pose the question: “Does
God suffer in God’s creative actions?” In preparing to respond to this question, he draws
upon several resources, including: (1) an evaluation of what contemporary science shows
about the potential for God to interact with creation; (2) an interpretation of Paul’s
thought on creation in Romans 8; and, (3) an analysis of the relationship between “chaos”
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and God. He considers these various elements separately and then brings together the
conclusions they yield, in order to form a unified answer to the above question regarding
God’s passibility in creation.
First, looking to the developments of recent science, McClendon argues that,
against the science of the Enlightenment, which held that the course of nature works like
a clock, that is, as a predetermined and contained sequence of events, the findings of
contemporary science increasingly show that the elements of nature actually function in a
more open-ended and interactive manner. For instance, he holds that recent cosmology
has demonstrated that, with the so-called big bang, “the predecessors of the cosmos’
present components at near-infinitesimal early time (t=10-43 seconds) interacted to form
the basic physical forces of nature.”86 According to McClendon, the extensive
complexity of this interaction “is friendly to the proposal that God’s method in ongoing
creation was interactive from the first amid interactive primitive particles, long before
there were living cells or animals to form cooperative intentions.”87 Furthermore,
McClendon here suggests (but does not fully develop) the notion that the more one
interacts with (and does not stay distant from) another, the greater potential one incurs to
experience higher levels of pain.88
Next, McClendon turns to some of the Apostle Paul’s thoughts on creation, as
they appear alongside some of his other concepts in chapter 8 of his Letter to the
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Romans, and he discovers here some startling assertions. For example, according to
McClendon, Paul’s starting point in considering creation is not “the idea of a perfect
creation later marred; . . . [rather,] his starting point is present Christian suffering,”89 that
is, the present suffering of both creation and of believers who, with Christ, suffer “the
excruciating way of the cross.”90 McClendon maintains that, by taking such a starting
point, Paul intends to convey that suffering is part of creation itself. However, from this
follows a second startling Pauline assertion: the suffering of creation and of believers –
which is a sharing in the suffering of the cross – is “the way to a glorious future.”91 Here,
McClendon suggests that, for Paul, the suffering taking place in creation has a purpose –
as believers (and creation?) share in Christ’s suffering, they are enabled to share in his
glory. And, from this follows still a third starling Pauline assertion. Looking to Paul’s
use of the verb, sunergei, in Romans 8:28, which McClendon translates as “synergizes”
or “co-operates” in the phrase: “‘in everything, . . . [God] co-operates . . . [“synergizes”]
for good with those who love God,’”92 McClendon implies that, for the Apostle, this
means that God lovingly “co-operates” or “interacts” with believers (and creation?) in the
process of moving from suffering to glory.93
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Then, McClendon considers the relationship between “chaos” and God. In
agreement with some of the biblical interpretations of Jon Levenson,94 McClendon holds
not only that God permits chaos to exist within creation but also, in view of “passages
such as Psalm 74, Isaiah 51, and Isaiah 54,” . . . [that we can perceive] post-creation . . .
chaos . . . threatening God’s elect people.”95 This leads McClendon to inquire
(independently of Levenson) about “the reality-status of primeval chaos.”96 Rejecting the
notions that either “chaos timelessly pre-existed creation . . . [or that] chaos . . . [is]
within God himself,”97 McClendon reasons that, in Scripture, “chaos” can be a symbolic
description of “the . . . [divine] potter’s struggle . . . to shape workable clay into a work
of art.”98 In McClendon’s view, this “is a struggle that encounters the ‘evil’ of hard work
and variety in material, but not the evil of cosmic dualism.”99
Therefore, McClendon’s treatment of the above three elements seems to have
yielded the following results: (1') contemporary science allows for the potential that God
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is not distant from – but interacts closely with – the various elements of creation; and
(separate from recent science), it appears self-evident that the more in-depth one interacts
with another, the more susceptible one becomes to suffering; (2') in Romans 8, Paul
argues that suffering is an aspect of creation itself but that, for the believer, this suffering
leads to glory; and, he holds that God lovingly “interacts” with the believer in the process
from suffering to glory; and, (3') that “chaos” is a means through which the Bible
symbolically describes God’s struggle to shape creation according to God’s will.
Formulating a response: God does suffer in God’s creative actions. With these
results in hand, McClendon returns to the question: “Does God suffer in God’s creative
actions?” However, in doing so, he stresses that he intends to address only that aspect of
God which involves “God’s creative love, the love that sets out on the costly adventure of
creation itself.”100 That is, he does not intend to treat here “that about God which is
utterly reliable . . . [or] the qualities inherent in God’s Godhood.”101 With this important
clarification in view, and in light of (1') - (3') above, McClendon reaches the following
conclusions about God’s passibility in creation. First, he argues that because God has the
“ability to enter into loving relations with what is outside God and by doing so to bring
about changed circumstances in the world, . . . these changes, . . . [since they] are
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show and examine below.
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relational, . . . imply change not only for the world, but also for God.”102 That is, he
holds that God cannot work towards authentic relational change without being genuinely
open (or vulnerable) to change within Godself. Second, McClendon avers that “the
changes involved in this world by the human adventure . . . entail the risk of further
suffering: to love is to suffer, . . . and to love recalcitrant or rebellious or sinful creatures
is costly suffering indeed.”103 Therefore, he suggests that God, in the “chaos” of the
divine potter’s struggle with often unwieldy human beings, not only experiences change
but also suffers. Third, he concludes that God can and must suffer in God’s creative
actions because “the very act of creation on the part of an all-sufficient God involves a
divinely necessary rejection, a deliberate surrender, . . . of the solitary hoarding of free
existence.”104 That is, he maintains that God must suffer since God’s creation of
dependent creatures requires that God must give up a measure of independence that God
otherwise would have had.

The Identity of God
After setting forth his understanding of the rule of God, along with its corollary
sub-doctrines of eschatology, salvation, and creation, McClendon’s remaining two major
sections in Doctrine are “The Identity of Jesus Christ” (Part II) and “The Fellowship of

102

Doctrine, 171, emphases mine.

103

Doctrine, 171. Here, McClendon refers to Rosemary Haughton, The Passionate
God (New York: Paulist Press, 1981).
104

Doctrine, 171. Also, McClendon loosely cites Geddes MacGregor, He Who
Lets Us Be: A Theology of Love (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

237
the Spirit” (Part III). Under “The Identity of Jesus Christ,” in addition to developing a
doctrine of the atonement and a doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ, he also considers
the way in which the Christian doctrine of God relies upon the biblical narrative – which,
in part, leads him to explore how the Bible identifies God by means of trinitarian
categories. Furthermore, under “The Fellowship of the Spirit,” not only does he
construct a doctrine of the church and a doctrine of Christian worship, but he also
constructs (tightly interwoven) doctrines of the Holy Spirit and of the church’s mission.
Since my primary concern is to examine his overall doctrine of God (and not to
examine all the doctrines he develops in regard to the Christian faith as a whole), I will
consider only those doctrines above that most pertain to this primary concern.
Accordingly, I will first investigate his doctrines of the atonement and of the person of
Jesus Christ. Second, I will analyze his doctrine of the Holy Spirit; however, since his
development of this doctrine is so closely interwoven with his doctrine of mission, I will,
in a more limited manner, analyze this latter doctrine as well. Also, because aspects of
his doctrine of the church’s mission rely upon his understanding of the church, I will very
briefly investigate his ecclesiology (prior to treating his doctrines of the Holy Spirit and
the church’s mission). Third, I will examine his understanding of the manner in which
the Christian doctrine of God depends upon the narrative of Scripture – and the way in
which this leads him to explore how the Bible identifies God by means of trinitarian
categories.
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The Atonement and the Person of Jesus Christ
McClendon avers that “the identity of God as Christians know it is tied to the
identity of Jesus Christ risen from the dead.”105 Thus, for McClendon, a key for
understanding the identity of God is to understand the identity of Jesus Christ – and a key
for comprehending the identity of Jesus Christ is to comprehend the work of Christ, most
especially the work of the cross. Therefore, I will turn now to an analysis of
McClendon’s development of these doctrines, beginning with an investigation of his
comprehension of the meaning of the cross.
The Atonement. Recognizing the longstanding difficulty the church has had in
explaining the “shame . . . [of the cross],”106 and in order to establish a context for his
own constructive efforts, McClendon begins his treatment of the atonement with
reference to three major strands of atonement theory in the Christian tradition, which
reflects that aspect of his theological method that calls for a secondary but essential
reliance upon the narrative of tradition. Then, he turns to various metaphors or “pictures”
in the New Testament that endeavor to connect the cross with Old Testament concepts.
Yet, after examining several of these metaphors, he determines that they do not cohere
well with any of the main atonement theories. So, he next considers how these
metaphors for the cross should be evaluated in light of their role in “the . . . [larger]
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gospel narrative.”107 And, he argues that the atonement theories from the Christian
tradition should be treated as “midrashim” or as commentaries on the biblical story.
McClendon identifies three major strands of atonement theory in the Christian
tradition as the “evilward,” “Godward,” and “manward” strands.108 First, with the
“evilward” strand, he has in mind what has sometimes been referred to as the “ransom”
or “victory” theory of the atonement. He traces the development of this strand from
Irenaeus through the Cappadocian Fathers,109 and he argues that it is “evilward” because
it conveys the notion that the purpose of “Christ’s work . . . [was] to defeat the devil.”110
He maintains that the most significant limitation of this view, which he also refers to as
the “‘Christus-victor’ type,” . . . is that it . . . [makes it] all too easy . . . to confuse God’s
final triumph with the maintenance of military Christendom, losing sight of the
nonviolent way of the cross.”111
With the “Godward” strand, McClendon has in view the “satisfaction” or “penal”
theory of the atonement. He sketches the development of this strand (and variations of it)
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from Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo through the work of Hugo Grotius,112 and he holds that it
is “Godward” since it expresses the idea that the aim of the cross was to satisfy “God’s
honor or justice,”113 by means of “God inflicting upon Christ, through evil hands, the
infinite evil that was man’s due.”114 He avers that the substantial weakness of this view
“is that it drives a wedge of separation right into the Godhead, separating the roles of the
Father and the Son in redemption. God demands justice; Christ pleads for mercy. That is
a parody . . . [of this view], but it is a recognizable parody.”115 In other words,
McClendon suggests that the limitation of the “satisfaction” view is that it can allow for
an understanding of the cross, in which the will of God and the will of Jesus are (even
ultimately) not aligned.
Finally, with the “manward” strand, he has in mind what is sometimes referred to
as the “moral-influence” or “vicarious sacrifice” theory of the atonement. He traces the
development of this strand from Abelard through Horace Bushnell,116 and he argues that
it is “manward” because it articulates the view that the goal of Christ’s work was to
prompt humans, by means of Christ’s example of having “his heart burdened by . . . [the
sin and sickness of others],”117 to similarly show “sympathetic love . . . [to these same
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others troubled by sin and disease].”118 He holds that the most significant limitation of
this view is that it offers “no clear account of the fact of redemption prior to response on
the part of its recipient. . . . Here, . . . the actual shape of Christ’s death seems incidental
to his mission rather essential to it.”119
In view of his understanding of these three strands (and of their apparent
limitations in addressing the “shame” of the cross), McClendon turns, as he does with the
development of some of his other doctrines, to various metaphors or “pictures” in the
New Testament – in this case, to those seeking “to link Jesus’ death to Old Testament
themes.”120 For instance, he argues that Paul and other Epistle writers look to Isaiah’s
description of a suffering servant, in Isaiah 53:8, where “‘the prophet clearly sees an
innocent Israelite who rescues his fellow Israelites from suffering by bearing their
suffering himself.’”121 According to McClendon, the New Testament writers apply this
“description to Christ crucified, . . . [because] Isaiah’s account of unjust punishment . . .
[and] substitutionary suffering . . . spoke to them of Jesus.”122 In addition to this
metaphor of substitution, McClendon also considers New Testament atonement
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metaphors of military victory, kinship, and sacrifice.123 However, after a fairly extensive
analysis of these metaphors, he concludes that “it is not possible to line up even one set
of New Testament writers behind any one . . . [of the various ‘theories of atonement’ in
the Christian tradition] without embarrassing anomalies.”124
Accordingly, in an effort to uncover a more complete understanding of the cross,
McClendon turns to “the gospel story itself,”125 as it is set forth not only “in the Gospels
and Acts, . . . [where] the narrative form is explicit . . . [but also] in the Letters, . . .
[where] it is implicit.”126 And, he suggests that the gospel narrative is able to offer a
fuller understanding of Jesus’ death precisely because it sets his death “within its own
longer story;”127 or, in other words, he maintains that the gospel narrative more
completely conveys the meaning of Jesus’ death by situating both the “character” of
Jesus and the “circumstance” (or “plot”) of the cross within the “setting” of God’s
kingdom rule.”128
Yet, in shifting to the gospel narrative as his primary resource, McClendon does
not aver that either New Testament metaphors for the cross or atonement theories from
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the Christian tradition should be marginalized from constructive efforts. For instance, in
terms of these metaphors, he argues that within the “evangel-narrative is the story that
grounds the metaphors of the death of Christ. Slave-release and (crooked) justice,
cosmic triumph and ultimate sacrifice, all find their home in the . . . [gospel] story.”129
That is, he implies that once these New Testament metaphors for the cross have been
situated within the meta-narrative to which they also contribute, they should certainly be
a significant resource for doctrinal endeavors. In addition, with regard to atonement
theories from the Christian tradition, he holds that one may, “by taking a leaf from Jewish
interpretive practice,”130 essentially treat the atonement theories as midrashim – as
narrative commentaries on the gospel story.131 And, as with the New Testament
metaphors, McClendon advocates for the use of “each of the great Christian . . .
[atonement] midrashim . . . [in constructive efforts, since each of them] has its special
thrust or force, worth a place in today’s doctrine.”132
Moving to the gospel narrative, and still looking to address the central issue of the
reason for the cross, McClendon holds that this narrative conveys that when Jesus of
Nazareth launched his ministry, he sought, through “nonviolent warfare, . . . to establish
once more . . . the new rule of God.”133 According to McClendon, while this effort was in
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harmony with the rule that God had tried to establish at least since Israel’s origin,134 it “of
course . . . did not work. The enemies plotted; the disciples doubted. . . . He was
executed, . . . [and] he was buried. . . . God was dead.”135 However, McClendon argues:
The sequel both denied and affirmed what had gone before. It denied it: In the
resurrection God raised Jesus Christ, that same one, up from the dead, alive with
God forevermore. . . . The enemies did not prevail as they intended. The
disciples, doubting, returned to follow him. The sequel also affirmed what had
gone before: The resurrection was God’s sign of self-identification with Jesus
who had taken the nonviolent way of the cross. It was God’s way, God’s only
way. . . . The chief obstacle to . . . [the faith of the disciples], the cross, became
the chief content of their faith. God’s rule, by the way of the cross, prevailed.136
In view of this interpretation of what the gospel narrative conveys about the
meaning of the death of Jesus, McClendon restates the central features of his doctrine of
the cross in terms of the three major strands of atonement theory [midrashim?] that he
had previously identified as the “evilward,” “Godward,” and “manward” strands.137
First, he holds that the Jesus story (of the gospel narrative) “clearly . . . displays the . . .
devilward vector . . . [but that it does so] without the weakness of the (midrashic)
Christus-victor teaching with its fateful link to military Christendom and it abjuration of
nonviolence.”138 This restatement, then – in light of McClendon’s interpretation of
Scripture that Jesus genuinely endured the cross – cautions against forms of the
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traditional “ransom” or “victory” view of the atonement that would permit the possibility
that Jesus only pretended to endure the cross, so that the devil could be tricked.
Second, he avers that the constitutive story shows the Godward strand, “if (and
only if) . . . [Jesus’ story] is God’s own story – if . . . we cannot exclude God from the
action, but must see the Jesus story as exactly what God would do, exactly what God
would be satisfied to do, on earth.”139 Here, McClendon indirectly points to what he
understands to be a significant potential weakness of the traditional “satisfaction” or
“penal” theory, that is, its capacity to permit an understanding of the death of Jesus in
which God’s will and Jesus’ will remain at odds with one another (with implication that
God forced Jesus, against Jesus’ will, to finally go through with the cross). McClendon
holds that, in contrast to this flawed notion, the constitutive story demonstrates that the
cross “is God’s own action on the scale of Jesus of Nazareth.”140
Third, according to McClendon, the gospel narrative also displays the manward
strand but with an emphasis (which is not present in the traditional “vicarious sacrifice”
theory) that it is “only . . . [by] his full faithfulness enacted in the cross that . . . [Jesus
enables his] disciples . . . [to change] from observers to participants.”141 That is, for
McClendon, “the constitutive story has the objectivity, the given quality of God’s prior
action, that . . . [has not been an aspect of most “vicarious sacrifice” midrashim].”142
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Therefore, McClendon seeks to recover each of these three traditional atonement
strands but in a manner that he feels more appropriately reflects the content of the gospel
story. Moreover, he implies that a comprehensive doctrine of the atonement should seek
to weave together the various strengths of each of these revised strands. However, since
McClendon’s understanding of the trinitarian identity of God, as well as his Christology
and pneumatology, have so far not been addressed, it is difficult, at this point, to fully
evaluate his doctrine of the atonement. Nevertheless, his development of this doctrine
does appear to shed some additional light on his understanding of God. For example, he
has here reiterated that God is a God who seeks to establish God’s rule or kingdom. In
addition, particularly with his restatement of the evilward, Godward and manward
strands – in view of the constitutive story in the New Testament – he makes clear his
perspective that Jesus of Nazareth and God were of the same purpose in willfully
enduring personal suffering for the sake of others.
The Person of Jesus Christ. In developing his doctrine of the person of Christ,
McClendon avers (in view of the hermeneutical principle of “this is that” and “then is
now”) that this must be a doctrine that considers Christ to be alive and present with his
disciples today; otherwise, for him, this doctrine is not a doctrine that is faithful to the
New Testament witness of the resurrection. Therefore, McClendon begins his
Christology by examining the way in which it might be held that Christ is present (and
capable of being known by his disciples) today. Then, he introduces the notion that the
resurrection is the key to determining the identity of the present Christ. Next, he
considers three major Christological models that have been developed within the
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Christian tradition (what he describes as: the Logos model, the two-natures model, and
the historical model), before finally proposing his own narrative Christological model,
through which he restates and further develops his Christological perspective.
As he approaches a doctrine of Christ, McClendon holds that “the identity that
Christian teaching must clarify for itself is not first of all that of a teacher who lived and
died in long ago Palestine,”143 rather, he maintains, it is the identity of a present “Risen
One who confronts us here and now, today, in the common life of the church, . . . [with
which Christian teaching must first be concerned].”144 This matter of beginning with
“Christ’s present presence is . . . of the highest importance for theology,”145 because,
McClendon suggests, Christology would otherwise be of little relevance for
contemporary Christians, for they “are not a people of antiquarian taste, roaming the
relics of lost civilizations, looking for some ‘light from the past’ that might illuminate
their weary minds, and (as it just happens) seizing upon a certain radical rabbi as most
interesting of all.”146
McClendon recognizes challenges to beginning a Christology with the present
Christ, acknowledging, for instance, that “it may be contrary to what . . . [some]
Christians think they know about life in this age;”147 however, he argues that, according
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to the narrative of the New Testament, “the Spirit’s coming . . . [which is promised with
Christ’s ascension and launched through the Pentecost event] is the inward divine means
by which the Christian community, and thus the individual disciple as well, are provided
access to the present Christ.”148 That is, McClendon holds that the biblical narrative
conveys that, through the Spirit, Christ is present to disciples today both corporately and
individually. In addition, in holding to that element of his theological method that calls
for a reliance upon the practices of the church, he specifies at least four spheres in which
disciples can experience Christ’s presence: worship, witness, (kingdom) work, and the
word of Scripture.149
Not only does McClendon argue that Christ is present to his disciples today, he
also endeavors to show in what sense these disciples can be capable of knowing the
present Christ. Here, McClendon essentially expounds upon the difference between
“knowing about someone” and “knowing someone,” and he avers that the latter involves:
(1) knowing someone (not in a secondhand but) in a firsthand way;150 and, (2) knowing
someone reciprocally, where “the other can properly claim to know us also.”151 And, it is
in this sense of “knowing someone” in a firsthand, reciprocal fashion, that McClendon
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maintains authentic disciples can – through “worship, work, witness, . . . [and] word – . . .
[know] the Risen One.”152
Having sought to establish that Christology should begin with an understanding
of Christ present to and knowable by his disciples today, McClendon then argues that
exploring the meaning of the resurrection is central to determining the identity of this
present Christ.153 After a brief treatment of Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances,154
McClendon recounts his view that Jesus (uniquely) lived a life that was fully faithful to
God’s way and that this faithfulness ultimately led to his death; and, he argues that
“where God is concerned, . . . [though,] even death’s finality is not final. . . . The Jesus
story is also the story of God’s utter involvement. God acted. God raised Jesus from the
dead ‘on the third day.’”155 Next, in light of this interpretation of the resurrection event,
McClendon asks the probing question: “What . . . could that ‘raising’ be?”156 In other
words, he inquires: “What happened to the person of Jesus in the act of the resurrection?”
To this query, McClendon introduces the argument that God “re-identified” Jesus, or,
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more fully, he holds that, with the resurrection: “God . . . identified the life of Jesus of
Nazareth afresh with God’s own life, so that from that time, and in accordance with an
eternal purpose of God, the history of this man, Jesus of Nazareth, was to be counted
identical with God’s inner history, in such a way that in the knowing of Jesus Christ God
could be truly known.”157
McClendon defers offering a more complete explanation of this argument about
what happened to Jesus with the resurrection until after he has gleaned insights from his
evaluation of some major historical Christological models (an analysis of which I will
offer below), but here, as he introduces this argument, he presents a few brief
clarifications that are helpful. For instance, with the concept of “a re-identified life,” he
explains that he has in view something akin to a “changed human life,” arguing that this
is not a far-fetched notion, since it is an everyday occurrence that “people . . . ‘change
their identities,’ . . . sometimes changing inwardly as well.”158 Moreover, he holds that
“if we believe in God, we believe in one who as the absolute right (as Creator) to identify
. . . [and to re-identify?] each one of us.”159 One aspect along these lines that McClendon
does not appear to explicitly clarify, though, is the degree to which Jesus was “reidentified.” However, drawing from that portion of his interpretation of the postresurrection appearances, in which he holds that the early disciples knew “that the One
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who was alive was the very one they had known, Jesus of Nazareth, that man,”160 one can
infer that McClendon does not have in view a resurrection re-identification of Jesus that
would have completely subsumed his previous identity. That is, McClendon suggests
that with the resurrection re-identification of Jesus something of Jesus’ pre-resurrection
identity must have been maintained. However, McClendon does not appear to specify
what exactly God “re-identifies” or “changes” within Jesus. Did God change Jesus’
nature? And, if God did not change Jesus’ nature, what about Jesus did God change?
McClendon does not explain these matters.
Nevertheless, another clarification McClendon makes here, as he introduces this
argument about Jesus’ resurrection re-identification, is that “Jesus is not identified merely
as one of God’s children . . . but is re-identified, resurrected as the unique sharer of
God’s own identity: for us, by this resurrection, the whole story of Jesus is God’s own
story.”161 McClendon does not make explicit what he means with the terms “unique” and
“whole” in this phrase; however, he suggests that while, with “other of God’s children,”
part of their story might become God’s own story, with Jesus, all of his story becomes
God’s story – and that in this way Jesus is unique from other followers (children) of God.
Even with this brief introduction to his concept of Jesus’ resurrection reidentification, McClendon seems to anticipate that he will meet charges of
“adoptionism.” In response, he argues that he should not “be reckoned an adoptionist, . .
. [since he holds that] Jesus’ . . . [unique] Sonship is . . . what God intended for him even
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‘before the foundation of the world’ (Eph. 1:4).”162 Therefore, McClendon suggests that
his Christology should not be perceived as “adoptionistic” at least in the strong sense of
“implying . . . . [that] ‘God had to wait around’ for someone like Jesus to appear so God
could ‘adopt’ the lucky winner as his Son.”163
McClendon next considers three substantial Christological models – the Logos
model, the two-natures model, and the historical model – that have been developed
within the Christian tradition, in further preparation for a proposal of his own narrative
Christological model. I will not fully recapitulate the capable historical sketches that
McClendon offers with each of these three models; instead, I will focus on the main
points he makes with regard to each of them, giving particular attention to his perceptions
of their limitations.
First, with the Logos model, pointing to Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Clement, and
Origen as its primary developers, McClendon holds that some early “Christian apologists
. . . saw in logos the very vehicle needed to explain the Jewish Messiah to pagans. Christ
was the Logos incarnate – not actually the high God, yet truly divine.”164 He maintains
that the limitation of this view, as it has been historically developed, is “the gap it opens
between the (inaccessible) superordinate God and the accessible (but not fully divine)
Christ.”165 That is, according to McClendon, this view has tended to treat Christ as

162

Doctrine, 249.

163

Doctrine, 248-49.

164

Doctrine, 252.

165

Doctrine, 252.

253
“truly” – but not as “fully” – divine, thus relegating Christ to a “subordinate place.”166
Therefore, one can perhaps deduce from his assessment that McClendon seeks a model
that allows for a concept of the full divinity of Christ.
With the two-natures model, McClendon indicates that, most simply stated, this
model holds that “Christ has both a divine and a human nature;”167 yet, he traces its
development up through what he terms as “the resultant ‘Definition’ of the Council of
Chalcedon (451),” which he summarizes, in part, as follows: “Christ . . . [is] perfect in
manhood, perfect in Godhood, consubstantial (homoousios) both with the Father and with
us, born of Mary (who is called theotokos), so that the two natures, divine and human,
continue after the union, ‘unconfusedly, unalterably, undividedly, inseparably’ in one
‘hypostasis’ or self-identical person.”168 One of the issues this model could not or did not
resolve, however, according to McClendon, was the matter of where Christ acquired his
human nature. Did he acquire it “directly from God in a fresh creative act, or . . . [did he
acquire it] indirectly through inheritance from his mother?”169 Thus, one can deduce
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from this assessment that McClendon seeks a model that will clarify whether Jesus
received his humanity from a divine resource or a human source (or, perhaps, from both
sources).
Finally, according to McClendon, a new model, what he terms as “the historical
model,” emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.170 Shaped by figures ranging
from Hermann Samuel Reimarus to Johannes Weiss, this model, he argues, “seemed to
place not pope or Bible, but historical research, in the seat of authority.”171 The great
strength of this model (which, he argues, is the model that still prevails today, embraced
by Wolfhart Pannenberg and others),172 McClendon avers, is that it offers “a new
appreciation of the human Jesus.”173 The weakness, however, according to him, is that it
fails to allow for the divinity of Christ.174 McClendon argues that this weakness is
apparent, for example, in that strand within the historical model (the strand developed by
David Strauss and Rudolf Bultmann) that seeks to treat the central biblical narrative as
“myth” – where “myth” is understood not only as “a story of the gods (or of God) . . .
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[but also as] a story of events outside our time and space”175 – thereby making “divine
being” and “historical presence” mutually exclusive concepts.176 Therefore, one can
deduce from his assessment here that McClendon intends to pursue a model that will not
rule out investigations into the divinity of Christ based upon pre-existing definitions of
what constitutes such entities as history and myth.
Against the background of his understanding of these Christological models, and
drawing upon his previous argument about God’s resurrection re-identification of Jesus,
McClendon sets forth his own narrative-based Christological model, a model that he
eventually refers to as a “two-narrative Christology.”177 He begins the development of
this model by examining the timing and the nature of the “self-emptying” described in
Philippians 2:5-11. Here, he considers an exegetical observation of Origen on this
passage “that ‘some say’ the self-emptying was the emptying of the soul of Jesus after it
was enfleshed.”178 McClendon acknowledges that such an interpretation substantially
differs from the long-standing view that the passage “speaks of a heavenly being who
emptied himself (2:7) . . . [before taking human form],”179 but he argues that the passage
(or the early Christian hymn within it) is actually “not . . . about the pre-incarnate acts of
God . . . [but about a juxtaposition of] . . . Messiah Jesus’ earthly vicissitudes with the
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vast claim of his Lordship – on earth, but also in heaven and over the nether world.”180
Not surprisingly, therefore, McClendon clearly favors the “some say” interpretation that
Origen mentions, and he argues that if we read the Philippians passage in this manner –
as conveying a self-emptying after Jesus’ birth – then Paul must “refer here to a Jesus
who might have been made a king (cf. Matt. 4:8-10 par.; John 6:14f), but who instead
identified himself and his cause with servants and serfs, outcasts and victims, to a degree
that led the authorities to arrange his death.”181 In other words, for McClendon, Jesus’
self-emptying amounts to a series of decisions during his life and ministry not to
succumb to the temptation to pursue secular glory, so that he could instead associate and
identify with those on the margins of society.
With this understanding of Philippians 2:5-11, McClendon then inquires about
what such an after-enfleshment self-emptying might mean for interpreting Paul’s
reference to Jesus’ “‘being in the form of God’ (Phil. 2:6)?”182 In response, drawing on
the thought of Eugene TeSelle,183 McClendon avers that “we must understand that ‘the
image of God’ in Scripture is not a designated state but a task set, not an ontic level
enjoyed but an ideal to be realized.”184 Therefore, McClendon equates the “form of God”
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(in Philippians 2:6) with the “image of God” (in passages such as Genesis 1:26-27), and
he suggests that for Jesus – and for all other humans as well – the image (or form) of God
is not a state in which humans are born but a goal to which many aspire but only Jesus
attained, because only Jesus completely followed God’s way of the servant.185
Furthermore, McClendon holds that these concepts of Jesus’ after-enfleshment
self-emptying and of his eventual complete realization of the image of God (through his
full faithfulness during his life and death) cohere with the biblical narrative’s accounts of
his birth and resurrection. For instance, with regard to Jesus’ birth, McClendon argues
that the “Gospel stories do not say or suggest that it is by virtue of this marvelous
conception that Jesus was divine.”186 While McClendon allows that these stories suggest
that “the Spirit as the human Jesus’ divine Mother, conceived Jesus exactly when and as
Mary conceived him,”187 he rejects the notion that “the Holy Spirit is . . . presented . . . as
a Jupiter-like father deity who impregnates a human mother.”188 In addition, in terms of
Jesus’ resurrection, returning to the argument he previously introduced, McClendon
maintains that the resurrection of Jesus “is nothing less that God’s (re)identification of
the entire early life of Jesus of Nazareth, from conception to its last breath, with God’s
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own immortal life.”189 Accordingly, following that aspect of his theological method that
calls for the formation of conviction sets using various loci of justification (or loci of
formation) such as coherence, McClendon suggests that if one can affirm the individual
components thus far set forth as part of his narrative Christological model – that is, his
understanding of the non-divinity-imparting birth of Jesus; his notion of Jesus’ post-birth
self-emptying to follow God’s way of service; his concept of Jesus’ gradual (and
eventually full) achievement of the image of God; and, his idea of God’s resurrection reidentification of Jesus with God’s own life – it would seem that one should conclude that
these various components harmonize with (or at least do not contradict) one another.
Thus far with his efforts in constructing a narrative model for Christology,
McClendon has focused on how this model might appear within the boundaries of the
Jesus story proper, from Jesus’ conception through his resurrection. However,
McClendon also seeks to explore how this same model can “hold up to” (or work within)
the broader parameters of the entire “long biblical and postbiblical story whose center . . .
is Jesus of Nazareth.”190 He begins this broader effort, which he now starts to refer to as
a “two-narrative Christology,”191 by arguing that the biblical story is actually “not one
story, but two.”192 By this he means that, within the biblical narrative, one
simultaneously sees both (1) an ongoing story of God reaching down to humans and (2)
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an ongoing story of people reaching up to God. For example, he maintains that, within
the same portion of the biblical narrative: there is (1A) the account (or story) of “a
Redeemer God who leads his people out of Egyptian slavery;”193 while at the same time,
there is (2A) the account (or story) of “the daughter of Levi who entrusts her babe with a
Hebrew name to a little boat surely named Hope, and of a daughter of Pharaoh who
withdraws from that same boat the infant she will in the Egyptian tongue name
Moses.”194 His point with this example (and several others) is that with every single
biblical episode there are “two points of view.”195 The first point of view expresses the
story of “divine self-expense;”196 the second point of view conveys the story of “human
investment.”197
In addition, McClendon avers that the fact that there are two stories (the story of
God and the story of people) and not one indicates “the failure and fragmentation that
have been a part of the creature’s story.”198 That is, for all of God’s reaching down to
people with the first story and for all of humanity’s reaching up to God with the second
story, God and God’s people never seem to completely meet each other. Yet,
McClendon holds that both of these stories continue with Jesus of Nazareth. On the one
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hand, the first story of divine self-expense – of God reaching down to humans – “is no
new story when once again it focuses, this time upon . . . [(1B)] the cross as the ultimate
power . . . of a God who all through the story has been reaching out, reaching down, to
us.”199 And, on the other hand, the second story of human investment – of people
reaching up to God – is also no new story when once again it concentrates, this time upon
[(2B)] “Jesus, who against all odds, in what must have seemed the worst of times, lived a
life of full faithfulness, fulfilled his mission and was fully rewarded by his heavenly
Father.”200 Moreover, McClendon argues, because of his total obedience, even in
submitting to the cross, all of which “God intended for him even ‘before the foundation
of the world’ (Eph. 1:4),”201 with God’s resurrection of Jesus, “the twoness of the . . .
[biblical] story . . . converges completely, and we see a human story that God will
without qualification acknowledge as his own.”202
Thus, according to McClendon:
The story Scripture tells is the story of God. It reaches it climax in Jesus risen
from the dead. Concurrently, Scripture tells a moving human story that climaxes
in the same resurrection. The two narratives, divine and human, are seamlessly
one narrative throughout; though they may be distinguished for analysis, they
cannot be separated without harm.203
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And, in seeking to complete a theme he introduced as he approached this doctrine,
McClendon emphasizes that it is “in, with, and under this story . . . [that] one meets its
Lord and our own. Here one meets a Present Christ.”204
With the development of his doctrine of Christ and his model of two-narrative
Christology, McClendon has left some important questions still unresolved. Most
significantly, he does not address what exactly God “re-identifies” or “changes” within
Jesus with the resurrection. Nevertheless, in developing his Christology, he has shed
further light on his understanding of how the biblical narrative conveys who God is
through the telling of Jesus’ own story. For instance, his Christology suggests that, in
Jesus of Nazareth, God fulfilled God’s intention to be able to fully reach down to a
humanity that had been endeavoring to reach up to God. Also, his Christology implies
that since Jesus was re-identified with God’s own life, it follows that, in Christ, through
the Spirit, God is present with Christ’s disciples today in a firsthand, reciprocal manner.

The Holy Spirit and the Church’s Mission
McClendon closely interweaves his development of a doctrine of the Holy Spirit
together with his development of a doctrine of the church’s mission. His intention is “to
show that it is exactly by taking up the doctrine of God’s Spirit in its relation to mission
that we gain clarity about both questions, about our task (mission) and about God’s holy
nearness (Spirit).”205 Therefore, while my chief concern is to examine his pneumatology
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in order to gain a more complete understanding of his overall doctrine of God, I will also
need to consider his doctrine of the church’s mission since he so closely connects this
doctrine with that of the Spirit. Moreover, in order to address his notion of the church’s
mission, I will need, at least briefly, to consider his doctrine of the church. Accordingly,
in my analysis, I will first offer a brief investigation of his ecclesiology; then, I will offer
a combined examination of his doctrines of Spirit and mission.
The church. McClendon approaches his doctrine of the church by arguing that
there are “three circles of Christian community (each inclusive of the next in order): First
is the overarching rule of God; within it, the people (or peoples) of God; finally, the
concrete gatherings – the (local) churches of God.”206 The first circle of Christian
community – the rule or kingdom of God – he develops elsewhere as a meta-doctrine,
which contains sub-doctrines of eschatology, salvation, and creation (as I have analyzed
above). Here, he indicates that the remaining circles of Christian community – “the
people of God” and of “the (local) churches of God” – should also be developed as subdoctrines under the meta-doctrine of the rule of God, with the implication (as will
become more clear below) that, because of the Resurrection-Ascension-Pentecost events,
the people of God, working through the local churches of God, have been entrusted to
work as partners with God to carry forward the rule of God.
The second circle of Christian community, according to McClendon, is the people
(or peoples) of God. He argues that, according to the Apostle Paul, the people of God are
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“an earthly, here and now new creation, a new people, whose character is to gather in
assemblies, each original, each dependent upon the present Spirit, each gathered around
the risen Christ.”207 Here, McClendon appears to have in view the entire present
Christian community.
And, the third circle, he avers, is the local church or “the local assemblies
(ekklesiai) of the peoples.”208 The local church, he holds, can take many forms, from “a
storefront Pentecostal fellowship . . . [to] a timeworn ecclesial structure in place for a
thousand years or more;”209 yet, in every case:
The rule of God requires church members subject to that very rule. The centrality
of Jesus Christ demands church leaders led by Christ crucified and risen. The
fellowship of the Spirit implies a common life whose practices suit, not this
present age, but the age to come – a community at once redeemed and
redemptive.210
Thus, for McClendon, the purpose of the local church is to help carry out the rule of God
by acting redemptively towards others.
The Holy Spirit and the church’s mission. With this understanding of the church
in hand, McClendon sets forth his interwoven doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the
mission of the church. His method of argumentation in developing these doctrines is to
move back-and-forth between them, probing deeper into the nature of the Spirit and the
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nature of the church’s mission with each pass. Accordingly, I will endeavor to follow the
course of this back-and-forth argumentation in my analysis of his development of these
doctrines.
McClendon introduces the doctrines of the Spirit and of the church’s mission by
arguing, in view of his concept (mentioned in the previous subsection) that the purpose of
the local church is to act redemptively:
That the church is a redemptive community only when and as its mission is
determined by God the Spirit: God’s Holy Spirit alone creates the church as a
uniting and redemptive community. . . . Pentecost showed that one new human
race, redeemed and reconciled to God and thereby joined into one . . . [people],
was the mission goal of the Holy Spirit.211
Thus, in part, McClendon seeks to establish: (1) that the Holy Spirit determines the
mission of the church; and, (2) that the mission the Holy Spirit has for the church is to
work towards forming one people that is redeemed and reconciled to God. Furthermore,
McClendon argues that the mission that the Holy Spirit has for the church is the exact
same (com)mission that Christ has for the church: “the missionary task that the risen
Lord entrusted to his own followers (Matt. 28:18-20, par.) . . . [is the] ongoing task . . .
[of] discipling . . . all nations, that is, all peoples, all cultures, all human life.”212
Not only does the Holy Spirit provide the church with its mission, but, according
to McClendon, the Spirit also guides the church in carrying out this mission. McClendon
introduces the notion of this particular type of guidance by turning to the New Testament
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image of “a door.”213 Informed by Eduard Schweizer’s interpretation of Acts 16:9 as an
occasion where “‘Paul is prevented by the Spirit from doing missionary work where he
really wanted to,’”214 McClendon argues that this is an instance of the Spirit guiding the
church in carrying out its mission – in this case by “closing” a door in a particular
direction Paul himself wanted to go, so that Paul would take a different direction, a
direction that the Spirit wanted him to take. In this manner, McClendon suggests that the
Spirit guides the church (past and present) in carrying out its mission – not only by
“closing” some doors and “opening” others but also by indicating that the “open door”
may be different in different contexts.215 Thus, in contemporary Latin America, the
“open door” might include a Spirit-led sensitivity to political and economic liberation,
while in contemporary North America, the “open door” might involve a Spirit-led
sensitivity to “spiritual barrenness.”216 However, in none of the regions of the world,
according to McClendon, “are disciples themselves required to make a way for the gospel
to enter. Instead, their task in each is to find and faithfully to follow the way of the
providential God, in obedience to Christ the commander, in the strength of the indwelling
Spirit.”217
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Yet, when it comes to more fully comprehending “the Spirit’s exact will (God’s
will) for present kingdom tasks,”218 including the church’s mission to form one people
that is redeemed and reconciled to God, looking to the New Testament image of “a door”
alone is not sufficient; instead, what is required, according to McClendon, is to look more
closely at the work of the Spirit at Pentecost. At Pentecost, he argues, “the mighty force
present in Jesus and his Way is released to waiting disciples and thereby to nations
waiting unawares. At Pentecost, via the Spirit, the historic involvement of the Risen One
with the wide world begins.”219 And, in view of the “this is that” and “then is now”
baptist hermeneutical principle, as it was for the early disciples, so it is “for disciples
today: Pentecost is here, waiting to be claimed as they claimed it.”220 McClendon means
not that contemporary disciples should expect tongues as of fire to alight upon them anew
but that they should expect “God’s own Spirit . . . [to still] occupy, master, . . . [and]
equip each resurrection witness for her or his assigned task of witness to Messiah Jesus
as each witness finds his or her proper place in God’s long history of salvation.”221
In addition, McClendon holds that from the New Testament account of Pentecost
and from related accounts, one can glean certain themes about the nature of the Holy
Spirit. First, these accounts show, he argues, that “the Spirit is missionary.”222 In other
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words, “that mission toward ecstasy – the multiplicity of earth’s peoples not conformed
to another, but at one with one another in the oneness of God – is shown at Pentecost to
express the character of God’s Holy Spirit.”223 This leads McClendon to deduce that “the
Spirit is a missionary, as Jesus is a missionary, as Torah’s Adonai is a missionary
God.”224 Second, he avers that these New Testament passages reveal that “the Spirit
accepts . . . [disciples as] partners.”225 That is, he holds that the Spirit takes on Christ’s
followers as co-workers, guiding and empowering them to complete God’s kingdom
tasks.226 Third, McClendon argues that the biblical narrative shows that the Spirit guides
the “gathered disciples.”227 Here, while acknowledging that the activities of God are in
no manner “confined to gathered congregations,”228 he maintains that it is nevertheless
the case that “when the world mission of Jesus . . . [was] launched, the disciples’
community, . . . [both past and present, was] chosen as ship’s company to the Spirit, and
Christian community life (thus empowered) . . . [began to] take on a crucial role in
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history.”229 Thus, “the gathered community, for all its frailty and fallibility, . . . [has]
become the Spirit’s agency for the world mission of the gospel.”230
With this fuller understanding of the nature of the Spirit, McClendon then seeks
to more adequately uncover the goal of the Spirit’s mission for the church (that is, to
more sufficiently uncover the goal of forming one people that is redeemed and reconciled
to God). In order to do so, he avers, one must begin by endeavoring to address the matter
of God’s basic purpose. Here, McClendon agrees with Karl Barth that “‘[the] . . . primal
and basic purpose of . . . [a God who in his love is sovereign] is to impart and reveal
Himself – and with Himself His glory.’”231 McClendon acknowledges that, on the
surface, an essential purpose of showing one’s own glory would seem to “ill become a
God of love;”232 however, he holds that, “in a strict biblical sense ‘God’s glory’ means
God’s character of divinity emanating to the creature, so that human beings, as they are
‘glorified’ (cf. Rom. 8:30), come to share God’s own character; they become godlike.”233
Therefore, McClendon suggests that God’s purpose in revealing God’s glory is not just
self-serving but also a gift God gives to God’s human creatures so that they can become
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like God. In addition, drawing on the work of Jonathan Edwards,234 McClendon argues
that this ultimate plan of God’s – to impart God’s self and God’s glory – is “one that
begins as God undertakes to give himself away and that reaches its goal as human selves
answer God’s gift with consenting, self-giving love toward one another and supremely
toward God’s own holy being.”235 In other words, McClendon further builds his
argument here to claim that God’s purpose in showing God’s self and God’s glory
involves God’s glory emanating to people so that they can become godlike and freely
respond to the gift of God’s glory – by loving God and loving others. Accordingly, it
follows, for McClendon, that the goal of the Spirit’s mission for the church would seem
to be for followers of Christ to help others experience “the gift of the Spirit whose
intimate presence grants ecstasy in God and fellowship with others.”236 What remains for
him is to explore whether or not the narrative of Scripture confirms this hypothesis.
McClendon conducts this exploration by turning, in part, to Paul’s use of the term
“koinōnia” in 2 Corinthians. Maintaining that “the strong sense of koinōnia throughout
the New Testament is participation with someone in some common engagement,”237
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McClendon argues that Paul’s employment of koinōnia in the phrase, “‘the fellowship
[koinōnia] of the Holy Spirit’ (as presented, e.g., in 2 Cor. 13:14) . . . [points to]
participation in nearness to God with others in whom the same Spirit works.”238 Along
these lines, McClendon argues that Paul, with his use of the concept of “koinōnia:”
Neatly designates the characteristic work of the Spirit, drawing believers
Godward (i.e., Christward) and in the same act drawing them into fellowship or
congress with one another. And since that work, that achievement, is the goal of
the entire divine mission – the goal of creation, of the cross, of the consummation
– the Spirit’s work, . . . seen by eyes focused on mission, expresses Divinity’s
own ultimacy, God’s inner nature, laid open to reverent and awe-struck human
gaze.239
Thus, McClendon holds that Paul provides confirmation that the goal of the Spirit’s
mission for the church is for Christ’s followers to work towards all people having unity
or “intimacy with God and with one another in God.”240
Furthermore, in a final step in the development of his doctrines of the Spirit and
of the church’s mission, McClendon seeks to investigate what sort of “unity” or
“intimacy” this is that the Spirit works to accomplish both between humans and God and
among fellow humans. In order to get to the core meaning of this particular type of unity,
McClendon relies upon the thought of “Russian philosopher Vladimir Sergeyevich
Solovyov.”241 According to McClendon, Solovyov, concerned by the manner in which
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unrestrained human egoism – since it resists cooperation with others – can be a hindrance
to gaining knowledge, maintains that only a certain kind of love can genuinely “force
egoism to sacrifice itself to the beloved other, leading (at least in this case) to an unforced
and real unity.”242 And, Solovyov holds that of all the various kinds of human love,
including “mystical love, parental love, . . . [and] sympathetic fellowship,”243 “only
sexual love (erōs) . . . [is capable of forcing egoism to sacrifice itself in this way].”244
Moreover, according to McClendon, for Solovyov:
The beloved ‘other’ that can liberate our individuality from the blinders of egoism
must correspond to the whole of our individuality: the other must be as real, as
concrete, and as objective as we ourselves are, and at the same time must differ
from us in every way so as to be really ‘other.’ Now this just describes the
characteristic object of sexual love; sexual union strives for a total fusion of self
with the alternate other.245
A complication emerges, though, McClendon avers, with this line of thought, since, in
practice, the ecstatic aspect of sexual love is often short-lived, and this complication
would seem to suggest “that the erotic dream of total self-giving is only illusory.”246
Yet, McClendon suggests that Solovyov sees hope that this dream is not illusory
because of “the long human evolutionary experience: Once art, science, civil society, the
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control of natures’ forces seemed each to be . . . only farfetched dreams, but these have
one-by-one been realized;”247 therefore, as humans continue to advance, the potential for
sustained total self-giving might become more of a realistic aspiration. But here, in this
latter case, according to McClendon, Solovyov argues that this “task . . . [involves] the
realization of the truly human and . . . [that] this . . . will be the realization of the image of
God (Gen. 1:27) in a union of pure love . . . in the material world.”248 Along these lines,
McClendon concurs with Solovyov’s view that the ecstatic aspect of sexual love can
become more enduring, even on this side of the eschaton, as God enables humans to
evolve more completely into the image of God. Or, more specifically, transitioning from
Solovyov’s terminology to his own, McClendon argues that:
In short, conjugal or sexual love cannot realize what it fleetingly glimpses short of
the transformation that is . . . the end of the Spirit’s mission. Just as one is
married to a spouse and (ideally) finds in her or him an ‘other’ who is ‘all,’ and
for whom sacrifice is altogether appropriate, every social organism must be for
its members an ‘other’ and an ‘all’ that, as Christians know, can be supported
only by sacrifice, by taking up a cross.249
Thus, McClendon suggests that the unity (or intimacy) the Spirit seeks to accomplish –
not only between all humans and God but also among all fellow humans – is a mutual
posture of sacrificial self-giving that seems not strained but altogether natural.
In addition, according to McClendon, the term “Solovyov coins . . . for this
relation . . . [of sacrificial self-giving] between each and all . . . is ‘syzygic’ – from Greek
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syzygia, sexual congress, conjunction,”250 and, for Solovyov, “‘syzygy’ speaks of full
unity achieved without the cancellation of the individual. No participant is absorbed . . .
into the whole, yet none flourishes in isolation, . . . but each interacts in love.”251
Therefore, McClendon argues that “what Solovyov intends by ‘universal syzygy’ is in
fact . . . [nothing else] than the unity of the Holy Spirit of God (Eph. 3:1-13).”252
Moreover, McClendon stresses that such unity cannot be obtained by human effort alone
(or even mostly); to the contrary, he argues that “the mission of the Spirit achieves
syzygic unity precisely by confronting each living human being with the reality of life in
the risen Christ, displaying the way of his cross, accepting the uniqueness of each, and
inviting from each a response that can be made only by the power of the Spirit of
love.”253
In constructing his doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the church’s mission,
McClendon provides additional insight into his doctrine of God. For example, he
identifies the Holy Spirit as “God the Spirit . . . [or as] God’s Holy Spirit,”254 thus
suggesting the view that, at least to some degree, what can be said of the Spirit can be
said of God. Accordingly, he further implies that the Spirit, and therefore God, guides
the church (and works with disciples of Christ as partners) in carrying out the church’s

250

Doctrine, 449.

251

Doctrine, 449.

252

Doctrine, 449.

253

Doctrine, 449.

254

Doctrine, 418.

274
mission to help others experience the gift of the Spirit – whose intimate presence grants a
syzygic unity (of sacrificial self-giving) with God and with one another.

The Biblical Narrative and God’s Trinitarian Identity
In addition to setting forth his doctrine of the atonement, his two-narrative
Christology, and his doctrine of the Holy Spirit (considered together with his doctrine of
the church’s mission), McClendon also develops a doctrine of God. However, his chief
purpose (within this particular aspect of his larger project of setting forth Christian
doctrine) is not to offer a comprehensive doctrine of God but, more modestly, “to show
the dependence of the Christian doctrine of God upon the narrative we call gospel.”255
That is, he intends to demonstrate that God’s identity is known through the biblical
narrative. Along these lines, begins his construction of a doctrine of God by examining
the manner in which the Bible identifies God, and he does so according to two different
arrangements – first according to three historic moments and, then, according to
trinitarian categories. Next, he endeavors to demonstrate how, throughout the history of
the Christian tradition, the efforts of many, including even well-intentioned Christian
thinkers, have often caused these biblical identifications of God to become displaced.
Finally, in response to such displacement, he sets forth his understanding of “a narrativebased trinitarianism.”256
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Three spheres of force. McClendon first considers the way in which Scripture
identifies God by means of the arrangement of “three historic moments or spheres of
force, the organic, the corporate, and the anastatic.”257 Starting with the last of these
spheres, the anastatic moment, he argues that the biblical narrative portrays God as “a
pioneer, a trailblazer of destiny.”258 He bases this identification of God on his
interpretation of such passages as Exodus 3:14. In this passage, he maintains that since
“the Hebrew verb . . . [upon which the divine name (in this instance) has been based] is
imperfect and causative,”259 the phrase often rendered as “I am that I am” should actually
be rendered as: “‘I will be what I will be,’ . . . [or] more freely, . . . [paraphrasing as:] ‘I
will always be ahead of you. Find Me as you follow the journey.’”260 Thus, for
McClendon, the Bible portrays God as an initiating and guiding “eschatological
presence.”261 Part of what this entails, McClendon further argues, is that God, rather than
sin, sets the agenda for transformation throughout the history of the world. In fact, he
holds that this is so much the case that, “in a sinless world, God would still be the God of
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change, still be the God of adventure, and transformation and adventure would be God’s
typical gifts still.”262
Moving to the second sphere of force, the corporate (or social) moment,
McClendon maintains that Scripture shows God to be “a covenanting God, one who
promises ongoing companionship and who keeps every promise . . . [to God’s
people].”263 Here, for example, McClendon has in view the way in which some biblical
translations “render . . . [the Hebrew word] chesed . . . [as] ‘unfailing love,’ as in Psalm
63:3.”264 In other words, he holds that, with this sphere, the Bible portrays God not as
one who whimsically “comes and goes” in God’s dealings with God’s people but as one
who stays with them “as a resident missionary.”265
Then, with the third sphere of force, the organic moment, McClendon avers that
the biblical narrative presents God as Creator – not just as the one who began the
universe but also as the one who remains “creatively present.”266 McClendon holds that
particularly this latter type of on-going present creativity is implicit, for instance, in the
Gospel of John’s accounts of Jesus’ “wine miracle at Cana (John 2:1-11) . . . [and of his]
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raising of Lazarus (11:1-45).”267 These events and others combine to show that “in
early Christian belief, God is ‘ruler of all nature.’”268
Trinitarian categories. After exploring the manner in which the biblical narrative
identifies God as “God the Adventurer, God the Companion, and God the Powerfully
Present One,”269 by means of the anastatic, corporate, and organic spheres of force
(which, in turn, appear to loosely share affinities with, respectively, with his doctrines of
eschatology, salvation, and creation), McClendon continues his construction of a doctrine
of God by investigating the way in which Scripture identifies God by means of a second
arrangement – trinitarian categories.
Beginning with “God in Christ,”270 McClendon focuses primarily on the use of
the term “logos” in the Prologue of John’s Gospel. He holds that John identifies “Jesus,
that flesh-and-blood human being . . . [as] the pre-existent logos of God;”271 however,
McClendon suggests that “logos,” in fidelity to the Septuagint’s “translation of Hebrew
dabar,” . . . [should here be] associated . . . with the speaking, the word of God in Hebrew
Scripture.”272 By defining “logos” as “the speaking of God,” McClendon suggests that
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the “logos,” while pre-existent, was something other than a personal pre-existing being.
However, this notion of a non-personal pre-existent logos as “the speaking of God”
coheres well with several of McClendon’s other Christological perspectives [such as: his
understanding of the non-divinity-imparting birth of Jesus; his notion of Jesus’ post-birth
self-emptying to follow God’s way of service; his concept of Jesus’ gradual (and
eventually full) achievement of the image of God; and, his idea of God’s resurrection reidentification of Jesus with God’s own life]. Moreover, with this understanding of
“logos,” McClendon implies that he can still make the fairly high Christological claim
that “Jesus . . . is the word at human scale. This refers not to the lesser sign of the
wonderful birth of Jesus . . . but to the sign of signs, the life, death, resurrection of . . . the
unique only God.”273
Turning next to the trinitarian category of “God as Holy Spirit,”274 McClendon
argues that the New Testament never fully presents God’s Spirit as the “later Christian
writings . . . [would, as] a ‘distinct divine person;’ . . . [however,] what the New
Testament does do . . . is to broaden and deepen the biblical idea of God so that God’s
true role as Trailblazer and Co-conspirator and Divine Dynamis is conveyed.”275
Furthermore, McClendon suggests that the identification of God’s Spirit in this manner –
as God’s power – is evident (though in different ways) both with regard to the Spirit’s
relationship with Jesus and in terms of the Spirit’s relationship with the church. For
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instance, with the first of these relationships, McClendon maintains that “the Gospel
writers . . . present God’s Spirit . . . as the dynamic divine aid to Jesus during his earthly
ministry.”276 In addition, with the second of these relationships (between the Spirit and
the church), he holds that, in some sense, according to the New Testament authors,
“God’s Spirit had become the Spirit of Jesus Christ.”277 To illustrate (and, by way of
illustration, to clarify) the way in which the New Testament shows this, McClendon
points to the account of Stephen’s martyrdom in Acts 7, and he maintains that “Stephen
sees the glory . . . of God and Jesus seated in the place of authority. Yet he does not see
the Spirit, for the Spirit, intimate enabler, was within him, allowing Stephen to see the
vision of Jesus in his place and to die a faithful death.”278 Therefore, McClendon
suggests that the notion of “God’s Spirit becoming the Spirit of Jesus Christ” means that,
with the birth of the church, one of the primary purposes of the Spirit became to empower
disciples to connect with the risen Christ.
Finally, with the trinitarian category of “God as Father,”279 McClendon holds that,
like other ancient near eastern nations:
The Hebrews . . . knew God as the originating father of their peoplehood, but
there were two significant differences: (1) JHWH was an adoptive father. There
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was no hint here of sexual procreation. And (2) this adoption was a liberation;
precisely, it was redemption from Egyptian bondage.280
Furthermore, McClendon argues that “‘Father’ was Jesus’ chosen word for God . . . [and
that] Jesus appropriated both . . . [of] these elements of the . . . [early Hebrew
understandings of God as Father].”281 That is, according to McClendon, “Jesus’ Father
was the familiar divine friend awaiting the cry of the human heart;”282 and, “Jesus’ Father
was the liberator from bondage, . . . [which] included religious bondage, political
bondage, social and cultural bondage, and the bondage of one’s own sin.”283
The displacement of biblical identifications of God. In both of the above ways,
therefore, by means of the three spheres of force and in view of trinitarian categories,
McClendon endeavors to show how, in part, the Bible identifies God; yet, he argues that
throughout the history of the church these scriptural identifications of God have often
become displaced. For instance, he holds that even with “the second and later centuries, .
. . the ‘Father’ Jesus knew as intimate and as liberator was assimilated in Christian
speech to father Zeus, the maintenance God of things-as-they-are.”284 Moreover, he
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maintains that this trend continued and grew through the centuries, so that, by the
seventeenth century, even “Christians of good intent, . . . [such as Leonardus] Lessius
and . . . [Marin] Mersenne,”285 in their particular case because they “treated . . . [atheism]
as only a philosophical issue rather than a religious one,”286 “pushed the narrative of
God’s identity into second place – where it was lost to sight.”287
A narrative-based trinitarianism. In response to this increasing displacement of
the biblical identifications of God, McClendon argues that “the biblical heritage must
reject a theism that discards the story of God,”288 and as a contribution towards
maintaining this story, McClendon sets forth (or, at least, introduces) “a narrative-based
trinitarianism.”289 He begins by arguing that the biblical story of God, of which he offers
a brief summary,290 “drives us . . . to a trinitarian expression of the doctrine . . . [of

285

Doctrine, 310.

286

Doctrine, 309. McClendon here refers to Nicholas Lash, “When Did the
Theologians Lose Interest in Theology?,” in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in
Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce Marshall (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 134-36. In addition, as part of McClendon’s
analysis of Lessius and Mersenne, he points to Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of
Modern Atheism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987), 33, 65-66, et
passim.
287

Doctrine, 310.

288

Doctrine, 310.

289

Doctrine, 320.

290

Doctrine, 319.

282
God].”291 He recognizes, however, that there are various “objections to trinitarianism.”292
And, as he addresses what he considers to be three significant such objections, he further
begins to unfold how a narrative-based trinitarianism might appear.
The first objection he considers is that trinitarianism minimizes the “wholeness
[of God,] . . . implying tritheism.”293 McClendon concedes that “there are indeed forms
of the doctrine of the Trinity that are vulnerable to . . . [this] failing.”294 However, those
trinitarian doctrines that insufficiently emphasize the wholeness of God are in direct
opposition, he argues:
To the . . . [biblical] story that the . . . [trinitarian] doctrine is set to conserve, a
story in which one God, over against all earth’s gods, is Israel’s Redeemer: ‘Hear,
Israel: The Lord is our God, the Lord our one God’ (Deut. 6:4). That oneness is
not fractured but deepened in the chapters of the story that reaches its climax at
Calvary and opens to all peoples at Pentecost.295
Thus, he suggests that when the development of a trinitarian doctrine gives appropriate
attention to the scriptural narrative, not just an understanding of God’s “threeness” but a
fuller, richer comprehension of God’s “oneness” should come forth as well.
The second objection is that trinitarianism “forces the free, dynamic language of
Scripture into a mold, asking of the Bible what it will not yield, namely, the doctrine of
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later centuries.”296 To this objection, McClendon replies that it should be immediately
acknowledged “that the trinitarian doctrine as such does not appear in Scripture. Rather,
‘Trinity’ was invented in order to encode and protect what does appear in Scripture, the
one God who is truly Israel’s Father, truly eternal Word, truly life-giving Spirit.”297 In
addition, McClendon does not see a difficulty with such a trinitarian “encoding of the
biblical narrative of God, . . . provided . . . [that] it is recognized as just that – an
encoding meant to return us to its . . . [scriptural] source.”298
The third objection he considers is that “trinitarianism with its names Father, Son,
Holy Spirit provides gods of gender rather than the God beyond gender, thus relegating
itself to the past.”299 In part of his reply, McClendon holds that those who make such
objections “would be correct to insist that alongside the traditional terms others may be
inserted: ‘Parent’ as well as Father; ‘Child’ as well as Son.”300 That is, he allows that
there are legitimate social reasons to “protest the classic ‘images’ of God the Father and
the Son as gender-biased.”301 However, with the remainder of his reply to this objection,
he avers that “in fidelity to Scripture (where pater and huios are repeatedly part of the
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New Testament texts) these others . . . [i.e., other terms such as ‘Parent’ or ‘Child’] must
appear alongside, not instead of, the classic terms, and in honest acknowledgment that the
proposed substitutes have their own defects.”302

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have endeavored to explore both McClendon’s understanding of
the doctrine of God and the extent to which this doctrine builds upon his theological
method. As part of his doctrine of God, he first endeavors to show how, according to the
narrative of Scripture, God’s activity within creation occurs through the rule of God (or
the kingdom of God) – which is a present rule but, at the same time, a rule that spans
from the distant past to the far future. In view of this broad span, McClendon posits that
the doctrines of creation, salvation, and eschatology may be perceived as sister doctrines
under the mother doctrine of the rule of God.
With his doctrine of eschatology, following those aspects of his theological
method that call for constructing doctrine through conviction sets (or picture sets) and for
utilizing the “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutical principle, McClendon turns to
the New Testament “end-pictures” of the last judgment and of Jesus Christ returning, and
he argues that the Jesus Christ who will be king at the last judgment is the same Jesus
Christ who lived in first century Nazareth and the same Jesus Christ who reigns in the
present. Thus, it follows, for McClendon, both that Christ is the one on whom history
centers and – since Christ is the resurrected Lamb who was slain – that Christ intends to
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form a new people (his kingdom) by means of his own sacrificial love and the sacrificial
love of his disciples. Accordingly, McClendon’s doctrine of last things informs his
doctrine of Christ; specifically, it presents Christ as one who rules not by force but by
self-sacrifice and as one who expects his disciples to follow this example.
Next, with his doctrine of salvation, McClendon holds that because Jesus of
Nazareth, as fully human, was completely faithful to God this shows that sin is not a
necessary feature of humanity and that people, therefore, have real hope of being made
new in Christ – in at least three specific ways: being made new in terms of restoring right
relations with others and especially with God (which McClendon identifies as a
Protestant emphasis); being made new with regard to becoming holy (a Catholic stress);
and, being made new in terms of turning from “humanity’s way” to “God’s way” (a
baptist emphasis). In addition, McClendon maintains that these three ways of being
made new in Christ – justification, sanctification, and “the way” – represent not an ordo
salutis but different aspects of the one process of salvation, a process that is unique for
each person but that typically involves the following four stages (in connection with four
related church practices): preparation (in connection with the practice of instruction);
conversion (baptism); following (the Lord’s supper); and, soaring (communal
discernment). Thus, McClendon’s doctrine of salvation further illuminates, in particular,
not only his conception of Jesus, as one who, as fully human, was completely faithful to
God, but also his understanding of God, as one who seeks to establish right relations with
people and who enables the salvation of humans to occur.
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Then, with his doctrine of creation, again in keeping with his theological method
of endeavoring to develop doctrine through reliance upon conviction (or picture) sets,
McClendon examines the biblical pictures: of creation involving ongoing conflict
between God and other powers; and, of creation taking a toll upon the artisan. This leads
McClendon to pose the question: Does God suffer in God’s creative actions? In
formulating a response, he considers three resources – contemporary science; Romans 8;
and, an examination of the relationship between “chaos” and God. He avers: (1) that
contemporary science describes the elements of nature as being not predetermined and
contained but interactive; (2) that, according to Paul in Romans 8, not only is suffering
part of creation itself, but suffering is also the way to a glorious future for creation and
believers – and God cooperates with believers in the process of moving from suffering to
glory; and, (3) that “chaos” in Scripture is symbolic of God’s creative struggle to shape
creation into a work of divine art. Furthermore, McClendon’s assessment of these three
resources leads him to conclude: that, since God relationally interacts with the world in
God’s creative activity, not only the world but also God changes; and, that God suffers
throughout these changes, both “artistically,” as God seeks to mold recalcitrant human
beings, and in terms of God surrendering some of God’s own independence, as God
sacrificially releases some of God’s existence to dependent creatures.
In addition to attempting to demonstrate how the divine activity within creation
occurs through the rule of God, McClendon, secondly, endeavors to set forth the identity
of God as one who sacrificially gives of God’s self. Towards this end, McClendon
develops several doctrines that inform this identity either directly or indirectly, including
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doctrines of: the atonement; the person of Christ; the Holy Spirit and the church’s
mission; and, God’s trinitarian identity.
With his doctrine of the atonement, McClendon begins by considering three
major strands of atonement theory that have been set forth within the Christian tradition,
strands which he terms the evilward, the Godward, and the manward. Yet, he argues that
each strand contains significant flaws. For instance, the evilward (ransom or victory)
strand interprets the cross as Christ’s defeat of the devil but does so in a way that allows
for a militaristic type of Christianity. Similarly, the Godward (satisfaction or penal)
strand understands the death of Christ as an effort to satisfy God’s honor or justice but
does so in a manner that permits the will of God and the will of Jesus to be at odds with
one another. Also, the manward (moral influence or vicarious sacrifice) strand interprets
Christ’s work as an example of how to show sympathetic love for others but does so in a
way that portrays Christ’s death as incidental. With these three strands (and their
limitations) in view, McClendon moves to biblical pictures, such as the suffering servant,
that the New Testament writers use to establish metaphors, like substitution, to render the
meaning of the cross. However, he avers that none of these scriptural metaphors align
well with the above three strands of the Christian tradition. Therefore, he turns to the
story of the gospel itself, and he maintains that this narrative demonstrates that the main
reason for the cross (verified by the resurrection) was to more fully establish God’s rule
(or kingdom) through non-violent means. Then, he restates his understanding of the
purpose of the cross through the three major strands of atonement theory, treating them in
this case as midrashim (or as narrative commentaries). Thus, with the evilward strand, he
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argues that Jesus’ death still defeats the devil but in a way that lends itself to a nonviolent rather than to a militaristic Christianity; with the Godward strand, the cross is no
longer at odds with – but is exactly what God would do; and, with the manward strand,
Jesus’ full faithfulness in his death is not incidental to but that which enables the love
that Christ’s disciples show to others. In addition, McClendon’s doctrine of the
atonement further illuminates his conception of God, as through his development of this
doctrine he not only reiterates that God is a God who endeavors to establish God’s rule,
but he also stresses that Jesus of Nazareth and God were of the same purpose in suffering
self-sacrificially for others.
Next, with the development of his doctrine of the person of Christ, McClendon
examines three major Christological models that have been developed within the
Christian tradition (the Logos model, the two-natures model, and the historical model);
however, finding shortcomings with each of these models (either because they do not
adequately allow for the full divinity of Christ or because they are vague regarding from
whom Jesus acquired his humanity), he sets forth his own “two-narrative Christology,”
first by considering the Jesus story proper and then by turning to the entire biblical
narrative. With the Jesus story proper, he begins by arguing that the “self-emptying”
described in Philippians 2 refers to a certain emptying of Jesus’ soul that occurred, not
before, but after Jesus was born. Thus, he maintains that this “self-emptying” points to
Jesus’ ongoing persistence in rejecting the pursuit of worldly fame in favor of the pursuit
of identifying with those on the margins of society, a choice that eventually led to his
death. In taking this latter path, McClendon further avers, Jesus was completely faithful,
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during his life and death, in following God’s way of the servant – thereby exhibiting a
degree of faithfulness not attained by any other human being. And, due to this complete
faithfulness (which, according to McClendon’s interpretation of Scripture, was not
accidental but intended by God from before the beginning of the world), in the act of
Jesus’ resurrection, God re-identified Jesus with God’s own life. Then, in turning from
the Jesus story proper to the entire biblical narrative, McClendon further develops his
two-narrative Christology by arguing that the scriptural story is not one story but two; it
is simultaneously both the story of God reaching down to humans and the story of people
reaching up to God. Throughout most of the biblical narrative these two stories fail to
completely meet each other, but with Jesus of Nazareth they fully converge, bringing
together God and humans in the person of Jesus Christ. In addition, McClendon holds
that because of the event of Pentecost, this same Christ is present to his disciples today –
in a firsthand, reciprocal fashion – through the church practices of worship, (kingdom)
work, witness, and (the reading of) the word of Scripture. Thus, McClendon’s
Christology provides a more complete understanding of his notion of God. For example,
his Christology conveys that, through Jesus, God accomplished God’s own intention to
completely meet the humanity that had been seeking to fully encounter God.
Furthermore, his Christology expresses the view that because Jesus was re-identified with
God’s own life, it follows that, in Christ, through the Spirit, God endeavors to be present
with people today in a firsthand, reciprocal manner.
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Then, with his interwoven construction of doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the
church’s mission, McClendon argues that the Holy Spirit, or “God the Spirit,”303
determines the mission of the church, where one conceives of the church as the entire
Christian community as it gathers in local assemblies. This mission is for the church to
work towards forming one people (from among all peoples) that is redeemed and
reconciled to God. The Spirit guides the church in carrying out this mission both by
“opening” and “closing” various doors of opportunity that may or may not coincide with
human intent and (in view of the hermeneutical principle of “this is that” and “then is
now”) by continuing to make available to Christ’s disciples today the power of Pentecost.
In addition, relying upon the thought of both Karl Barth and Jonathan Edwards,
McClendon considers the Spirit’s mission for the church from the vantage point of God’s
basic purpose, which he maintains is to manifest God’s glory – a glory that emanates to
people, helping them to become godlike, as they freely respond to the gift of God’s glory
by loving God and loving others. From this vantage point, it follows that the Spirit’s
mission for the church, as McClendon holds Paul corroborates through his use of
koinōnia in 2 Corinthians, is for Christ’s disciples to help others experience the gift of the
Spirit, so that they can also have a unity with God and with one another in God.
Moreover, in an effort to unfold the nature of this unity, McClendon turns to the
philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov and avers that, similar to the unity accomplished in
sexual love, the unity disciples can have with God and with one another in God may be
described as “syzygy” – a full unity, without cancellation of the individual, accomplished
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through sacrificial self-giving and made possible only by the power of the Spirit.
Therefore, McClendon’s doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the church’s mission also allow
for a more full comprehension of his doctrine of God. Especially as he identifies the
Holy Spirit as “God’s Holy Spirit,”304 he conveys that, at least to some degree, what can
be said of the Spirit can be said of God.
Furthermore, with his treatment of how God’s identity can be known through the
narrative of Scripture, McClendon begins by considering the way in which the Bible
describes God according to two separate arrangements: three spheres of force (anastatic,
corporate, and organic) and trinitarian categories. First, with the three spheres of force,
McClendon maintains that Scripture shows God as: (1) the God of forward-looking
change (with the anastatic sphere), in a sense so strong that, even in a world without sin,
God would still be the adventurous God of transformation; (2) the God of constant
companionship (with the corporate sphere), who remains alongside of us; and, (3) the
God of an ongoing, creative, powerful presence (with the organic sphere). Second, he
examines the manner in which the Bible portrays God by means of the trinitarian
categories, “God in Christ,” “God as Holy Spirit,” and “God as Father.” With “God in
Christ,” McClendon argues that “logos” in the Prologue of John’s Gospel should be
understood – not as a pre-existent, personal “Christ” but – as a pre-existent, non-personal
“speaking of God,” an interpretation that aligns well with several of his other views,
including the perspective that Scripture does not indicate that divinity was imparted to
Jesus at his birth. Next, with “God as Holy Spirit,” he holds that the New Testament sets

304

Doctrine, 418.

292
forth the Spirit – not as a separate divine person – but as God’s dynamic power, a power
that assisted Jesus of Nazareth during his time on earth and a power that enables disciples
(past and present) to connect with the risen Christ. Then, with “God as Father,” he avers
that the Bible portrays Yahweh as a father who adopts (or befriends) and liberates his
people – perfectly and fully so, he suggests, as “Father” to Jesus of Nazareth. This
interpretation of “God as Father,” therefore, would appear to support the view that
McClendon constructs a Christology that contains at least an element of adoptionism –
although, perhaps, of an eternally intentional (and not a capricious) variety. In addition,
McClendon suggests that, when the Christian tradition has gotten away from scriptural
identifications of God, erroneous doctrines about God’s identity have emerged –
doctrines that (in his view) convey such flawed perspectives as: Jesus of Nazareth as the
incarnation of a pre-existent, personal Christ; the Holy Spirit as a separate divine person
within a Trinity of three distinct persons; and, God the Father as a biological Father.
Accordingly, to avoid what he regards as misunderstandings, McClendon calls for a
“narrative-based trinitarianism,”305 by which he means a trinitarian expression of the
doctrine of God that is based upon the narrative of the Bible. A narrative-based
trinitarianism, he argues, would allow for, among other benefits, an emphasis on the
wholeness of God – who at the same time is a God of adventurous transformation,
constant companionship, and powerful presence.
Therefore, through his construction of several doctrines, all of which contribute to
an overarching doctrine of God, McClendon shows that he relies upon his theological
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method, a method that I have sometimes referred to as convictional perspectivism. Many
examples of the manner in which he builds upon this method have been demonstrated
above; however, I will summarize here some of the main components. McClendon
endeavors, for instance, to develop several of his doctrines by setting forth communal (or
narrative?) conviction sets (or picture sets) that have primarily been based upon the
narrative of Scripture (either directly or indirectly), all from the perspective of a baptist
community. This endeavor is evident with his initial levels of doctrinal development, as,
for example, in order to begin to construct his doctrine of eschatology, he looks to New
Testament “end-pictures” of the last judgement and of Jesus Christ returning. Moreover,
this endeavor is apparent with his more final levels of doctrinal development, as, for
instance, in order to consolidate the construction of his narrative Christological model, he
assembles a conviction set that includes all of the following conviction-based subdoctrines (each of which, he would argue, has been biblically informed): the non-divinity
imparting birth of Jesus; Jesus’ post-birth self-emptying to follow God’s way of service;
Jesus’ gradual (and eventually full) achievement of the image of God; and, God’s
resurrection re-identification of Jesus with God’s own life. In addition, McClendon seeks
to form communal conviction sets on the basis of various loci of justification; although,
he appears to primarily rely upon the locus of coherence. This is evident with his
construction of the above narrative Christological model and also with his development
of a doctrine of God in view of the trinitarian category of “God in Christ.” In this latter
case, he avers that a non-personal pre-existent logos as “the speaking of God” coheres
well not only with the just mentioned Christological sub-doctrines but also with the
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trinitarian notions of Spirit, as a non-personal dynamic power, and of Father, as one who
adopts and liberates his people. Through efforts such as these, McClendon implies that
he has prepared for dialogue between his baptist community and other convictional
communities, where at least the locus of coherence (if not other formation-justification
loci as well) might be shared between them on an “ad hoc” basis.
Furthermore, with his theological method, McClendon seeks to construct all of
his doctrines (that, in turn, inform his doctrine of God) by rooting them in one or more of
the following sources: narrative (both the narrative of Scripture and the narrative of
tradition); experience; and, the church. Instances in which the development of his
doctrines draw upon the narrative of Scripture would be too many to list. In fact, he
appears to build everyone of his major doctrines primarily upon the biblical narrative.
He also relies fairly extensively upon the narrative of the Christian tradition. For
example, he turns to Karl Barth’s and Jonathan Edwards’s understandings of the basic
purpose of God, as part of his development of his pneumatology. However, much of
McClendon’s dependence upon the narrative of tradition is not as a foundational source,
in a strong sense, but more as a secondary source of confirmation for what the narrative
of Scripture already appears to show. This is evident, for instance, through his argument
that the atonement theories from the Christian tradition should be treated as “midrashim”
or as commentaries on the biblical story. As far as the source of experience, by which
McClendon means religious experience, this seems to be a source that he uses quite
sparingly. Yet, Hans Hut’s apparent experience of suffering (as something that can occur
simply as part of existence itself), upon which McClendon draws for his doctrine of
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creation, may be one such instance. Moreover, with regard to the source of the church,
by which McClendon means especially the practices of the local church, this does seem
to be a source that he turns to with at least some frequency. For example, with his
doctrine of salvation, he looks to the church practices of instruction, baptism, the Lord’s
supper, and communal discernment – as marks of the various stages of the process of
salvation; and, with his doctrine of the person of Christ, he considers the church practices
of worship, (kingdom) work, witness, and (the reading of) the word of Scripture – as
means through which the Spirit provides access to the present Christ.
In addition, McClendon seeks to develop his doctrines in view of a baptist
hermeneutical principle of “this is that” and “then is now.” This admittedly mystical
endeavor is apparent, for instance: with his eschatology, as he argues that the Jesus Christ
who will be king in judgment is the same Jesus Christ as the first century Jesus of
Nazareth and the same Jesus Christ who reigns now; and, with his pneumatology, as he
maintains that Pentecost is here today, just as it was two millennia ago, so that even now,
as in the first century, the Holy Spirit occupies and equips each disciple for the task of
carrying out his or her mission.
With this examination of McClendon’s doctrine of God and of how his
construction of this doctrine stems from his theological method, I will now, in chapter 5,
strive to set forth a more extensive evaluation of certain key aspects of the way in which
Farley’s and McClendon’s doctrine of God have been shaped by their respective
theological methods. I will also analyze the persuasiveness of these doctrines of God.
That is, I will seek to address such questions as: “Given Farley’s and McClendon’s
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different theological methods, to what extent do they contribute to (or yield) compelling
doctrines of God?”
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
By way of introduction to the evaluation and comparison that I will offer of
Farley’s and McClendon’s theological methods and doctrines of God in this chapter, I
will set forth, in rather broad brush strokes, a few general observations on their respective
projects. One observation is that they each display what might be described as both
conservative and progressive tendencies. For instance, a conservative leaning in Farley’s
project comes forth through his staunch rejection of the multiple symbolic universes of
postmodernism (in favor, implicitly, of holding onto the one real universe of modernity),1
while a progressive tendency appears in his rejection of Scripture-as-sacred (in favor of
turning primarily to faith realities themselves and, secondarily, to Scripture-as-a-field-ofevidence).2 In addition, a conservative tendency in McClendon’s project manifests itself
through his view of the Bible – as that through which God speaks “today” (in resistance
to a view of the Bible as something less than God’s word), while a progressive leaning
emerges through his postmodern allowance that there can be multiple and equally
legitimate loci of justification for beliefs (in resistance, implicitly, to the modern notion

1

Farley’s overall rejection of postmodernism is perhaps most clearly articulated in
Deep Symbols, 8-12, 61-65.
2

More specifically, Farley suggests that he has sought to displace the notion of
Scripture as an “authority” with the notion of Scripture as a non-authoritative “field of
evidence,” as set forth in ER, 179.
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that there can be only one primary locus of justification for beliefs, the locus of
correspondence).
A second observation, which to some extent overlaps a portion of the first, is that
Farley (with his general methodological and theological posture of “the way to God”)
and McClendon (with his general methodological and theological posture of “God’s way
to us”) both seem quite earnest in their efforts to help steer their readers towards an
authentic encounter with God, at least as far as they hold that God can be known. For
Farley, this effort is particularly evident: through his implicit call for “theology” to return
to its original practice of pursuing knowledge of God rather than continuing on the more
recent path set for it (starting in the eighteenth century) of pursuing knowledge merely of
faith’s doctrines;3 and, through his call to desist from conceiving of Scripture as sacred,
since, in his view, the “Scripture-as-sacred” perspective causes people to erroneously
“stop” at a supposedly all-authoritative Bible rather than looking “past” what is, in
actuality (in his view), a non-authoritative document that potentially stands as an obstacle
to the present realities of the faith, which ultimately appresent God or, as he more often
argues, the character of God. Moreover, for McClendon, this effort to help his readers
have a genuine encounter with God is especially apparent by means of his call to
approach Scripture as authoritative, since in his view, God would speak to people
through the Bible, as “the hound . . . [seeks] the hare,”4 in order to establish an indwelling
relation with them.

3

Theologia, 31-81 passim.
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Doctrine, 462.
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These observations show in part, I would argue, that an assessment and
comparison of Farley’s and McClendon’s projects (as initially addressed in the previous
four chapters) should seek to avoid facile caricatures in which the views of either figure
are portrayed as either “simply conservative” or “simply progressive” or as either
“simply against encountering God” or “simply for encountering God.” In actuality, both
Farley and McClendon set forth complex (in some ways conservative, in some ways
progressive) methodological and theological developments that ultimately have as their
purpose assisting others to authentically encounter God, at least as far as they maintain
that God can be known.
Accordingly, in the following sections, I will endeavor to evaluate Farley’s and
McClendon’s methodological and theological constructions in a manner that does not
blunt the complexities of their positions and that acknowledges the overall positive intent
of both of their efforts. First, in dialogue with other critical perspectives on his work, I
will assess Farley’s theological method and doctrine of God, giving particular attention to
the impact his method has had on this doctrine. Next, in similar dialogue with other
critical voices, I will separately assess McClendon’s theological method and doctrine of
God, providing like attention to the impact his method has had on this doctrine. Then, in
view of these assessments, I will directly compare Farley’s and McClendon’s projects to
each other.
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A Critical Assessment of Edward Farley’s Theological Method and Doctrine of God
In this section, I will assess Farley’s project in three parts. First, I will examine
his argument regarding “the house of authority” and his call for its destruction; second, I
will evaluate some of the central features of the theological method he advances, which
he refers to as “ecclesial reflection;” third, I will consider his development of a doctrine
of God, with a special focus on how it has been shaped by his theological method.

An Evaluation of Farley’s Critique of “The House of Authority”
Within Farley’s description and critique of “the house of authority,” while he also
addresses the loci of dogma and the institutional church as well as the founding axiom of
the principle of identity, the more substantial issues seem to be his treatment of the locus
of sacred Scripture and of the founding axiom of salvation history; therefore, I will
consider each of these latter issues in turn.
An evaluation of Farley’s critique of sacred Scripture. With his concept of the
locus of sacred Scripture, Farley argues that, by the second century, the early Christian
church, because of internal threats “created by a plurality of traditions,”5 made the
choice, after considering its options, to start treating Scripture no longer as a mere record
of events – but as an inspired, sacred and authoritative collection of documents.
Moreover, he holds that the fact that the church had a choice in this matter shows that the
this collection of documents cannot be sacred and, therefore, that one should not consider
the Bible to be authoritative for the church or for developing Christian doctrine. If Farley
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is correct in this assessment, then, as Geoffrey Wainwright notes, “just about all classical
Christian theology . . . would prove to have been grossly mistaken, certainly from the
viewpoint of method and in all probability from the viewpoint of substance also;”6 and,
as David Pellauer remarks, “Christian thinkers . . . [would] have simply been wrong for
centuries now.”7 In other words, in calling for the abolishment of Scripture-as-sacred,
Farley makes no small claim; he would overturn almost two thousand years of tradition.
In response, one could endeavor to argue against this call for abolishment by
considering both intra-biblical and extra-biblical evidence. In terms of an intra-biblical
pursuit, one could (1A) consider some of the claims that Scripture makes about itself –
claims such as: “all scripture is inspired by God;”8 and, “the word of God is living and
active”9 – and (1B) attempt to show how such verses demonstrate that Scripture is sacred
(or, perhaps, “God-breathed”) and, therefore, authoritative. However, even if a clear
connection between (1A) and (1B) could be demonstrated, a counter-argument to such an
endeavor could be made that (1') considering what Scripture claims about itself is self-
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Geoffrey Wainwright, review of Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of
Theological Method, by Edward Farley, and of A Church to Believe In: Discipleship and
the Dynamics of Freedom, by Avery Dulles, in Theology Today 40 (July 1983): 200.
7

David Pellauer, review of Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological
Method, by Edward Farley, and of Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of
Theological Education, by Edward Farley, in Religious Studies Review 10 (July 1984):
247.
8

2 Tim. 3:16 NRSV (New Revised Standard Version). However, a more literal
translation of “θεόπνευστος” in this verse might be rendered as “God-breathed” (rather
than as “inspired by God”).
9

Heb. 4:12 NRSV.
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referential and, therefore, cannot be considered as legitimate evidence. To this counterargument, a response could be made: that (2) assuming the legitimacy of some coherence
theories of truth, the various truth claims within the overall narrative of Scripture appear
to cohere well with each other; thus, the Bible’s self-referential claims have merit; or,
that (3) assuming the legitimacy of some pragmatic theories of truth, the various truth
claims within the overall narrative of Scripture seem to lead to behavior (among Christ’s
disciples) that is generally in keeping with this narrative; thus, the Bible’s self-referential
claims have merit.
Furthermore, with regard to an extra-biblical pursuit, one could (4) attempt to call
into question Farley’s underlying assumption that the fact that the early church had a
choice in the matter as to whether or not Scripture should be considered inspired or
sacred necessarily leads to the conclusion that the Bible cannot be sacred. It seems that
drawing so strong a conclusion would likely involve infusing concepts such as “inspired”
or “sacred” with a notion of something akin to “that which cannot be resisted.” That is,
Farley suggests that if God had inspired Scripture or if God had somehow caused
Scripture to be sacred, God could not also have given humans enough freewill to resist
viewing the Bible as inspired or sacred. In other words, as William Thompson observes,
Farley seems to set forth “an either/or alternative. Either one accepts the house of
authority . . . [including the notion that Scripture is sacred], . . . or one accepts human
freedom and historicity and thus ‘demotes’ the traditional vehicles.”10 In response,
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William Thompson, review of Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological
Method, by Edward Farley, and of The Continuity of Christian Doctrine, by R. P. C.
Hanson, in Horizons 9 (Fall 1982): 377.
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Thompson maintains that “some theologians deny this alternative,”11 and he implies that
it is possible that God could have set about actions that caused the Bible to be sacred,
while at the same time granting humans enough freedom to resist accepting the Bible as
such.12
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation for me to offer an exhaustive response
to Farley’s view that Scripture should not be approached as sacred or authoritative, but
were I to offer such a response, it would be along the lines of (1) - (4) above. In any
case, much hinges, it seems, on whether Farley appropriately rejects the notion of
Scripture-as-sacred. If he is correct, then, as Wainwright and Pellauer have suggested,
certainly the method and likely also the content of much of Christian theology through
the centuries has been misguided. However, it should be remembered that in seeking to
abolish Scripture-as-sacred as part of the larger removal of “the house of authority,”
Farley’s intention is to remove an obstacle to authentic encounter with God, at least as far
as he holds that God can be known. In addition, it seems intuitive that Farley’s rejection
of Scripture-as-sacred would probably be well received by much of contemporary
culture, for whom belief in the concept of a divinely inspired, authoritative text would, at
least at first glance, appear about as rational as belief in a Santa Claus who actually lives
at the North Pole. Accordingly, I am sympathetic with assessments, such as David
Jaeger’s, that one of the strengths of Farley’s project is “his formidable effort to maintain
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dialogue between theology and the . . . [current] Western intellectual climate.”13 This
does not mean that I agree with Farley’s rejection of Scripture-as-sacred, but I
acknowledge that arguing for the authority of the Bible in the current culture is, at a
minimum, an uphill battle.
An evaluation of Farley’s critique of salvation history. Another significant matter
within Farley’s description and critique of “the house of authority,” is his treatment of
what he refers to as the founding axiom of salvation history. With this concept, he holds
that the church has traditionally used royal imagery to describe God’s relation to creation
in a manner that depicts God triumphing over all evil, at least eventually at the end of
time. In addition, he avers that the church has presented this triumph as being so forceful
that human freedom, in any substantive sense, has been completely suppressed.14 Thus,
Farley argues that one should consider the salvation history framework to be discredited.
Several scholars have appreciated certain aspects of Farley’s argument along these lines.
For instance, James Buckley suggests that Farley appropriately seeks to replace “the
monarchical God of classic theism . . . [with a God] who acts in history in ways that . . .
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David Jaeger, review of Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological
Method, by Edward Farley, in Theologische Zeitschrift 43 (1987): 389.
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Farley primarily addresses the concept of salvation history in terms of the issue
of God’s sovereignty. However, there are a variety of other issues that have surfaced in
recent discussions about salvation history, issues such as “whether the use of salvation
history has been crippled by a distorted or myopic christocentric interpretation of
history,” as set forth in Bradford Hinze, “The End of Salvation History,” Horizons 18
(1991): 238. Hinze identifies this and several other issues directly related to salvation
history in ibid., 227-45.
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[protect or preserve] human subjectivity in nature and history.”15 Moreover, Wendy
Farley contends that “her father’s outright rejection of sovereignty models and
monarchical imagery . . . [has been] his most valuable legacy.”16 I agree that the
salvation history model, as traditionally conceived in Christian theology, can and has
been abused in a way that portrays human freedom as much too limited, and I would
argue that this, in turn, has often been used by those with ecclesially-endorsed power to
suppress marginalized people groups. Yet, it seems that this is again an instance of
Farley unnecessarily presenting a stark “either/or” alternative – with the only options
being, in this case, that either one accepts the notion of salvation history or one accepts
human freedom.17 I would maintain that the salvation history framework could be
modified (in a direction away from a highly deterministic sense), so that this framework
and human freedom need not be mutually exclusive. However, Farley will not entertain
such potential compromises; rather, he “admonishes that a theologian can live inside or
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outside the house of authority, but not both. To quit the house is to leave behind the
foundational materials on which it was built.”18

An Evaluation of Farley’s Method of Ecclesial Reflection
Having rejected “the house of authority” as a viable resource for constructing
Christian doctrine, Farley sets forth his own method of ecclesial reflection, through
which he calls for a turn directly to the realities of faith themselves as they can be found
in the faith community. This process, he argues, requires the use of theological
portraiture or theological eidetics, a core feature of which is the phenomenological tool of
appresentation. Below, therefore, I will evaluate both Farley’s notion of turning to the
realities of faith themselves and his understanding of theological appresentation.
To the realities themselves. One of the key principles of Farley’s theological
method is to turn to the realities of faith – not through Scripture-as-sacred, dogma, and
the institutional church – but as they may be directly ascertained in the faith community.
In order to illustrate this principle, he considers a person who might desire knowledge of
a city. Generally speaking, this person has two choices. She can obtain a map from a
cartographer and seek to gain knowledge of the city simply by studying the map, or she
can go to the city herself and, as a city-dweller, seek to gain knowledge of the city
through her own direct experiences and perceptions.19 Farley argues against the first
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choice, since it is difficult to know if the cartographer has provided an accurate map –
and, even if an accurate map has been made available, it can only provide, at best, a
superficial knowledge of the city. Thus, he maintains, the second choice – the one of
direct contact as a city-dweller – should be taken because it is more reliable and because
it yields more substantive results. In light of this argument, one would expect that the
development of Farley’s theological method would point toward unmediated realities.
Indeed, he argues at one point that with the apprehension of a reality, “the object is given
immediately.”20
However, as Gordon Kaufman observes, when Farley “turns to the actual
execution of his program, we find him analyzing images and stories and concepts
throughout, all of them taken as mediating the realities of faith.”21 Kaufman continues:
“It is clear that what he is doing here is interpreting symbols, not simply reading off some
phenomenological ‘givens’ in their bare givenness. Where the ‘givens’ are words and
images there is no bare givenness at all.”22 Kaufman’s criticism along these lines seems
to have merit.23 For instance, Farley elsewhere maintains that one must “dig beneath” the

vol. 2, Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen (The Hague, The Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 66-67, as shown in EM, 53.
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“second moment” of the (conscious, institutional) Genesis myth, in order to get to the
“first moment” of the (pre-conscious, pre-institutional) story and images behind the
Genesis myth,24 in order to get to the (still deeper) reality that “the ‘world’ is the setting
of the story of Yahweh and his people.”25 Moreover, when he applies his method
towards an investigation of the meaning of “the event of Jesus Christ,”26 he holds that this
meaning “turns on the use . . . of historical method toward the materials of the New
Testament collection, which materials provide the only access we have to the event and
figure of Jesus.”27
What should be made about this apparent contradiction in Farley’s project
between his claim that the realities of faith can be directly experienced in an unmediated
manner and his practice of seeking these realities through narratives and symbols? I
would argue not only that, through this practice, Farley is tacitly acknowledging that at
least some of the realities of faith are mediated through stories and images, but also that,
through this apparent contradiction (between claim and practice), he is pointing to a
tension in a shift in authority (or in power) that he hopes to make in the dynamics among:

judgment, one wonders if there might be a softening of the phenomenologist’s claims for
privileged access to theological realities,” as set fort in Mark Kline Taylor, “Truth and a
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(A) “the contemporary ecclesial community;” (B1) “the narratives and symbols of the
Bible and the Christian tradition;” (B2) “the actions and structures of the institutional
church;” (C) “the realities of faith;” and, (D) “contemporary doctrines.”
All of these entities, (A) - (D), are present (to one degree or another) both in the
“old house” of authority against which he argues and in the “new house” of authority for
which he argues; yet, Farley clearly suggests that the two houses have structured – and
have placed authority among – these same entities in substantially different ways. With
the “old house” (to which he refers as “the house of authority”), most of the power has
been placed with (B1) and (B2). And, in this “old house,” (B1) - (B2) “tells” (A), “the
contemporary ecclesial community,” through “atomistic” truth claims,28 what (C), “the
realities of faith,” are, and these become the basis for (D), “contemporary doctrines,” that
(A) constructs. However, with the “new house,” the house that Farley champions with
his theological method of ecclesial reflection, most of the power has been placed with
(A), “the contemporary ecclesial community.” And, in this “new house,” (A), “the
contemporary ecclesial community” (or its representative theologian), “discovers” (or
“uncovers”) (C), “the realities of faith,” either in an unmediated manner, through direct
contact with creation, the world, or nature;29 or, in a linguistically mediated manner,
through (B1), “the narratives and symbols of the Bible and the Christian tradition;” or, in
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an other-than-linguistically mediated manner,30 through (B2), “the actions and structures
of the institutional church.” Thus, (C), “the realities of faith,” gleaned from one or more
of these three sources become the basis for (D), “contemporary doctrines,” that (A), “the
contemporary ecclesial community,” constructs. Moreover, since, with the “old house”
perspective, (A) submits to the authority of (B1) - (B2), in order for (B1) - (B2) to “tell”
(A) what (C), “the realities of faith,” are, it follows that (B1) and (B2) remain essentially
unchangeable. But, because, with the “new house” perspective, (A) looks to (B1) - (B2)
– as well as to creation, the world, or nature – as resources in which (C), “the realities of
faith,” can be “discovered,” it follows that (B1) and (B2) can be altered, for if (A) comes
to uncover an insight into (C) in creation,31 then it may fix or revise the “ancient codes . .
. [of (B1) - (B2)].”32
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Therefore, the apparent contradiction between Farley’s claim that the realities of
faith can be directly experienced in an unmediated way and his practice of seeking these
realities through narratives and symbols becomes, upon further reflection, both less
tangled and more understandable. It becomes less tangled, because (even though some of
his claims for unmediated experience are so strong that they can easily lead to the kind of
consternation Kaufman experiences with the apparent inconsistency of Farley’s position)
Farley eventually makes clear, as he develops his project, that he allows for both
unmediated and mediated experiences of faith realities. Moreover, the seeming
contradiction becomes more understandable, since, if he places too much emphasis on
seeking the realities of faith through narratives and symbols, he risks his “new house”
emphasis – of narratives and symbols existing as (somewhat significant, though not
authoritative) resources through which the contemporary faith community can “discover”
the realities of faith – being misperceived as an “old house” emphasis – of narratives and
symbols existing as authoritative documents that “tell” the contemporary faith
community about the realities of faith.
However, while this apparent contradiction has perhaps become less tangled and
more understandable, other difficulties, I would maintain, have emerged, particularly
with regard to his understanding of the “old” and “new” houses of authority. First,

of faith-at-hand,” such as direct experiences of redemption; then, (C1), “the realities of
faith-at-hand” can (indirectly show or) appresent (C2), “the realities of faith-not-athand,” such as the character of God; and, the divine ciphers come into play in that they
can describe some of these realities of faith-not-at-hand – and, in so doing, they can
contribute to a doctrine of God, one of the doctrines that forms a central part of (D),
“contemporary doctrines.”
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Farley’s depiction of the “old house” seems to be of a residence in which few, if any,
would actually claim to dwell. Along these lines, I find persuasive Avery Dulles’s
assessment that Farley’s “abolishment” of the “old house” “reads like a caricature built
out of the worst tendencies of a now discredited theology.”33 What contemporary
theologian would agree that she has come to regard the Bible “not . . . as narrative . . . but
as an atomistic compilation of truths?”34 Or, what theologian would agree that, at least in
worship, Scripture does not point beyond itself to God, at least as far as God may be
known?
Second, it appears that Farley has yet again unnecessarily set forth a fairly rigid
“either/or” alternative – with the two options being here that either one accepts all of the
structure of the “old house” or all of the structure of the “new house.” This alternative
would rule out the possibility that one could simultaneously accept much of what
historical criticism has shown about the Bible and still approach the Bible as
authoritative, a possibility that does not seem too far-fetched.
Third, as part of his understanding of the “new house” of authority, Farley
maintains that the faith community can discover at least some of the realities of faith
either in a completely unmediated manner, holding that an “object . . . [can be] given
immediately,”35 or in an other-than-linguistically mediated manner, holding that the
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“historical faith has vehicles of availability other than its own language, namely, its cultic
acts, institutional structures, and the like.”36 However, it seems that “cultic acts,
institutional structures” – or any other reality – would have no sense or meaning at all to
us without language. Therefore, I would argue against Farley, in this instance, that
language is inescapably the way in which the historical faith and all faith realities are
available to us.
Fourth, with his notion of (what I have termed) the “new house” of authority,
Farley calls for a substantial shift in the placement of authority (or power) – from where
it had been located, with the “old house,” in Scripture-as-sacred, dogma, and the
institutional church – to a new location, with the “new house,” in the contemporary
ecclesial community. And, a potential difficulty with this shift, as David Pellauer notes,
is what might happen if the faith community “miscarries and does so badly,”37 as it seeks
to uncover, through theological portraiture or theological eidetics, the realities of faith?
Moreover, if one places authority primarily with the current ecclesial community, what
forces are in place to ensure that the theology generated by this community remains
distinctly Christian, even if this community “is perceived or experienced as redemptive,
and even if it endures?”38 Pellauer argues that it is questions such as these “that keep the
. . . [old] house of authority standing – or . . . [that] at least . . . give many a convenient
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excuse not to leave the old, familiar home.”39 Farley might respond: that the faith
community, as well as Christianity itself, is not static but is in an ongoing process of
development; and, that with his principle of positivity he has been at methodological
pains to try to ensure the uniqueness of the Christian faith community. However, without
a narrative or an institution as a guide, it seems that the placement of authority primarily
with the contemporary ecclesial community ultimately gives this community license to
develop theology in any direction in which it so desires, with no mechanism to correct its
course should it veer away from that which has so far kept Christianity unique among
various worldviews.
Appresentation of “realities not at hand.” In addition to his call to turn to the
realities of faith themselves, another key principle of Farley’s theological method is his
appropriation of Husserl’s concept of appresentation, through which Farley maintains
that “realities at hand” (such as “the reality at hand” that ecclesia seeks to abolish ethnic
and social boundaries) can appresent various “realities not at hand” (such as the historical
redeemer who initiated the removal of ethnic and social boundaries – and, ultimately, the
transcendent as God). Robert R. Williams views this notion of appresentation as a major
strength of Farley’s methodological project, since, from Williams’s perspective, it
permits Farley to “prevent a Feuerbachian reduction of theology to anthropology and a
reduction of the transcendent to human autonomy.”40 Yet, Williams implies that this
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aspect of Farley’s method eventually permits only silence when it comes to the
transcendent, since “appresentation cannot bridge the gulf between finite and infinite.”41
However, Williams further suggests that this appears to be unproblematic for Farley,
since, with his doctrine of God, Farley will argue that “the proper position is that God is
beyond affirmation and negation.”42 While I agree that Farley’s doctrine coheres with his
method in this regard, I cannot help but wonder, if one’s God is beyond affirmation and
negation, can that God be a God that is worthy of worship?

An Evaluation of the Development of Farley’s Doctrine of God
As part of his doctrine of God, Farley considers many relevant matters such as:
how God can be known; how one can speak of God; and, the world in which God works.
However, the heart of his doctrine of God has to do with the interconnectedness he finds
among ecclesia (i.e., the Christian faith community), Jesus, and God. To restate this
central thrust in very general terms, he maintains, in keeping with his theological method,
that (1) ecclesia and its redemptive efforts to abolish ethnic and social boundaries is a
“reality at hand” that appresents (2) the “reality not at hand” of the historical Jesus, as
one who, with a radical trust in God, empathetically and publically suffered for all others,
which worked to launch a universal form of the faith of Israel, where ethnic and social
boundaries would be removed – who, in turn, appresents (3) the “reality not at hand” of
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God’s character being one of divine empathy in all of God’s creative and redemptive
works. Because they represent the core of his doctrine of God, I will evaluate each of
these three features below.
The “reality at hand” of ecclesia and its redemptive efforts. In approaching
“ecclesia” as that which appresents Jesus, who, in turn, appresents the character of God,
Farley means by “ecclesia” not the institutional church but something akin to Emil
Brunner’s sense of “the distinctive, corporate existence characterized by the presence of
Jesus Christ,”43 in other words, what might be described as the Christian faith
community, in general. Moreover, he maintains that theological eidetics, applied to the
depth ecclesia strata of this faith community, uncovers the unique manner in which nonecclesia participants are present to ecclesia participants – as those who are not required to
undergo ethnic conversion in order to participate in ecclesia. Therefore, as one
phenomenologically observes ecclesia, it becomes evident, according to Farley, that
ecclesia actively strives to abolish ethnic and social boundaries.
A struggle I have with this aspect of Farley’s theological project is that even a
casual observation of much of what might count as present day ecclesia would seem to
show a people working for just the opposite of abolishing ethnic and social boundaries.
Martin Luther King Jr.’s well-known statement about Sunday morning being the most

43

EM, 152. Here, Farley refers to Emil Brunner, The Misunderstanding of the
Church, trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Westminster Press, 1953), 6,
10-12.

317
segregated time in America appears no less applicable today than when he first made it.44
Accordingly, Gordon Kaufman seems to offer an appropriate criticism that Farley
presents not an actualized but an “idealized vision of ecclesia.”45 That is, while Farley
sets forth “an imaginative vision of what human reality might be and should be: it is
difficult to see how anyone could hold it to be simple and straightforward
phenomenological description of anything that now exists (except as an ideal).”46 This is
a significant potential weakness in Farley’s development of a doctrine of God, in my
view, because if his notion of “ecclesia” is closer to an ideal entity than to an actual one,
how can “ecclesia” be said to be a “reality at hand?” Moreover, especially with an
idealized ecclesia, it seems, apart from the “old house” of authority, that a “historical
redeemer” might be posited by – but would unlikely be a necessary given of – the fact
that there is a community that seeks to abolish ethnic and social boundaries. And, if the
“historical redeemer” is more likely posited than given, this would appear to be a tacit
acknowledgment of a strong idealism.
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The “reality not at hand” of the historical Jesus. Nevertheless, after setting forth
his notion of ecclesia, Farley offers a treatment of the historical Jesus that presents a very
compelling figure:47 one who lived a life of a radical, “innocent” trust in God; one who
sought to expand the faith of Israel across all ethnic boundaries; one who was unique in
his empathetic suffering for his people, being motivated, not by ethnic loyalty, but merely
by the fact that others suffered; one whose empathetic suffering was not only felt but also
publically expressed, resulting in his humiliating death; and, one whose exemplary life
gave “rise to a new community,”48 a community that was also committed to expanding
the faith of Israel across all ethnic boundaries by means of empathetic suffering for
others.
With such a view of Jesus, Farley clearly avoids presenting him as any sort of
“triumphalist monarch,”49 as might occur with a Christology carried out under the “old
house” of authority. To the contrary, according to Farley, as Gary Dorrien observes:
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Jesus was open to the divine empathy, which opened him empathetically to his
companions and acquaintances. His empathetic concern for others took on the
risk of being exploited and violated; it was apparently unrestricted, accepting
whatever came from caring for others. Thus he appeared to be ‘one with divine
empathy,’ which inspired the ideal of the divine-human union that defined the
Christian movement. The redemptive faith of Israel was ethnic and national. In
the name of Jesus, Christianity became a universal religion of the union of divine
and human empathy.50
Thus, as Robert Williams notes, Farley’s “Christology is in the liberal anthropological
tradition of Schleiermacher and Tillich.”51 However, Williams also maintains that
Farley’s Christology departs from this tradition in one particular regard: “[For Farley,] . .
. whatever way God is in Jesus is not an exception to the way God can be in other human
beings.”52 Thus, for Farley, the uniqueness of the event of Jesus (unique primarily in the
sense as that which prompted the emergence of the new faith community) appears more
accidental than intentional. While this limited and accidental uniqueness allows Farley to
successfully avoid such problems as an overly-monarchical (and, therefore, overlydeterministic) messiah, it comes at the price of not being able to acknowledge that the
event of the historical redeemer has anything to do with God’s initiative, which seems to
be a steep price when Farley also wants to claim that the empathy of God “would . . .
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[seek to] ease . . . [our] suffering and promote . . . [our] well-being.”53 In addition,
especially since his understanding of the event of Jesus involves a speculative dimension,
and since he perceives this event taking place as an accident of history, it appears to be a
bit of stretch to maintain, as Farley endeavors to do, that God or the character of God
could be a given of the fact that there was once a man who sought to abolish ethnic and
social boundaries by empathetically and publically suffering for others. And, if God or
the character of God is merely posited and not a given (of the fact of the historical Jesus),
this would seem to be a further implied acknowledgment of a strong idealism in Farley’s
theological project.54
The “reality not at hand” of God’s character of divine empathy. Finally, in close
connection to his understanding of the Jesus of history, Farley sets forth his specific
doctrine of God. He argues that since Jesus so completely trusted in God and that
because the effect of Jesus’ suffering for others was so profound that it prompted the start
of the new community of universal redemption, it follows that the character of God must
include a redemptive divine “empathy,” where empathy consists of “participative
suffering, self-impartation, perception of our experiencing, and compassion.”55 In
addition, Farley holds that because the cosmos demonstrates an empowerment of “world
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process in directions of synthesis, cooperation, and novelty,”56 and since these creative
tendencies are so similar to God’s redemptive tendencies, it must be the case that God’s
creative purposes are the same as God’s redemptive purposes. Thus, the key component
of God’s creative and redemptive actions – and, accordingly, the key component of
God’s character – is divine empathy.
Moreover, this description of God’s character harmonizes with the three
overarching ciphers that, Farley argues, “converge in the name of God: . . . [the ciphers
of] redeemer, creator, and the Holy.”57 The first two of these ciphers, redeemer and
creator, emerge in each of the three spheres of human reality (the individual, the
interhuman, and the social).58 Thus, for example, in terms of the first cipher of redeemer:
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as the faith community observes individual redemption – that is, as it observes the
process of being-founded59 – it senses, through appresentation, “the cipher of redemptive
founding;”60 as it detects communal redemption – such as the process of repentance and
forgiveness overcoming alienation among human relations – it perceives (or, better,
apperceives) the cipher of “Creativity as reconciling love;”61 and, as this community
notices social redemption – such as the process of corporate justice taking place – it
senses the cipher of (redemptive) divine justice.62 Moreover, after making similar
arguments with regard to the second cipher of creator,63 Farley holds that as ecclesia
observes instances of holiness taking place within “human experience,”64 it senses, again
through appresentation, the cipher of divine holiness, which functions, in part, “to display
the poverty of all ciphers,”65 including the limitations of the ciphers of redemption and
creativity.66 In addition, Farley avers that these limited divine ciphers (limited in that,
ultimately, they indirectly describe not God but merely certain aspects of God’s
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character) are appropriate, since they permit a mysterious (or reverent) distance between
the character of God (something that we can at least partially know) and God Godself
(something that we cannot know).
With this understanding of God, as one whose character centrally involves a
participative suffering or empathy with God’s creation, and as one who is substantially
“other” than – and not directly knowable by – creation, several potential strengths of
Farley’s doctrine of God seem evident. For instance, apart from a reliance upon the “old
house” of authority, he has endeavored to chart a course from a direct observance of the
Christian faith community (acting redemptively to overcome ethnic and social
boundaries) to an indirect observance of the Jesus of history (whose actions of
empathetic suffering on behalf of others led to the founding of this faith community) to
an indirect observance of the character of God (a character of participative suffering with
God’s creation). For those who share Farley’s antipathy for the “old house” of authority
(and it seems intuitive to me that, especially in the contemporary culture of the West,
there are multitudes who do share this antipathy), Farley has charted as compelling a
course for “the way to God” as could be constructed. Next, with his emphasis on God’s
character involving participative suffering with God’s creation, Farley has potentially
offered a significant corrective to theologies of God that portray God’s character as
impassible and triumphalist (which, in turn, can easily lead to all sorts of related
difficulties, particularly with regard to human freedom and the problem of evil). Also,
with his stress on the otherness of God (accomplished especially through his
development of the cipher of the Holy), Farley has sought to move his doctrine of God in
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a direction where God will be perceived not simply as a larger and more powerful
creature among other like smaller and less powerful creatures but as a unique and
unknowable Creator, separate from all creation. Wendy Farley maintains that this is
perhaps one of the most significant contributions of her father’s doctrine of God, for
“without negation, God becomes a being among beings, and, as too often happens, this
being functions to shore up the power of ‘his’ followers.”67
However, the very strengths of Farley’s doctrine of God also point to some of its
potential weaknesses. For example, through his stress on God’s character involving
participative suffering with God’s creation, Farley, as Robert R. Williams observes,
“does tend to underplay not only the divine enjoyment of creativity but . . . [also] the
comic dimension of redemption.”68 In fact, were it not for a few comments in some of his
footnotes about the presence of joy in the divine activity, such as, “if God is not a sheer
indifference, there is something like a divine enjoyment that marks the tone of Creativity,
possibly even the dominant tone,”69 Williams further remarks that “Farley’s position
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would border on agnosticism and stoicism.”70 In addition, with his emphasis on God’s
otherness and on our inability to know God – even the act of worship, he argues, requires
only the character of God and not “God as a personal entity”71 – his position would seem
to leave to the faith community with a God that is essentially not present.
Nevertheless, as Paul Lakeland perhaps aptly summarizes: “those committed to . .
. [the] house of authority will be uncomfortable with . . . [Farley’s overall
methodological-theological] process and . . . [his] conclusions; . . . [however,] for the rest
of us, Farley’s work suggests not only how unnecessary those authorities are, but how
without them God emerges in the experience of redemption – at once both less surely
known and yet more reassuringly encountered.”72

A Critical Assessment of James McClendon’s Theological Method
and Doctrine of God
In this section, I will assess McClendon’s project in two parts. First, I will
examine some of the central features of the theological method he advances, giving
particular attention: to his notion of “convictional perspectivism;” as well as to his
understanding of narrative, experience, and the church as three sources for Christian
convictions; and to his concept of the “baptist” hermeneutical principle of “this is that”
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and “then is now.”73 Second, I will consider his development of a doctrine of God, with a
special focus on how it has been shaped by his theological method.

An Evaluation of McClendon’s Theological Method
Convictional Perspectivism. A crucial aspect of McClendon’s theological method
is his and James Smith’s argument for (1) “convictional perspectivism” – a view
according to which one holds to a soft epistemological relativism and maintains that
differences regarding convictions (or regarding significant and persistent beliefs) are at
least partially eradicable; that is, a view that falls between: (2) “convictional
imperialism” – according to which one holds to a hard epistemological realism and
maintains that differences regarding convictions are, ultimately, completely eradicable;
and, (3) “convictional relativism” – according to which one holds to a hard
epistemological relativism and maintains that differences regarding convictions are
completely ineradicable. Then, McClendon and Smith further develop their via media of
convictional perspectivism by indicating that the unhappiness or happiness of particular
“conviction sets” (from which individual convictions are derived) can be determined (or
anticipated) by ascertaining the degree to which these conviction sets meet at least some
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– but not necessarily all – widely accepted loci of justification (such as correspondent
truth; coherent truth; pragmatic truth; and so on).74
What McClendon and Smith most particularly seem to be pursuing here,
therefore, in their argument for “convictional perspectivism,” is an effort to liberate the
development and justification of convictional beliefs (and, for McClendon, also the
development and justification of theological doctrines) from the restraint of those views
(such as “convictional imperialism”) which posit that only correspondence theories of
truth may be appealed to in seeking to develop and justify convictional claims, while at
the same time avoiding a swing, to the other end of the pendulum, to those views (such as
“convictional relativism”) which seem to posit that – for purposes of dialog and
persuasion among different communities – all potential theories of truth are of little, if
any, value in seeking to develop and justify convictional claims. Accordingly,
McClendon and Smith seek to “defuse” both hard religious epistemological realism and
hard religious epistemological relativism.
Between these two poles of “convictional imperialism” and “convictional
relativism,” McClendon and Smith suggest that, with “convictional perspectivism,” one
may (or a community may) employ one or more theories of truth – or one or more “loci
of justification” – on an “ad hoc” basis, according to what might best suit one’s present
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or anticipated justificatory concerns.75 Moreover, they imply that since these theories or
loci are not universally accepted,76 neither all of them – nor any one of them in particular
– have to be used in the process of developing or justifying convictions (or conviction
sets).77 That is, they hold that “anyone can refrain from appealing to any one of these
considerations . . . [i.e., certain theories of truth or particular loci of justification] without
being inconsistent or absurd.”78 Or, conversely stated, they maintain that while one must
have at least some evidence in order to support (or justify) a conviction (or other beliefs),
it is not necessary to have unlimited evidence.79 However, in apparent contradiction to
this “ad hoc” outlook of “convictional perspectivism,” McClendon and Smith suggest
that the convictional perspectivist must always at least endeavor to show correspondence
between words and things, in order to develop and justify convictions (or conviction
sets).80 Yet, while they rather tenaciously want to hold to some sort of correspondence,
they acknowledge that they “seem to have no theory of representation at all.”81
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Therefore, McClendon’s and Smith’s understanding of the role of correspondence
theories of truth within “convictional perspectivism” appears to contain at least some
ambiguity. In view of the emergence of postmodernism in contemporary Western
culture, I wonder if their argument along these lines might be strengthened, if they were –
especially for purposes of inter-communal dialogue or persuasion – to allow for two
phases of justification: with a first phase consisting of all relevant loci of justification
(such as coherent truth, pragmatic truth, and so on), except for correspondent truth; and,
with a second phase consisting of correspondent truth, where possible and when
additional dialogue or persuasive endeavors have been deemed necessary. It seems, on
an “ad hoc” basis, that there would often be a cornucopia of decisive material to cover
just with phase one, so that moving to phase two, for purposes of inter-communal
dialogue or persuasion, might seldom be necessary – except, perhaps, until one were
otherwise completely convinced that he or she should “embrace” the conviction sets of a
new community.
Narrative, experience, and the church as sources for Christian convictions.
Another central aspect of McClendon’s theological method is his argument that narrative,
experience, and the church should be three of the main sources for forming Christian
convictions or doctrines. In the actual development of his doctrine, at least with his
development of a doctrine of God, while the latter two sources, experience (where
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“experience” means the religious experiences of communities and individuals) and the
church (where “church” chiefly means church practices, such as prayer), function to
some extent in his constructive efforts, it is the first source, narrative (where “narrative”
means the narrative of Scripture and the narrative of the Christian tradition), that carries
the majority of the burden for these efforts. Moreover, within the source of narrative,
while the narrative of tradition does play a role in his constructive pursuits, it is the
narrative of Scripture, in the sense of “God speaking,”82 that clearly dominates these
pursuits.
All of the emphases he places on these various sources as he develops his
doctrines are largely in keeping with what he claims he will stress as he sets forth his
theological method; yet, the rather heavy weight he places upon Scripture in his actual
doctrinal developments, including his doctrine of God, would still likely strike many as
overwhelmingly significant emphasis. For some of McClendon’s critics, this type of
emphasis on the Bible would seem to be a strength, because, as Douglas Ottati remarks, it
allows him to “work from a strong confidence in the sufficiency of revelation;”83
however, for others, such as Terrence Tilley, this type of emphasis would appear, in some
regards at least, to be a weakness.
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In his essay, “Incommensurability, Intratextuality, and Fideism,” Tilley makes a
distinction between what he terms “pure intratextualism” and “dirty intertextuality,”84
where the former concept contains the notion that Christianity has really had only one
text, the Bible, in which textual interpretation occurs, and where the latter concept
includes the idea that Christianity “has always had a multiplicity of canons and texts in
which textual interpretation takes place.”85 For “pure intratextualists,” among whom
Tilley includes McClendon (as well as Hans Frei and George Lindbeck), one “presumes
easy access to a privileged framework which is already given . . . [a framework often
identified as] ‘the’ Christian Scripture . . . [and which is] immune from shaping by
ongoing conversation.”86 However, for “dirty intertextualists,” with whom Tilley aligns
himself, one “presumes that no privileged framework is available,”87 and one holds “that
even the text to be interpreted . . . [including Scripture] is in part given as a function of
the context of interpretation, not as a pure text.”88 In addition, Tilley argues that,
because of their view that “Christianity . . . [and its central documents are] something
found, not made,”89 “pure intratextualists” perceive religious documents, like Scripture,
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as “agents” that perform actions of identification, such as the action of identifying the
person of Christ.90 But, he suggests that, due to their view that “the community of
Christians chooses . . . [its central] documents,”91 “dirty intertextualists” perceive this
community and its “members as agents, . . . since . . . [Tilley maintains] the power of
agency . . . [actually and] finally resides with those who constitute the documents as
agents.”92
Thus, Tilley implies that McClendon, as a “pure intratextualist,” inappropriately
grants too much authority to Scripture as a resource for Christian doctrines (or
convictions) and not enough authority to the Christian community, which, in Tilley’s
view, has the power to choose Scripture as a resource. Whether McClendon or Tilley is
more correct in this matter hinges, it seems, on how one understands and identifies
Scripture. Is it primarily to be identified as a document through which God speaks to us,
as McClendon avers, in which case it would be more of a document in which God “finds”
us than a document which the faith community has “made?” Or, is it chiefly to be
identified as a document that the Christian community has assembled and that is open to
“shaping by ongoing conversation,”93 as Tilley suggests, in which case it would be more
of a document that is “made” by the faith community than a document in which God
“finds” us?
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Another challenge to McClendon’s understanding of Scripture as the primary
resource for forming Christian convictions has been suggested by Douglas Ottati.94 Ottati
wonders what McClendon would do if he found a non-Christian narrative to be “more
true” than the Christian narrative of Scripture on a particular topic. If so, would
McClendon be willing to go as far as to question the veracity of at least a portion of the
biblical narrative?95 More specifically, Ottati makes the following argument:
May a non-Christian interpretation of a circumstance or reality (e.g., a Jewish
interpretation of the holocaust or a scientific interpretation of the interdependence
of the ecosystem) disclose significant truths that are obscured by our received
understanding of the Christian perspective? If so, is it then a work of faithful
truthfulness to revise our received understandings of the Christian perspective, to
revise our received estimate of the biblical narrative on which our perspective
rests, or even to call into question some aspect of the biblical narrative itself?
Attention to matters such as these . . . would make for a more comprehensive
account of how the perspective of the Christian community relates to other
similarly prominent, historically and socially generated perspectives.96
McClendon, as Ottati observes,97 does maintain that any narrative under
consideration as a resource for Christian convictions or doctrines, including the narrative
of the Bible,98 should be continually submitted to “a tournament of narratives.”99 That is,
McClendon holds that the narrative of Scripture and other narratives should be allowed,
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in some sense, to compete with one another, so that those narratives which point to what
is “more true” might become apparent. In addition, McClendon also indicates that he,
along with James Smith, adheres to the notion that all of his convictions – including, it
would seem, his convictions regarding the authority and truth of Scripture – “might be
false and are in principle always subject to rejection, reformulation, improvement, or
reformation.”100 Thus, to Ottati’s questions, McClendon would appear to aver that, at
least in theory, if he were to discover a non-Christian narrative that was found to be
“more true” than the Christian narrative of Scripture on a particular topic, he would be
willing to go as far as to question the veracity of at least a portion of the biblical narrative
in relation to that particular topic. However, in practice, this would likely be no small
concession for McClendon to make; and it could, as his and Smith’s definition of
“conviction” suggests, make his theology “significantly different . . . than before.”101
McClendon has such a high view of Scripture, holding, for instance, that “we can make
full sense of biblical narrative only when we see its implied narrator not as the human
author (who, to be sure, is fully involved at his or her own level), but as the very God of
whom Scripture speaks,”102 and he so heavily relies upon the Bible – as “God
speaking”103 – in the construction of his doctrine, that if he were to concede a lack of
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veracity of even a portion of the scriptural narrative, it would seem that conceivably his
entire theological project might have to begin again from scratch. So, while there is no
reason to doubt the sincerity of McClendon’s call for even the Bible to be submitted to a
tournament of narratives, I would imagine that he would fight quite tenaciously to
preserve his view that “Scripture is the tale God tells.”104 Furthermore, while McClendon
allows that any of his views might be fallible, I would also suspect, as Ottati implies, that
McClendon’s tenacity on this matter might worry some who would seek an account of
how McClendon’s perspective might “relate to other similarly prominent, historically and
socially generated perspectives.”105
“This is that” and “then is now.” Still another central feature of McClendon’s
theological method is his hermeneutical principle of “this is that” and “then is now.”
With this principle, he means that, in a mystical manner, the Bible addresses Christians in
“this present church” just as much as it addressed them in “that primitive, first century
church” and that the Bible addresses Christians now in “this present church” just as much
as it will address Christ’s followers, then, in “the future, eschatological church.” Some
scholars perceive this aspect of McClendon’s theological method as persuasive. For
instance, Stanley Hauerwas maintains that, with his “this is that” and “then is now”
principle, “McClendon forces us, in effect, to become better readers of the Gospel so that
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we might see in our reading that we are ourselves already characters in the story.”106
However, others, such as David Wayne Layman and Willie James Jennings, maintain that
there are potential faults within this hermeneutical principle of McClendon’s.
For example, David Layman, in an article criticizing both McClendon and John
Howard Yoder, avers that, with this hermeneutical principle, McClendon effectively
seeks to bypass church history.107 That is, Layman holds that “despite McClendon’s
assertion that he does not intend ‘a denial of the facts of history, nor a rejection of their
significance,’ he does intend to jump back to the apostolic era in a ‘single bound’ of
mystical solidarity, thus establishing an immediate relationship with the Jesus of the
apostolic faith.”108 Furthermore, relying upon the thought of John Williamson Nevin,109
Layman argues that because McClendon intends this jump back, he “leaps over the
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history of the church, . . . [and by doing so he] denies that God is present and active in
that history.”110
McClendon, in an article written together with John Howard Yoder, offers a
response to Layman’s criticism.111 The thrust of McClendon’s and Yoder’s response is
that they and Layman have in view different understandings of “catholic church.” Thus,
after distinguishing among three senses of “catholic church” – (catholic1), a whole or
well-rounded individual church; (catholic2), all the church or the ecumenical church; and,
(catholic3), the Roman Catholic Church112 – McClendon and Yoder maintain that Layman
has in mind catholic3 (as a path towards achieving catholic2) and that they and the
“baptist” tradition have in mind catholic1 (as a path towards achieving catholic2), where
catholic1 could be restated as “the baptist vision that understands our relation to the
present Christ and to one another in the present Christ.”113 McClendon and Yoder
indicate that whether the “baptist” tradition is in fact a catholic1 tradition is beyond the
scope of their essay, yet they hold that it is a legitimate “question for history (and for
historians).”114 In other words, the heart of McClendon’s and Yoder’s response is that
they have a significantly different understanding of “church” than Layman does, so that
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when Layman mentions “church history,” he has missed what McClendon and Yoder
(and perhaps the “baptist” tradition as a whole) have in view with the concept of
“church.”
I cannot dispute McClendon’s and Yoder’s claims, at least as they set them forth
in the above mentioned article. However, in his overall theological project, especially in
his monograph, Doctrine, while McClendon certainly appeals to an understanding of
“church” as the local church (or as catholic1),115 he also appeals to what Layman may
have in view with (catholic3) church history.116 Although, in making these latter types of
appeals, McClendon often treats the narrative of (catholic3) church history not as an
authority that can offer entirely new doctrine beyond what has been presented in the
Bible but more as a collection of commentaries – or as what he sometimes refers to as a
collection of midrashim117 – that expound upon or seek to clarify the doctrine already set
forth in Scripture.
It is along these lines of interpreting McClendon as offering more of a midrashimtype treatment of church history that Willie Jennings critiques McClendon’s “this is that”
and “then is now” hermeneutical principle.118 That is, in contrast to David Layman’s
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critique, Jennings faults this principle not for the way in which it might permit one to
“leap over” church history but for the manner in which it may allow one to “pit the
narrative of scripture” against “the narrative of a church learning to think through its own
life over the centuries.”119 In other words, for Jennings, “it is not the case that
McClendon fails to recognize classical doctrinal themes; . . . nor does he ignore doctrinal
developments;”120 instead, he places the narrative of the Bible in an adversarial
relationship with the narrative of tradition. Moreover, Jennings maintains that “it is
problematic and not entirely fair . . . [for McClendon] to call, . . . . [for example,] the
history of . . . [the] church’s reflection on Christ’s saving reality mere ‘theory’ while in
contrast contending that the scriptures offer a nontheoretical self-explanation.”121
While Jennings, in my view, offers a more focused critique of McClendon’s
hermeneutical principle of “this is that” and “then is now” than does Layman, I would
argue that much of the merit of Jennings’s objection (similar to the merit of Terrence
Tilley’s objection, discussed above) depends upon whether one should identify the
narrative of Scripture and the narrative of church tradition as narratives through which
God speaks in unlike manner, as McClendon maintains, or as narratives through which
God speaks (or does not speak) in like manner, as Jennings suggests. If McClendon is
correct, then it would seem appropriate to conceive of Scripture as “nontheoretical” and
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of church tradition as “theoretical;” however, if Jennings is correct, then it would seem
appropriate to conceive of both the Bible and church tradition as “theoretical.” Yet, even
if one were to side with McClendon on this specific point, I would argue that
McClendon’s project could more adequately allow, as Jennings suggests, for the positive
contribution that the narrative of church tradition has made to historical and
contemporary understandings of Christian doctrine. That is, I agree with Jennings’s
implication that, at least on occasion, McClendon seems to overly amplify those
instances where tradition has gotten it wrong, while unduly minimizing those instances
where tradition may have gotten it right.

An Evaluation of the Development of McClendon’s Doctrine of God
With his development of a doctrine of God, McClendon argues how God can be
known both through God’s reign or kingdom work (in the future, in the present, and in
the past) and, more specifically, through the salvific work of Jesus Christ and the
ecclesial and missional work of the Holy Spirit. Also, in each of these regards, his
application of various aspects of his theological method becomes apparent, to a greater or
lesser degree. For instance, he rather extensively applies his hermeneutical principle of
“this is that” and “then is now” in his development of doctrine of the rule of God
(especially with his treatment of the reign of Christ but also as he sets forth his notion of
God’s passibility in God’s ongoing activity of creation); yet, he makes only limited use
of experience and the church, for example, as sources for constructing a doctrine of God.
However, in the paragraphs below, I will limit my evaluation of McClendon’s
development of a doctrine of God to just a few representative components. First, I will
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assess the way in which he employs the narrative of Scripture to construct this doctrine.
Next, I will evaluate the manner in which he endeavors to establish the coherence of
various “conviction sets” or “doctrine sets” towards an overall doctrine of God. Then, I
will assess the way in which his doctrine of Christ informs his doctrine of God.
The narrative of Scripture and a doctrine of God. One aspect of his theological
method that McClendon extensively and consistently applies is his use of the narrative of
Scripture, where one conceives of Scripture as “God speaking,”122 as a primary resource
for developing all of his doctrines, which, in turn, inform his doctrine of God. For those
who reject the notion of Scripture understood in this manner, McClendon’s entire
theological project might seem to be misguided. However, for those such as Robert
Barron, McClendon’s heavy reliance upon Scripture-as-God-speaking enables him to
construct a doctrine of God that is both appealing and appropriate, precisely because it
makes this doctrine more of an “insider” affair.123 To emphasize this point, Barron
contrasts the approach of theologians such as McClendon and Hans Urs von Balthasar
with more progressive approaches:
The liberal theologian is like someone standing outside of Chartres Cathedral
pointing excitedly at the drab gray of the windows and trying to convince people
to come in and see them. The problem is that the windows come to life only
when they are seen from within the Cathedral, which is to say, from within the
worship and practice of the Christian community. Both McClendon and
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Balthasar want their readers inside Christian action before they either speak of
Christian teaching or seek a conversation with the wider culture.124
If one presupposes that Scripture is an authoritative resource, Barron provides a helpful
illustration to show the way in which the rich imagery of the biblical narrative allows
theologians like McClendon and Balthasar to construct vivid and compelling kataphatic
theologies of God as one who is present to and can be known by humanity. In the case of
McClendon’s theology, this seems to be why some, like Ralph Wood, in reviewing
McClendon’s work, Doctrine, are able to conclude: “Repeatedly I found myself asking,
‘How could one read this book and not want to become a Christian?’”125 The question,
though, is whether or not McClendon claims too much authority for Scripture, so that, as
Terrence Tilley suggests, one might be left with “doing nothing but ‘playing Bible
land,’”126 and, therefore, whether or not McClendon claims too much about the extent to
which God can be known.
The coherence of “conviction sets” and a doctrine of God. Another aspect of
his theological method that McClendon amply employs towards developing a doctrine of
God is his effort to show a strong coherence (which is one type of what he terms “loci of
justification”)127 of various sets of his “baptist” doctrine (where he understands
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“doctrine” as a subset of his notion of “convictions”)128 that either directly or indirectly
support his overall doctrine of God.129 For example, with the development of his “twonarrative” Christological model, he endeavors to demonstrate how the following set of
sub-doctrines harmoniously cohere together: the non-divinity imparting birth of Jesus;
Jesus’ post-birth self-emptying to follow God’s way of service; Jesus’ gradual (and
eventually full) achievement of the image of God; and, God’s resurrection reidentification of Jesus with God’s own life. Similarly, as he moves toward constructing
his narrative-based trinitarianism, he attempts to show how another particular set of subdoctrines cohere well together. In this instance, in an effort to emphasize the one-ness or
unity of God, he maintains that a non-personal pre-existent logos as “the speaking of
God” coheres favorably not only with the just mentioned Christological sub-doctrines but
also with his trinitarian notions of Spirit – where McClendon conceives of Spirit as a
non-personal dynamic power – and of God the Father – where he conceives of God the
Father as one who adopts and liberates his people.
These endeavors to justify various doctrines and, ultimately, his doctrine of God,
by seeking to demonstrate how well his doctrines cohere together, seem to reflect some
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of the key principles of McClendon’s “convictional perspectivism,” such as the notion
that various (but not necessarily all) theories of truth and other “loci of justification” may
be used to support the doctrines (or convictions) of a particular community and the notion
that at least partial inter-communal dialogue is possible on the basis of potential
overlapping loci of justification among particular communities. In addition, this type of
“perspectivism” puts McClendon’s theological project at odds both with hard
epistemological realists (who McClendon refers to as “convictional imperialists”), who
would insist on only and always using a correspondent theory of truth to justify doctrines
(and convictions),130 and with hard epistemological relativists (“convictional relativists”),
who would maintain that dialogue among various communities is not tenable, due to
incommensurable truth claims. However, this application of McClendon’s “convictional
perspectivism” towards a doctrine of God would seem to hold promise in a contemporary
culture that is increasingly embracing postmodernism.
A doctrine of Christ informs a doctrine of God. In Doctrine, McClendon’s main
work (as the title appropriately indicates) on theological doctrine, his chief purpose is to
set forth a “baptist” understanding not just of a doctrine of God but also of many of the
major doctrines of the Christian faith; nevertheless, the various doctrines that he develops
in this work – eschatology; salvation; creation; the atonement; the person of Christ; the
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Holy Spirit and the church’s mission; and, God’s trinitarian identity – combine together
to either directly or indirectly inform his notion of God and of God’s identity. From his
treatment of these various doctrines, he comes to some of the following findings about
the identity of God: God is one who reigns over the cosmos and over humanity, though
not by force but by self-sacrifice; God is one who seeks to establish right relations
between Godself and people; God is one who suffers both in God’s redemptive actions
and in God’s ongoing creative actions; God is one who ultimately completely “meets”
humanity through the person of Jesus Christ; God is one who, as Spirit, works through
God’s people, the church, to bring others into full “syzygic” unity with God and with one
another; God is one and whole – and is, at the same time, the God of adventurous
transformation, constant companionship, and powerful presence. In sum, his primary
conclusion about God’s identity, through his construction of these various doctrines, is
that God is one who sacrificially gives of God’s self.
There are many aspects of McClendon’s doctrine of God that could be evaluated
along these lines. However, rather than examining each aspect, I will, instead, offer a
representative assessment of the manner in which his Christology informs his doctrine of
God.
Beginning with his eschatology and shaped by his hermeneutical principle of
“this is that” and “then is now,” McClendon presents a fascinating picture of Jesus Christ
as the one will be king at the last judgment being not only the same Jesus Christ who
lived in first century Nazareth but also the same Jesus Christ who reigns in the present.
Also, as part of this mystically-informed, eschatological picture of Christ, McClendon
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argues that he is one who has been, is, and will be in the process of growing God’s
kingdom through the means of his own self-sacrificial love and the self-sacrificial love of
his disciples.
Then, with his particular development of a doctrine of Christ, McClendon sets
forth – against the traditional Logos, two-natures, and historical models – his own “twonarrative Christology.” Here, to briefly recapitulate my summary of his treatment of this
doctrine presented in chapter 4 above, he maintains, in part, that the “self-emptying”
described in Philippians 2 refers to a certain emptying of Jesus’ soul that occurred after
Jesus was born. Thus, he argues that this “self-emptying” points to Jesus’ ongoing
persistence in rejecting the pursuit of worldly fame in favor of the pursuit of identifying
with those on the margins of society, a choice that eventually led to his death.
With this understanding of Philippians 2:5-11, McClendon then inquires about
what such an after-enfleshment self-emptying might mean for interpreting Paul’s
reference to Jesus’ “‘being in the form of God’ (Phil. 2:6).”131 Drawing on the thought of
Eugene TeSelle,132 he avers that “we must understand that ‘the image of God’ in
Scripture is not a designated state but a task set, not an ontic level enjoyed but an ideal to
be realized.”133 Therefore, McClendon equates the “form of God” (in Philippians 2:6)
with the “image of God” (in passages such as Genesis 1:26-27), and he suggests that for
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Jesus, and for all other humans as well, the image (or form) of God is not a state in which
humans are born but a goal to which many aspire – but only Jesus attained, because only
Jesus completely followed God’s way of the servant.134
Furthermore, McClendon holds that these concepts of Jesus’ after-enfleshment
self-emptying and of his eventual complete realization of the image of God (through his
full faithfulness during his life and death) cohere with the biblical narrative’s accounts of
his birth and resurrection. For instance, with regard to Jesus’ birth, McClendon argues
that the “Gospel stories do not say or suggest that it is by virtue of this marvelous
conception that Jesus was divine.”135 While McClendon allows that these stories imply
that “the Spirit, as the human Jesus’ divine Mother, conceived Jesus exactly when and as
Mary conceived him,”136 he rejects the notion that “the Holy Spirit is . . . presented . . . as
a Jupiter-like father deity who impregnates a human mother.”137 In addition, in terms of
Jesus’ resurrection, McClendon avers that – due to Jesus’s complete faithfulness in
following God’s way of the servant (which, according to McClendon’s interpretation of
Scripture, was not accidental but intended by God from before the beginning of the
world)138 – God re-identified Jesus with God’s own life, starting with the time of Jesus’
resurrection.
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Moreover, he further develops his two-narrative Christology by arguing: (1) that
the scriptural story is simultaneously both the story of God reaching down to humans and
the story of people reaching up to God and (2) that, with Jesus of Nazareth, the two
stories fully converge, bringing together God and humans in the person of Jesus Christ.139
In addition, McClendon holds that because of the event of Pentecost, this same Christ is
present to his disciples today – in a firsthand, reciprocal fashion.140
Furthermore, McClendon argues that “logos” in the Prologue of John’s Gospel
should be understood – not as a pre-existent, personal “Christ” but – as a pre-existent,
non-personal “speaking of God.”141 Also, he avers that the Bible portrays Yahweh as a
father who adopts (or befriends) and liberates his people – perfectly and fully so, he
suggests, as “Father” to Jesus of Nazareth.142
Thus, McClendon’s Christology provides a more complete understanding of his
notion of God. For instance, his Christology shows that, through Jesus, God
accomplished God’s own intention to completely meet the humanity that had been
seeking to fully encounter God. Furthermore, his Christology expresses the view that
because Jesus was re-identified with God’s own life, it follows that, in Christ, through the
Spirit, God endeavors to be present with people today in a firsthand, reciprocal manner.
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A strength of McClendon’s Christology, as Robert Barron observes, is that his
“two-narratives” model seems to offer advantages over some of the more traditional
Christological models, such as the two-natures model and the historical model. For
instance, in comparison to the two-natures model, Barron argues that McClendon’s twonarratives model “gives an infinitely richer account of a person or thing than does an
abstraction such as ‘nature,’ . . . [since] however we nuance and tweak the terminology,
‘natures’ inevitably sound mutually-exclusive and contrastive; . . . [whereas] narrative,
like music, qualifies well for . . . [the Christological] task, . . . [for] a single story can
operate simultaneously on a variety of levels without contradiction.”143 Moreover, in
comparison to the historical model, Barron further maintains that McClendon’s twonarratives model “corrects the liberal-historical approach whose excessive emphasis on
the humanity of Jesus turns the life and career of Christ into a kind of idol.”144 I concur
with Barron’s assessment of these particular advantages of McClendon’s Christology.
Yet, there appear to be some possible disadvantages of McClendon’s treatment of
this doctrine as well. For instance, some scholars, such as Willie Jennings, raise the
criticism that McClendon’s “defense against the charge of adoptionism is
unconvincing.”145 I agree with this criticism, but only to a certain extent. For, on the one
hand, McClendon suggests that, since he holds that Jesus of Nazareth’s unique role as
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God’s Son “is what God intended for him even ‘before the foundation of the world’ (Eph.
1:4),”146 his Christology should not be perceived as “adoptionistic,” at least in the strong
sense of “implying . . . . [that] ‘God had to wait around’ for someone like Jesus to appear
so God could ‘adopt’ the lucky winner as his Son.”147 Thus, McClendon would seem to
at least partially refute the type of criticism that Jennings levies here. However, on the
other hand, the combination of several of McClendon’s Christologically-related
arguments – that “logos” in the Prologue of John’s Gospel should be understood as a preexistent but non-personal “speaking of God;” that Yahweh should generally be conceived
of not as a biological but as an adoptive father; that there was no emptying of the eternal
Christ’s power with Jesus’ birth; that no element of divinity was imparted to Jesus with
his birth; and, that Jesus gradually achieved the full image of God during his life and
death – would appear to show that McClendon develops a Christology that contains an
element of a soft adoptionism – although, perhaps, of an eternally intentional (and not a
whimsical) variety.
Moreover, even if it contains merely a soft adoptionism, the way in which
McClendon constructs his Christology has led some, such as Thomas Finger, to question
whether his “Christology adequately stresses . . . [the] divine initiative which McClendon
also finds important. . . . [That is, Finger wonders if McClendon’s Christology can] fully
affirm that God came to us in Christ; that God’s own self fully bore our sorrows, rather
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than doing this somewhat indirectly, through a mere man?”148 I feel that Finger has
identified a significant weakness or at least an inconsistency in McClendon’s overall
doctrine of God. For while McClendon would like to stress that God is one who, as part
of God’s rule, takes the initiative to sacrificially give of Godself, in order to establish
right relations between Godself and people, an adoptionistic perspective (even a soft one)
would seem to call into question just how strong this initiative has been. In addition, as
McClendon suggests (and Finger observes),149 if Jesus of Nazareth were only a man, even
a perfect man, but not also God (at least until God’s resurrection of Jesus and
simultaneous re-identification of Jesus with God’s own life), this would mean that, for
McClendon, merely a man, and not a God-man, was crucified. If this is the case, then, as
McClendon further indicates, the cross is only “what God would do;”150 thus, it is not
what God Godself actually did. Not only would this line of thought seem to exclude
some of the stronger theories of the atonement (such as the Anselmian notion of a
superabundance of merit),151 but it would also call into question the extent of God’s
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willingness to suffer in God’s own self for humanity (something for which McClendon
does want to argue).
For these and other reasons, some may be uneasy with certain aspects of
McClendon’s doctrine of God as well as with his overall methodological-theological
process. Yet, for others, McClendon’s work, as Robert Barron observes, has the
advantage of offering a doctrine of God from “within the Cathedral.”152 That is, despite
some potential limitations, particularly what the soft adoptionism within his Christology
appears to convey about his doctrine of God, McClendon develops a vivid and
compelling theology of God – as one who is present to and can be known by humanity.

Edward Farley and James McClendon in Methodological
and Theological Conversation
In an endeavor to bring Farley’s and McClendon’s methodological and
theological projects into conversation with each other, I will begin by noting some ways
in which aspects of their respective projects appear to share similarities with one another.
Then, in a somewhat speculative manner, I will hypothetically consider how they might
critique one another.
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Some Similarities Shared with Farley’s and McClendon’s Projects
The detachment of narrative from reality being perceived as problematic. One
similarity they share is the notion that the detachment of narrative from reality is
problematic. Though they approach this notion in different ways – and though Farley’s
approach to it is more evident – this does appear to be an area of some common ground
for them. For Farley, one of the major problems facing contemporary theology is a loss
of reality.153 To paraphrase his argument along these lines, he suggests that much
theological work, for at least the last two hundred years, has turned to perceived
authoritative texts, such as Scripture and the creeds of the church, and has simply stopped
there, instead of seeking the realities “behind” these texts or the realities to which these
texts point. His response to this problem involves: (1) a Husserlian-informed call for
theologians to go directly to the realities themselves, apart from any narrative; and, (2) a
plea for theologians, to the extent that they need to turn to texts (the Bible, church creeds,
etc.) at all, to treat such texts not as authoritative ends-in-themselves but as fields of
evidence (or as more or less a neutral means) through which actual realities can be
recovered.154 For McClendon, while he suggests that there can be no access to reality
apart from narratives,155 and while he and James Smith allow that they have no theory of
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correspondence,156 McClendon, with Smith, maintains that reality must always be sought
through narratives.157 Thus, both Farley and McClendon agree on this matter, at least to
the degree that, when working with a text such as the Bible or a church creed, theologians
should strive to connect (or to work through) these narratives to the realities to which
they point.
However, I do not find either Farley’s or McClendon’s views on this matter to be
entirely satisfactory. While I agree, more with McClendon here than with Farley, that
there can be no access to realities apart from narrative (or language) – or, at most, that
realities obtained apart from narrative, to use McClendon’s terminology, are “sterile”158 –
I would argue that, in the particular case of inter-communal dialogue, if a community
does not have a theory of correspondence, then that community should use caution in
striving to show correspondence between narrative and realities when seeking to engage
other communities. However, a situation involving intra-communal dialogue, is, in my
view, an entirely different matter. That is, if members within a community were to agree
that there is correspondence between narrative and realities, then I would argue that –
within their community – it should not be considered rationally problematic for them to
freely acknowledge and observe such a correspondence, even if they do not have a theory
to support it.
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Separation from traditional developments of certain doctrines. Another similarity
that McClendon and Farley share is the way in which they both break from more
traditional developments of the doctrines of the incarnation of Christ and of the Trinity.
For instance, with the incarnation of Christ, both McClendon and Farley either claim or
suggest that no element of divinity was imparted to Jesus of Nazareth at his birth. Also,
with the Trinity, while both McClendon and Farley stress the unity or the oneness of
God, both theologians tend to avoid any robust sense of “three separate persons.” In
particular, they both reject (either directly or indirectly): the idea that Christ existed as a
personal being before the incarnation;159 and, the idea that the Spirit should be conceived
of as a personal being (at any time).160 These similarities are especially interesting in
view of the substantially different theological methods used by these two theologians,
with McClendon employing a method based more on narrative and with Farley using a
method grounded more on contemporary communal experience, and these similarities
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suggest that there are at least some limits to the extent to which method might be claimed
to inform doctrine.
An emphasis on the suffering of God. Yet another similarity is that both Farley
and McClendon place an emphasis on the suffering of God. For instance, Farley argues:
that “the empathy of God is . . . a pathos, a ‘fellow-feeling’ that suffers;”161 and, that the
empathy of God is without limit.162 In fact, Farley suggests that the central feature of
God’s creative and redemptive works is God’s aim of divine empathy (where “empathy”
is broadly understood as including “participative suffering, self-impartation, perception
of our experiencing, and compassion”)163 and, therefore, that the central feature of God’s
character is divine empathy. Likewise, McClendon holds: first, (as part of his doctrine of
creation) that, since God relationally interacts with the world in God’s creative activity,
not only the world but also God changes; and, that God suffers throughout these changes,
both “artistically,” as God seeks to mold recalcitrant human beings, and in terms of God
surrendering some of God’s own independence, as God sacrificially releases some of
God’s existence to dependent creatures;164 and, second, (as part of his doctrine of the
atonement) that the cross was not at odds with – but was “exactly what God would do,”165
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so that Jesus of Nazareth and God were of the same purpose in suffering self-sacrificially
for others. Indeed, McClendon implies that the main aspect of God’s identity is that God
is one who sacrificially gives of God’s self. This similarity would seem to further point
to the importance of not overemphasizing the degree to which method might be claimed
to shape doctrine.

A Consideration of How Farley and McClendon Might Critique Each Other
Having endeavored to demonstrate some of the ways in which elements of
Farley’s and McClendon’s respective projects appear to share similarities with one
another, I will attempt, in sections below, to hypothetically consider how they might
critique one another.
How Scripture should be approached and utilized for developing doctrine. One
area where Farley and McClendon could likely critique each other would be with regard
to how the Bible should be approached and utilized for developing theological
doctrine.166
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The doctrine of Scripture is a topic that has received a substantial amount of
direct and indirect attention in the modern and postmodern eras, with a broad range of
positions offered. Furthermore, a significant number of these positions would be at odds
with the views set forth by both Farley and McClendon. It is beyond the scope of this
dissertation to set forth a treatment of these various views; however, an analysis of
Farley’s and McClendon’s understandings of Scripture would certainly merit additional
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Here, Farley could question whether McClendon, even with his claim, under
convictional perspectivism, for differing communities to be open to dialogue with one
another, would ever substantially consider as conversation partners those with
approaches to constructing theology that do not share his presupposition of a heavy
reliance upon Scripture-as-sacred-and-authoritative.

T. Thomson and Harold Knight, vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, part 2
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956); idem, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans.
Douglas Horton (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957); The Bible: Its Authority and
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359
Indeed, McClendon argues: that “the Bible is the church’s book;”167 and, that “we
are mistaken if we think the church has no agreed and coherent way to read the Bible.
The church has always had that.”168 Also, for McClendon, the “plain sense” of Scripture
seems to include the notion that the Bible is “the word of God written . . . [or that through
which] God speaks.”169 And, elsewhere, he holds that:
If one makes allowance for occasional excesses and extremes, the main course of
Christian Bible reading has held true over the centuries to the plain sense of
Scripture – its stories were read as (in the main) real stories about real people; its
history, real history; its declarations about God and God’s creatures as saying
what they meant and meaning what they said. The Bible was not a code or cipher
to be cracked; it was not a book of secrets; it was realistic; it spoke plain.170
McClendon further argues that, in addition to the “plain sense” of Scripture, there is also
“the point of that plain sense . . . [or] the spiritual sense of the text,”171 and he suggests
that while different Christian communities disagree on the “spiritual sense” of the Bible,
they all – except for rare aberrations – agree on the “plain sense.”
While the hypothetical critique I am here making of McClendon on Farley’s
behalf is, in some sense, an argument regarding what McClendon does not address – and
he cannot be expected to address all perspectives – such a critique could, in my view, be
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shown to have at least some merit. Farley does not share McClendon’s notion of the
“plain sense” of Scripture – or that the Bible is that through which God speaks. And,
because McClendon does not consider a non-plain-sense perspective, it seems as though
he has from the outset, almost by definition, excluded as a potential dialogue partner any
community that shares or reflects Farley’s type of perspective that “the house of authority
. . . [with its notion of Scripture-as-sacred] has been dismantled.”172 In other words, as a
practical matter, McClendon sometimes seems to assume that while different Christian
communities might disagree on how to interpret Scripture, they all – except for a few
anomalies (that need not really be addressed) – share the perspective that the Bible is the
authoritative word of God.
Nevertheless, McClendon could counter Farley’s critique in various ways. For
instance, he could argue that Farley’s methodological and theological project should be
classified with those “occasional excesses and extremes” that reject the “plain sense” of
Scripture or that reject the Bible as “the word of God.” McClendon would seem to be
accompanied by other scholars along these lines, as observations, made by David
Pellauer and Geoffrey Wainwright, noted above in this chapter, appear to indicate.
However, attempting this type of counter argument would be a difficult task, since Farley
is by no means a lone theological voice in holding that Scripture should not be viewed as
sacred or authoritative.173

172

173

ER, 171.

Farley, together with Peter C. Hodgson, elsewhere offers a condensed version
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In addition, in a perhaps more productive approach, McClendon could attempt to
refute Farley’s claim that the fact that the early church had a choice in deciding to treat
Scripture no longer as a mere record of events, but as an inspired, sacred and
authoritative collection of documents, shows that this collection of documents cannot be
sacred. McClendon could frame this refutation by considering some of the intra-biblical
and extra-biblical evidence that I have already described above in this chapter.
Furthermore, McClendon could endeavor to show that, to the extent that Farley
rejects the “plain sense” of Scripture and seeks to construct theology instead largely by
turning to realities themselves, Farley develops theology by means of what McClendon
refers to as a non-narrativist approach. McClendon could then reiterate his view that a
substantial limitation of the non-narrativist approach is that when one detaches
theological convictions from narratives, these convictions “become sterile because they
are ignorant of their own roots.”174
In reply to a counter like this last one, though, Farley could argue that even if
some of his doctrines seem “sterile,” at least he has not claimed more than he ought to on
the basis of a text which the Christian tradition has, for the most part, erroneously treated
as an authoritative document.

Tradition,” chap. in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, eds.
Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1982),
35-61. And, most of the various other contributors to this monograph appear to give at
least tacit endorsement to these views. In addition, many other significant contemporary
theologians, while they might view Scripture as some sort of “classic text,” would not, as
McClendon does, consider the Bible to be a text through which “God speaks.”
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How conceptions of God pertain to hope for the future. Another area where
Farley and McClendon could likely critique one another would be in terms of how their
understandings of God pertain to hope for the future.
Here, McClendon could question whether Farley’s doctrine of God, even with his
notion that the central feature of God’s character is divine empathy, offers any substantial
basis to claim that there is reason to hope for a positive future.
Farley suggests that, in light of his doctrine of God, any eschatology he could
offer would provide no “certain knowledge of what will happen in the future,”175 in part,
because of the fact that one can observe that entities self-initiate (and, therefore, that
humans are free), which means that the future must be an “open future.”176 Thus, Farley
would seem to acknowledge that one simply cannot know, with assurance, whether the
future will be a positive one or a negative one. However, he holds that, “at the same
time, the facticity of redemption and the event of Jesus as Christ bespeak an ever-active
God, a God whose empathetic relation to the world never ceases.”177 Therefore, he
implies that whatever the future may hold, when armed with an appropriate
“eschatology,” which, when adequately understood, “means convictions or theological
formulations that concern the reality of human hope,”178 one can hold out the belief that
God will remain in empathetic relation to the world. In addition, Farley maintains that
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the burden to establish and maintain this hope rests with ecclesia (which is not the
institutional church but the authentic faith community), since it is ultimately “religious
communities . . . [that] . . . are called to hope, . . . [and] to rediscover and rethink
hope.”179 That is, for Farley, “we do not hope because we believe . . . [doctrines] X, Y,
and Z. We believe . . . [doctrines] X, Y, and Z as expressions of . . . [a] hope [generated
by the faith community].”180
As part of his critique, McClendon could argue, first, that Farley’s belief in a God
who has an empathetic relation to the world rests upon his belief in the event of Jesus as
Christ, which rests, in turn, in large measure, upon his perception that the reality-at-hand
of the ecclesia, the faith community, has been working to eliminate ethnic and social
boundaries.181 McClendon could then inquire about the facts upon which this perception
might be based. Outside of a few fortunate exceptions, where does one see the Christian
faith community gaining any significant ground in eliminating ethnic and social
boundaries? If anything, the facts would seem to suggest the opposite, unless, perhaps,
one understands ecclesia too broadly. But, if so, where, then, concretely, would Farley
locate ecclesia?
Second, McClendon could question the basis on which the faith community, with
Farley’s schema, might find reason to generate hope. According to Farley, the faith
community cannot look to doctrines, church creeds, or Scripture as authoritative
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resources for hope. Can it look to God? It can only look indirectly to God’s character,
through appresentation, Farley avers – and that appresentation should be based, to a
significant degree, upon the presentation of the faith community striving to remove ethnic
and social boundaries, a presentation that would seem to be dubious (as discussed just
above).182 Can ecclesia look to nature or to the cosmos as a reason to generate hope?
Farley implies that this is a possibility, since, due to God’s redemptive activity, the faith
community can retrieve the reality that world-as-creation, while containing mystery and
the tragic, has significance and goodness as its primary characteristics.183 However, at
least in looking to the human part of the present world-as-creation, it would seem that
McClendon could mount substantial evidence (such as the holocaust or the growing
disparity between rich and poor across the globe, among other possibilities) not only to
show, as he argues, that “the world we know is torn by racial, national, economic, ethnic,
sexual, cultural, and (not least) religious strife,”184 but also to call into question
“significance” and “goodness” as primary characteristics of (the present) world-ascreation. Thus, given Farley’s understanding of how the character of God can be known
and what Farley would allow and would not allow as authoritative resources, McClendon
could argue that Farley has demonstrated only limited grounds on which the faith
community might find reason to generate hope for a positive future.
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In response, Farley could counter that at least he has not tried to make
eschatological claims beyond what can be known solely on the basis of realities at hand
and that he has successfully avoided turning to documents such as Scripture and the
church creeds that were never originally intended to have the authority that church
tradition has come to give them. Also, Farley could argue that, while his schema may
offer less than others in terms of assuring a positive hope for the future, he has not only
avoided erroneously conceiving of the character of God as overly monarchical (and the
related dangers that come with such a view), which such a strong assurance would tend to
require, but he has also amply provided for human freedom, which if that freedom is to
be genuine, he could further maintain, must have “an open future.”185 In addition, Farley
could inquire whether McClendon’s schema offers a viable alternative for claiming that
there is reason to hope for any sort of positive future.
McClendon could argue that his eschatology would provide at least a measure of
knowledge about what will happen in the future, because, in part, the New Testament
“end-pictures” of the last judgment and of Jesus Christ returning, when seen through the
lens of the “this is that” and “then is now” hermeneutical principle, show that the Jesus
Christ who will be king at the last judgment is the same Jesus Christ who lived in first
century Nazareth and the same Jesus Christ who reigns in the present. Thus, McClendon
could further aver that it follows, since Christ at the last judgment will reign as the
resurrected Lamb who was slain, that Christ intends to form a new people (his kingdom),
that will exist with God in the present and in the future, by means of Christ’s own
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sacrificial love and the sacrificial love of his disciples.186 Moreover, McClendon could
hold that because Jesus was completely faithful, during his life and death, in following
God’s way of the servant, in the act of Jesus’ resurrection, God re-identified Jesus with
God’s own life.187 Thus, what can be said of Christ’s role in eschatology may be
understood to reflect God’s role in eschatology. Therefore, McClendon could maintain
that one can know, with some assurance, that, for Christ and Christ’s disciples, the future
will be a positive one.
In response, Farley could argue, first, that McClendon’s entire eschatological
project rests upon, not realities at hand, but, to borrow Terrence Tilley’s phrase, upon
“playing Bible land;”188 in other words, Farley could hold that McClendon’s argument for
a positive future rests upon a notion of Scripture-as-sacred, a notion that careful historical
research simply does not support. Second, Farley could question whether McClendon’s
eschatological perspective portrays an overly deterministic notion of God’s sovereignty,
in which a kingly divine being willfully forces salvation to occur for only a part of
humanity.189
To counter, McClendon could argue, first, that he is not playing Bible land and
that, while acknowledging that Scripture was conveyed through human beings,190 there is
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abundant intra-biblical and extra-biblical evidence (previously mentioned) to support the
notion that Scripture’s primary identity is that of “God speaking.”191 Next, McClendon
could maintain that he has endeavored to set forth an eschatological perspective in which
Christ and his followers may be said, in a sense, to “conquer;” although this
“conquering” occurs, not through “the world’s weapons,”192 but through a suffering, selfsacrificial love, where Christ and his disciples willingly give up their lives for others.193
Therefore, McClendon could aver that he is advocating not a deterministic triumphalism,
where God makes his kingdom available to a select few (and where human freedom
would be suppressed), but a yielding self-sacrificialism, where God makes his kingdom
available to all (and where human freedom would be preserved).194

Conclusion
With this dissertation, I have sought to examine both Edward Farley’s and James
McClendon’s theological method and the manner in which their respective methods
shape and inform their doctrines of God. In addition, I have endeavored to compare their
methodological and theological projects with one another.
On the whole, it seems that both Farley’s and McClendon’s doctrines of God have
been partially influenced by their respective theological methods, at least in terms of the
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general thrusts of these methods. For instance, with Farley, while such features as eidetic
reduction and noetic-noematic analysis do not appear to carry over from his development
of theological method to his construction of a doctrine of God, his major emphasis on
turning away from “the house of authority” and turning to communal experience of
reality – or, more specifically, to ecclesia’s experience of the realities of faith – does
extend from his methodological endeavors to his theological work. This often results in a
fairly apophatic description of God, or, more accurately, since Farley maintains that God
Godself cannot be known by humans, of God’s character, as consisting of (partially
knowable) divine empathy in God’s creative and redemptive works. At times, as Robert
R. Williams suggests, Farley’s doctrine of God is so sparse that his “position . . . [appears
to] border on agnosticism and stoicism.”195 However, one of the great advantages of
Farley’s project appears to be that he strives not to claim more about God’s character
than can ultimately be supported by direct appeal to realities at hand, or, as Paul
Lakeland observes, with Farley’s doctrine of God, “God emerges . . . at once both less
surely known and yet more reassuringly encountered.”196 Indeed, even in view of some
of the criticisms raised in this chapter, if the various elements of “the house of authority,”
including Scripture-as-sacred, are disallowed as legitimate resources for constructing
doctrine, it would be difficult to conceive of a more carefully developed treatment about
what can be known about God’s character.
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In addition, with McClendon, while such elements as detailed depictions of
conviction sets as well as extensive use of the narrative of tradition, including biography,
do not seem to span from his treatment of theological method to his development of a
doctrine of God, his primary stress on the use of the narrative of Scripture and, to a
certain degree, his emphasis on the employment of various loci of justification, including
not just correspondence but also coherence and other loci, do carry over from his
methodological project to his theological task. For some of McClendon’s critics, this
largely amounts to a description of God that has been built upon a questionable basis of
Scripture-as-authoritative, while simultaneously showing an inadequate appreciation of
what the Christian tradition has contributed to a description of the divine. Max L.
Stackhouse likely voices the view of at least a few of these critics, when he states: “He . .
. [McClendon] has shown me why I am not a ‘baptist,’ and why I hope the current
fascination with narrative theology does not become predominant.”197 Yet, one of the
main strengths of McClendon’s work is that – because, as Robert Barron suggests, he
attempts to present an “inside-the-Cathedral” or an “inside-the-narrative-of-Scripture”
depiction of God198 – he can offer a rich and vibrant view of God as one who presently
and actively suffers with God’s people by sacrificially giving of Godself. Thus, while for
some McClendon may claim to know more about God than can be adequately
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demonstrated, if Scripture is, as he claims, Scripture-as-God-speaking, then he has, in my
view, contributed to showing how God is a God who is worthy of worship.
Moreover, one of the central differences between Farley and McClendon, it seems
to me, has to do with the issue of how one understands and identifies Scripture. For
Farley, since the early church had a choice in the matter as to whether or not Scripture
should be considered inspired or sacred, it necessarily and can only follow that the Bible
cannot be sacred. Thus, for him, while it can be one of several “fields of evidence” for
constructing Christian doctrine, Scripture is not God-speaking, and it is not authoritative.
It is, rather, chiefly a text that the faith community has “made.” For McClendon, while
he allows that Scripture was mediated through human authors, because of the claims the
Bible makes about itself and because of the “plain sense” that most of the Christian
tradition has attributed to the Bible, it must be the case that God is the ultimate narrator
of Scripture. Therefore, for McClendon, the Bible is God-speaking, and it is
authoritative for developing Christian doctrine. In other words, it is primarily a text
through which God can “find” us. At the same time, both Farley and McClendon seem to
“speak past each other” on this matter. Farley does not offer an analysis of what the
Bible says about itself, and he does not consider the possibility that the Bible could still
be authoritative even if the early church had a choice in whether or not to view it as such.
Similarly, McClendon does not offer an examination of how the early church viewed
Scripture and what possible impact this might have on whether or not it should be
considered sacred today.
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Furthermore, regardless of the fact that Farley and McClendon unfortunately
“speak past each other” on this issue, a corollary of their notions of the identity of
Scripture is where they place authority (or power) as the basis for developing Christian
doctrine. To borrow (but slightly reshape) Farley’s “house of authority” terminology,
Farley, as I have tried to show above in an earlier section of this chapter, locates this
authority chiefly in a “house” of the contemporary ecclesial community, while
McClendon clearly places it primarily in a “house” of the narrative (rather than the
atomistic truth claims) of Scripture-as-God-speaking. If Farley has a better grasp on the
identity of Scripture (as a collection of documents by only human authors), then that
would suggest that McClendon has treated as divine what is only human. However, if
McClendon has a better grasp on the identity of Scripture (as a collection of documents
with God as the ultimate author), then that would imply that Farley has sought to elevate
the voice of the contemporary ecclesial community over the voice of God. Much is
potentially at stake, therefore, in some of the differences between these two theologians.
Whether one sides more with the direction of Farley’s project or more with the
direction of McClendon’s, one must accept the challenges that come with these key
issues regarding how one understands the identity of Scripture and where one locates
authority (or power) as the basis for developing Christian doctrine. Given the respective
challenges, I would prefer to address the ones faced by those who would side more with
McClendon, not because they are any less difficult than the ones faced by those who
would side more with Farley, but because, in my view, there is much more ground to be
lost for the Christian faith, if McClendon’s perspective is wrong.
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